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2AN ENQUIRY INTO 
THE USE OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE MEASURES 
AS ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY INSTRUMENTS
ABSTRACT
The links and overlapping areas of concern between international 
trade policy and environment policy are many and varied, and a number 
of often competing interests at stake, each of which must be 
accommodated. Thus far, the debate on this issue has been 
characterised by a distinct lack of agreement on how to proceed, due to a 
lack of a common analytical framework; each of the main communities in 
the debate have sought to impose their agendas, priorities and analyses.
In light of this, the first purpose of this thesis is to determine 
whether or not there exists a legitimate role for international trade policy 
instruments in the conduct of environment policy.
This enquiry takes to be indisputable that the protection and 
maintenance of a healthy and stable environment must be accorded a 
higher priority than anything else, including the international trading 
system, to the extent that they are otherwise irreconcilable. Therefore, 
Chapter 2 examines the basis on which environmental standards should 
be established, and the extent to which they should be harmonised. To 
determine whether the use of trade policy instruments to achieve the 
necessary environmental standards should be considered legitimate, 
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 present and discuss three tests. It is argued that the
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use of trade-related environmental policy instruments (TREPI) should be 
considered to be legitimate only if it meets all three of these tests. This 
three-part legitimacy test describes a decision-making process, and is a 
useful way of organising and analysing policy problems concerning the 
relationship between international trade policy and environment policy. 
Chapter 6 considers two actual disputes and a potential case to show how 
this legitimacy test might work. This latter case involves the analysis of 
significant new evidence about the commercial impact of environmental 
and animal welfare regulations on UK agriculture.
By adopting the simple approach proposed in this thesis we seek to 
avoid the fundamental conflict caused by the epistemological and 
analytical assumptions and biases of each of the three communities: the 
international trade community, the environmental community, and the 
development community. Instead a more objective means of considering 
the complex of issues is proposed. The three tests are independent of 
any of the three communities and, in their simplicity, could be applied to a 
wide range of problems. Applied to the trade and environment issue, they 
demonstrate their objectivity by the conclusions they lead to: on some 
points they lend support to the interests of each of the three communities, 
while on others they do not.
To the extent that an appropriate role for trade policy instruments in 
the conduct of environment policy is found, the second purpose of this 
enquiry is to consider whether or not, and in what ways, the current 
international trading system frustrates or facilitates such a use. Chapter 7 
discusses, in three parts, the environmental effects of international trade 
liberalisation. In Chapter 8, the scope for possible amendments to the 
GATT system is considered by reference to the environmental provisions
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of the NAFTA. Finally, the use of domestic trade remedy laws 
environment policy instruments is considered in Chapter 9.
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8PREFACE
In 1991 Mr. Charles R. Carlisle, then the Deputy Director-General 
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), reportedly 
predicted that the relationship between international trade policy and 
environment policy would be "the number one trade issue of the 1990s"1. 
He argued that "trade and environment could be central to GATT's next 
Round, which could become, who knows, the 'Green Round'?"2 This view 
was all the more remarkable in as much as the relationship between 
international trade and the environment was almost entirely ignored in the 
Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations. The rise of this issue can be 
ascribed primarily to the interaction of two developments: continued 
economic globalisation, and the very rapid resurgence of environmental 
concerns during the latter half of the 1980s.
Under the heading of economic globalisation two issues are 
particularly prominent. First, the sheer scale of current economic activity
1 Financial Times, 12 April 1991, reporting a speech he gave before the Second World Industry 
Conference on Environmental Management, organised by the International Chamber of Commerce, in co­
operation with UNEP and UNCED, in Rotterdam, 10 April 1991.
2 See GATT Focus (86) Nov./Dec. 1991, p.6, reporting on a speech by Mr. Carlisle on 19 November 
1991 at the Malente Symposium IX, sponsored by the Drager Foundation, in Timmendorfer Strand,
Germany.
9
is unprecedented. Because of a rapidly rising population and a similarly 
rapid increase in the technological capacity to exploit nature, the use of 
natural resources and the concomitant production of waste is beginning to 
strain the ability of the natural ecosystems to cope and so is resulting in 
ever more ecological damage.
Second, globalisation has resulted in increased international 
competition for both productive capacity and markets. This is largely due 
to successive rounds of GATT negotiations which have resulted in 
historically very low tariffs throughout the industrialised world. At the 
same time, in many sectors, international and global arrangements of 
production and consumption have been developed3. In light of these 
processes, the attention of trade policy analysts has more recently begun 
to refocus away from traditional border restrictions and toward differences 
in internal political-economic constitutions and behaviour. Amongst these 
hitherto largely domestic issues is much of the environmental policy that 
has been developed to date.
Corresponding developments have occurred with respect to 
environment concerns. During most of the past 30 years or so, since 
environmental issues began to rise to public prominence, attention has 
largely been focused on local or regional problems. Many of these local 
and regional issues remain no less urgent today. Added to them, 
however, is a more recent recognition of international ecological 
interdependency and the existence of a number of global environmental 
problems. In short, environmental issues have historically been of a 
largely domestic nature but increasingly include international and global
3 Dicken (1992) provides an excellent discussion of these developments.
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concerns. International trade policy, on the other hand, has historically 
been mainly concerned with border measures which affect the 
international exchange of goods, but has recently also become concerned 
with domestic issues.
From this confluence of policy interests arises a complex of 
questions about the relations between international trade and the 
environment. Given that the authorities responsible for trade and 
environment policies are territorially bounded, this relationship is not 
limited to the interaction between the international trading system and the 
environment, but extends also to the interactions amongst and between 
the commercial and environmental policies of the various jurisdictions. 
Therefore we will be interested in this enquiry in elucidating whether there 
is an appropriate role for trade and trade policy in the conduct of 
environment policy, and what that role might be.
The use of trade restrictions in support of environment policy is not 
new. There is a long tradition of quarantine to contain the spread of 
contagious diseases, and for much of this century sanitary and 
phytosanitary regulations have included restrictions on the importation of 
flora and fauna. Thus there is an acknowledged right, which overrides 
commercial considerations, for a population to protect itself from coming 
into contact with things which have been found to be unhealthy or 
environmentally damaging. But the interaction of environment policy and 
international trade relations is much more complicated than that.
What happens if a jurisdiction wishes to restrict the importation of a 
product which, although perfectly safe in itself, is produced by what is 
seen to be an environmentally damaging method? This they may wish to 
do for any of a number of reasons. They may themselves feel some of
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the environmental effects of the production process; for example, 
transborder acid rain emissions. It may be the case that the production 
process adversely affects some aspect of the global commons, or even 
only the environment at the point of production, and the importer 
disapproves of that activity. There are, after all, precedents for the use of 
trade restrictions as sanctions against behaviour which one or more of the 
international community disapprove4.
Alternately, it may be felt that failure to implement particular 
environmental measures may convey a competitive advantage, and as 
such are a form of unfair trade behaviour. But it must be remembered 
that environmental measures should be designed for particular 
environmental problems, and that environmental differences, including 
geographical and climatic differences, are an important part of the theory 
of comparative advantage on which the international trading system is 
ostensibly founded.
Similarly, there are a variety of reasons why export restrictions may 
be implemented to give effect to an environmental policy. Export 
restrictions may be an important part of efforts to conserve a natural 
resource, or necessary to control the dissemination of environmentally 
dangerous goods such as toxic waste. To others, however, such 
restrictions may be seen as efforts to support local processors, either by 
curtailing the supply of inputs to foreign competing processors or by way 
of the lower domestic input prices which can result from the artificially 
increased domestic input supply.
Environmental regulation can also increase the operating costs of 
business. For this reason there is sometimes resistance to environmental
4 Chamovitz (1991) provides a useful account of the recent history of trade restrictions in the
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measures because of fears of being competitively disadvantaged vis-a-vis 
those not subject to such regulation. This may then lead to calls for 
import restrictions on competing products or for government assistance 
with the cost of complying with these regulations. But to others this may 
be seen as unfair, anti-competitive and/or protectionist behaviour resulting 
in escalating trade friction.
A corollary concern is that such environmental regulatory 
differences might induce prospective investors to site their investments in 
the least regulated jurisdictions -- the pollution havens. This, it may be 
argued, is both bad economic policy and bad environmental policy. It is 
bad economic policy because it drives away from those with high 
environmental standards many potential investments, and the jobs, skills 
and incomes associated with them. It is also bad environmental policy 
because it tends to reward with investments the jurisdictions that have the 
worst environmental regimes.
Clearly it will be important to ascertain if and when any such 
environmental regulatory differentials are necessary or desirable and 
when they are not. More generally, we will need to disentangle legitimate 
environmental motives from protectionist or otherwise economically- 
rooted motives. This is necessary to avoid the implementation of any 
spurious, unnecessary or inappropriate environmental measures which 
may tend to impair the functioning of the international trading system, as 
well as to minimise the possibility of needed environmental measures 
being successfully resisted.
By discussing this complex of questions it will be possible to 
elucidate means by which policies might be better harmonised in the
conduct of environmental policy.
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development of environmentally sustainable international trade policy. 
However, to be effective this requires amongst other things that all of the 
principal interests be accommodated in the necessary bargains. As a 
result of global interdependencies both in the economic system, as well as 
in the natural environment, the principal interests which must be 
accommodated necessarily include Third World development concerns in 
addition to the concerns of trade and the environment as such.
While problems arising from the relationship between international 
trade relations and environment policy have risen rapidly on the 
international policy agenda since 1990, they are not new: analyses of 
them can be traced to the early 1970s.
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Chapter 1 
A Review of the Debate
It will be useful at this point to look at the development of the 
debate regarding the relationship between international trade and the 
environment. By doing so we will elucidate the problem that this thesis 
seeks to address. We will look first at the two main phases of interest in 
this issue, and then look at the three key communities of interest that 
emerged during the second phase. From this, it will be shown that these 
communities approach the problem from radically different world views.
As a result, while all to varying degrees are now beginning to recognise 
the need for a mutually satisfactory conciliation, the search for a resolution 
to the debate is impaired by their lack of a common analytical framework. 
This thesis contributes to the development of such an analytical 
framework by articulating neutral criteria for evaluating when it would be 
legitimate to use trade measures as environmental policy instruments.
The First Phase: Interest in the relationship between 
international trade and the environment can be traced at least to July 
1971, and a report written by the GATT Secretariat for the 1972 
Stockholm Conference. This report looked mainly at the implications 
of increased environmental regulation for industrialised countries and
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their international competitiveness. Shortly after this, in November 
1971 the GATT established a committee under the chairmanship of 
Ambassador Hidetoshi Ukawa of Japan, called “The Working Group 
on Environmental Measures and International Trade”, to consider the 
issue further, but the committee never met until 1991, nearly 20 years 
later!
As Ugelow (1982) and Dean (1991) have shown, however, 
private research on aspects of the trade-environment relationship 
continued throughout the 1970s, long before the environment and 
development communities took an interest. Accordingly, Western 
trade analysts carried out most of this research. Mainly they 
examined the same three issues first discussed in the GATT report: 
the effect of environmental regulation on comparative advantage, the 
possible loss of international competitiveness, and the effect on 
decisions concerning the location of foreign direct investment. 
Interestingly, relatively little consideration was given to possible policy 
responses to any commercial losses which might be seen to arise 
from environmental regulation.
The analytical methodologies employed by the various authors 
varied, thus making direct comparisons difficult. Even so, a number of 
general conclusions were common: that environmental regulation had 
little effect on competitiveness, and that it was at best a minor factor in 
investment location decisions. Of more interest to this thesis, a further 
point of commonality is that they were almost exclusively analyses 
employing the tools and preconceptions of professional Western 
economists. Thus, Magee and Ford (1972), Walter (1973),
Richardson (1976) and Walter (1982), for example, all employed 
traditional microeconomic analytical tools, including linear
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programming, in their research. Similarly, OECD (1978) extended the 
analytical toolbox somewhat by demonstrating the usefulness of 
macroeconomic analysis.
It may come as little surprise, then, given the absence of 
influence by the environmental and development communities, that 
most official and academic research at that time provided defences 
against the view that international trade rules may need to 
accommodate environmental objectives. As Dean (1991) 
summarised, “it is doubtful that [stringent environmental regulations] 
would yield a significant impact on trade patterns...there is no role 
here for countervailing duties or an international environmental 
standard...subsidies are likely to be guises for trade barriers, and 
should in general not be accommodated... [and] trade barriers will be, 
at best, a second-best means of reducing environmental damage.”
The end of this first phase of research, it may be suggested, 
can be dated to the publication of Rubin and Graham (1982). This 
study, published under the auspices of The American Society of 
International Law, and drawing on the earlier work of economists and 
trade analysts, was the first major work on the trade and environment 
conducted mainly by lawyers. Accordingly, it can be seen as adding a 
new analytical dimension to the debate. It concluded that “current 
efforts to reduce unnecessary friction between trade and environment 
policies should concentrate upon procedural issues: the fairness of 
consumption pollution standards applied to imports; methods of 
financing the additional costs of pollution control; procedures for 
developing trade and environmental policies internationally and within 
nations; and development of more reliable information with respect to 
the economic effects of pollution control. These are the areas in which
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some tangible results have been achieved already, and in which 
progress is possible in the near term” (p. 163).
As already noted, during this first phase of the debate, 
environmental and development interests paid these issues little 
attention. As a result much of the research was little noticed and so 
relatively uncontentious. No doubt the global economic slowdown 
during the first half of the 1980s contributed to a decline in interest in 
these issues and to a shift in economic research priorities. A few 
papers, such as Siebert (1985) and Pasurka (1985), were published, 
but it was not really until after the Brundtland Report in 1987, and with 
the negotiations on the NAFTA and Uruguay Round Agreements, that 
the relationship between trade and the environment began again to 
attract the attention of analysts.
The Second Phase: At the request of the Swedish delegation, 
at the beginning of 1989 the OECD Trade Committee began a 
systematic investigation of the relationship between trade and the 
environment. Regrettably, most of the discussion papers produced 
during this investigation remain unpublished. The resurrection in 1991 
of the 1971 GATT Working Group on Environmental Measures and 
International Trade was at the request of the Nordic countries, but 
much of its work was also conducted largely in secret. Most other 
official organisations, including the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD)5, did not take up this issue in a 
systematic way until a few years later, after the Rio conference in 
1992.
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This second phase of research into the trade-environment 
relationship continued the analysis of the three primary issues of the 
1970s -- the effect of environmental regulation on comparative 
advantage, on competitiveness, and on investment decisions. 
Robinson (1988), for example, updated and reconfirmed the 
conclusions of Walter (1973). Similarly, Tobey (1990) used a 
Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek model to evaluate the effect of environmental 
compliance costs on patterns of trade. He found no evidence to 
support the view that strict environmental regulation affects trade 
patterns.
In addition to these issues, the second phase has seen a 
number of other aspects emphasised. These include: 1) a greater 
interest in possible policy responses to environmental regulation which 
impairs competitiveness, 2) transnational pollution, 3) hazardous 
substances and endangered species, 4) the relationship between the 
WTO agreements and the Multilateral Environmental Agreements 
(MEAs), and 5) production and process methods (PPMs).
Since 1993, in the aftermath of the United Nations Conference 
on Environment and Development (UNCED), there has been a 
significant increase in institutional work on aspects of the interactions 
between international trade policy and environment policy. For 
example, the International Institute for Sustainable Development, in 
Winnipeg, Canada, is a direct offshoot of the UNCED and has 
developed an extensive research programme on the trade- 
environment issue. Similarly, the Centre for Development and the 
Environment, at the University of Oslo in Norway, is undertaking a
5 Although UNCTAD did develop a number of excellent papers on this issue in preparation for the
Rio conference, formally known as the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
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major new research programme on environment, trade and 
industrialisation. Within North America, the Commission for 
Environmental Co-operation has been established under the North 
American Free-Trade Agreement (NAFTA) to consider all matters 
regarding the interaction of trade and the environment within that 
region. Research of internet sites suggests that since 1993 dozens of 
similar groups and organisations, large and small, have arisen 
throughout the world to examine aspects of the trade-environment 
issue. Amongst these is the Global Environment and Trade Study 
(GETS), directed by Steve Charnovitz. Established in 1995, this was 
an internet-based international conference for the international 
exchange and discussion of information, ideas and documents on 
issues regarding international trade, environmental protection, the use 
of natural resources, and sustainable development6.
Of greater importance to this thesis, the second phase has 
differed from the first by the very prominent participation of analysts 
sympathetic to the priorities of environmentalists, in addition to those 
of the free trade and business communities. This was the case, for 
example, in North America during the negotiation and implementation 
of the Canada-US Free-Trade Agreement in 1988 (CUSTA), the North 
America Free-Trade Agreement in 1992 (NAFTA), and the Uruguay 
Round GATT (1994). These new contributors7 to the debate achieved 
two main objectives: the explicit provision of environmental concerns 
in the NAFTA, including substantive agreements to protect the
UNCED in 1992.
6
Subsequently the name was changed to Bridges Weekly Trade Digest, and it is now published by the 
International Centre for Trade and Development.
7 These include Steven Shrybman of the Canadian Environmental Law Association, Charles Arden-
Clarke of the World Wildlife Fund for Nature, Mark Ritchie of the Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy, 
and Steve Charnovitz, amongst many others.
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environment from possible deleterious effects which may arise as a 
result of the NAFTA; and they were instrumental in getting the matter 
firmly back on the international trade policy agenda.
As we have already seen, also of great importance in the recent 
trade-environment research has been that the interests of the developing 
world have now become inextricably intertwined in the trade-environment 
relationship. This has occurred for two main reasons. First, the UNCED 
in 1992 raised the prominence of the relationship between development 
and the environment. Second, because developing countries constitute 
the majority of members in the WTO, the demands of the industrialised 
countries to have the trade-environment issue included on the new 
international trade policy agenda required the agreement of the 
developing country members who, in turn, demanded full accommodation 
of their concerns in any discussion of the relationship between 
international trade and the environment.
Accordingly, the second phase has seen the debate about the 
relationship between international trade and the environment develop 
into one between three communities: international trade liberals, 
environmentalists and developmentalists.
While both official and unofficial research on this topic grew 
quickly during the first few years of the 1990s, it was not until 1994 
with the publication of “Greening the GATT” by Daniel C. Esty that a 
unified, systematic treatment was undertaken of the whole complex of 
issues that constitute the relationship between international trade and 
the environment. Subsequently, research into this topic has mainly 
been kept to paper-length treatments of specific aspects of the 
debate. Low (1992) and Anderson and Blackhurst (1992) provide very
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useful edited compendia of research on, and analysis of, aspects of 
the trade-environment issue. But since Esty (1994), only Uimonen 
and Whalley (1997) have so far published a work that attempts to 
bring the whole issue within a single, coherent framework of analysis.
This lack of substantiated proposals for unified, broad ranging 
analytical frameworks has impaired progress in the debate.
It will be shown that the central problem in reconciling these 
interests is in the profound clash of the cultures and world views held by 
each of them. This leads to each community developing radically differing 
priorities for both the objectives and the costs of achieving those 
objectives, as well as a different evaluation of the balance of risks. Slow 
progress in resolving the debate is causing all three communities to begin 
to realise that ‘winning the intellectual battle’ is not possible and they need 
to consider and propose new ways forward.
It would be mistaken to view these communities as internally 
homogeneous or uniform. Advocacy of a liberal international trading 
system is widely tempered by the special arrangements in place for such 
groups as agriculture, steel, semiconductors, automobiles, defence- 
related equipment, textiles, and so on (see also Shutt, 1985). Similarly the 
range of views proffered by environmental interests is quite vast, 
extending from a "deep green" primitivist autarky on the one hand to a full 
acceptance of the status quo and minimally disruptive incrementalism on 
the other. Likewise the concerns and policies of the less developed 
countries (LDCs) are no more uniform than are the LDCs themselves8.
8 See, for example, Finlayson, J, 1990, where it is argued that "growing differentiation among the
states comprising the South, coupled with other recent trends in international relations, are transforming the 
ways in which many developing countries define their interests and participate in international regimes and 
institutions. A principal consequence of these developments will be the continued fragmentation and 
unravelling of the developing country coalition that traditionally has played a critical role in pressing for
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The international trade community is largely composed of 
economists and business people who analyse the issue with the tools and 
analytical preconceptions of liberal, neo-classical economics. They 
emphasise the benefits of, and are concerned to protect the international 
trading system that they see as being under threat. Institutionally the 
WTO, the OECD, the International Chamber of Commerce, and similar 
groups give such interests expression. Broadly, these are the “big 
business” interests that are concerned with the maintenance and further 
development of the open multilateral trading system as it has developed 
over the post-war period.
As we saw, analysts from the international trade community 
dominated the first phase of this debate. Accordingly, the history of this 
community during the second phase has been one of coming to terms 
with, and adapting to the interests and ideas of the environment and 
development communities.
In April 1991 the US Council for International Business articulated 
their view of the appropriate principles that should inform the trade and 
environment debate. They argued that “economic growth is necessary to 
improve general social welfare and to provide the conditions and 
resources to enhance environmental protection. Open trade is 
indispensable to economic growth and therefore a necessary element for 
enhanced environmental protection. In fact, economic growth, open trade 
and environmental protection are complementary objectives that are 
compatible.” Accordingly, “the GATT role should remain focused on
fundamental changes in the principles, rules and institutional arrangements characterising international trade
regimes. The 'bloc' approach to global trade negotiations long favoured by the Third World is thus
increasingly outmoded, and is likely to be left behind altogether in the 1990s" pp.3-4 .
( )
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preventing national implementation of environmental policies in a way that 
creates economic distortions” (Inside US Trade, April 5, 1991).
A leader in The Economist (January 26, 1991) put the concerns of 
the business community in rather more blunt and derisory terms. 
According to this leader, “deep green environmentalists are nervous of 
free trade. They see in it a threat to the right of each country to protect 
viridian quirks; quaint old farming practices, bottle-recycling schemes that 
depend on local breweries or milkmen. “The leader concluded that 
“greenery will become one more excuse to foul up trade.”
Anderson and Blackhurst (1992) provided a more serious analysis 
of the relationship between trade and environmental policies. This edited 
compendium of papers addressed the “concern that environmental issues 
are creating indirect as well as direct opportunities to erect new barriers to 
trade.” (p. 6). Employing the traditional tools of professional Western 
economists, the common conclusion of the book’s contributors “is that 
trade policies are not the best instruments to use in dealing with 
environmental problems. This follows from the fact that trade perse is not 
a direct cause of environmental problems” (p. 20). Indeed, as Sorsa 
(1992) concludes “overall, it would be reasonable to argue that the GATT 
is more in need of protection from poorly reasoned demands for reform 
based on environmental arguments, than the environment is from the 
rules of the international trading system.” (p. 12).
Vogel (1995) addressed the concern of environmentalists that free 
trade undermined environmental protection head on. “I demonstrate how 
[trade liberalisation] can, and frequently has, strengthened [national 
environmental regulation]. Rather than weakening the power of 
nongovernmental organisations in ‘greener’ nations, trade liberalisation
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and agreements to promote it can enhance the ability of NGOs to 
strengthen the regulatory standards of their nation’s trading partners. In 
fact, increased economic interdependence has been associated with 
stronger, not weaker, consumer and environmental regulations. By 
contrast, ‘ecoprotectionism’ threatens both free trade and, ironically, the 
improvement of environmental quality and consumer protection as 
well."(p. x)
In their submission to the UK Parliamentary Inquiry into World 
Trade and the Environment in 1996, Imperial Chemical Industries 
emphasised their concerns about the scope for protectionism in 
environmental regulation. “Linking trade to the environment is ‘manna 
from heaven’ for those wishing to take a protectionist stance against 
trade.”
Over the past two years or so, a shift in approach and emphasis 
can be detected. “In the longer term we believe that both the debate over 
trade and environment policies and the growing number of clashes 
between them will force consideration of a more explicit linkage than 
currently exists between the two policy subsystems. [However, this] is 
likely to be difficult to achieve because the objectives that the two 
subsystems set for themselves are so different and the connections 
between trade policies and environmental resources are complex.” 
(Uimonen and Whalley, 1997, p. 145). While identifying this fundamental 
problem, they do not proffer a way forward.
Further progress in moving away from the conflictual nature of the 
debate can be seen in the European Commission’s Strategy Paper on 
Trade and Environment in the New WTO Round (23 February 1999). 
“Specific problems of perception arise at the trade and environment
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interface due to differing points of view on the relationship between trade 
and environment.” As a result a mutually satisfactory outcome can be 
achieved only by ’’overcoming misperceptions and clarifying the 
relationship between WTO rules and environment policies”. However, as 
the paper admits, “solving ...these problems will not be easy”.
UNICE, the European federation of employers, has also adopted a 
rather more forward-looking and conciliatory position recently. It has 
argued that “European industry is committed to the principle of 
sustainable development [and the WTO] is expected to incorporate 
environmental aspects in its decisions, following the principle of 
sustainable development.” To help do this, UNICE suggest an 
institutional way forward. They argue that “only if we have similar 
organisations and structures will the pressure on the WTO ease and will 
the WTO not be held responsible for subjects for which it has no mandate 
whatsoever.” (UNICE, 1999). This follows the call in Ruggiero (1998) for 
an appropriate institutional arrangement for environmental concerns. He 
emphasised “the need to strengthen existing bridges between trade and 
environmental policies -  a task that would be immeasurably easier if we 
could also create a house for the environment to help focus and co­
ordinate our efforts.”
As we shall see, this institutional solution was first proposed by the 
environment community; a demonstration of their growing influence on the 
course of the debate. Aside from the resistance of the developing 
countries to this approach, an institutional solution is unlikely to bring 
about agreement among the interests on its own. As Sylvia Ostry has 
suggested, “there are enormous difficulties in formulating operational 
policies to deal with trade, environment and development. The trading 
system operates on the notion of diffused reciprocity...this is alien to
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environmental issues, which are global-commons concerns. If something 
is not worked out, the legitimacy of the WTO is at stake.” She argued 
“there are two possible routes: one, which she cautioned against, is the 
litigious route, wherein governments continually seek legal redress for 
their disputes. The other is a political route involving negotiations.” (USD, 
1999). Currently, the lack of progress between the three communities 
means WTO dispute settlement panels, such as “Tuna/Dolphin”, 
“Reformulated Gasoline”, and “Shrimp/Turtle”, enjoy enhanced 
importance in carrying forward the debate. The establishment of a 
common analytical framework would facilitate a negotiated solution.
While the analysis and proposals of the international trade 
community regarding the trade and environment debate appear to be 
adapting to new ideas, a number of “core beliefs” remain. The US 
National Association of Manufacturers, for example, continue to argue 
strongly “that multilateral trade rules must not allow the use of unilateral 
trade measures or sanctions for environmental purposes”, (USD, 1999).
In contrast, environmentalists see the international trading system 
at best as merely a tool for advancing material well-being. Of more 
fundamental concern to them are the threats they perceive are imperilling 
the environment. Indeed, often they will view liberal economics and the 
international trade system as root causes of the environmental 
degradation that has occurred this century. Given these fears, the 
environmental community have sought to influence the development of 
new international trade rules and considered their involvement in the 
negotiations as imperative. Such interests are expressed by non­
governmental organisations like Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth, and 
the World Wildlife Fund, as well as by the official national and international 
environmental organisations, departments, and agencies.
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Within the context of the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement, 
Shrybman (1988) argued that “the enormity of the trade deal’s 
environmental implications is truly breathtaking,...[and that] the trade 
agreement reveals that it has profound and disastrous implications for the 
Canadian environment, and may fundamentally undermine the principles 
of environmental protection and sustainable resource management.” 
Similarly, Arden-Clarke (1991) suggested that “the provisions of the GATT 
constitute potentially serious barriers to the implementation of 
environmental protection and sustainable use of natural resources.” 
Moreover, “the wide-ranging and more enforceable GATT set to emerge 
from the Uruguay Round negotiations could create even more conflicts 
with standards, legislation, and international agreements currently being 
formulated to conserve the environment and natural resources.”
These fears were echoed by Verbruggen (1990): “The conflict 
between trade and environmental policies is that the policy instruments 
being introduced under the heading of environmental policies are the 
same as those being eliminated in the framework of international trade 
negotiations... From the point of view of trade rules, all these 
environmental regulations and financial incentives can and are in fact 
seen as non-tariff barriers to trade.” (p. 3).
In a similar vein, Ritchie (1990) concluded “the GATT talks will set 
the international economic agenda, rules, and relationships far into the 
next century. They can be used to vastly improve the situation, or they 
can be a disaster. The environmental community must act now, or face 
the possibility that all the important gains we have made in environmental 
protection and regulation will be overturned in the future by GATT acting 
as a global supreme court.” (p. 12).
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Mead (1992) summarised this view of the GATT as “a kind of free- 
trade World Government...all Bottom Line: a global corporate utopia in 
which local citizens are toothless, workers’ unions are tame or broken, 
environmentalists and consumer advocates outflanked...regulations of all 
kinds will be lax: factories will be dangerous and their waste will be 
toxic...”.
Unfortunately, throughout the 1990s, despite some moderation in 
the approach of the international trade community, such views changed 
little. Many environmentalists still see the international trade regime as a 
threat to proper environmental management, and consequently call for 
greater participation in the formation of trade rules by environmental 
groups. Shrybman (1999), for example, argued that “the WTO is a 
constitution for corporations. Its rules take little or no account of people or 
the environment.” He went on to explain “why the WTO is such a threat.”
Attempts by the environmental community to get environmental 
considerations explicitly included in the Uruguay Round of GATT 
negotiations were not successful. However, the Preamble to the 
Uruguay Round Agreements declares the importance of members 
balancing the need to raise standards of living, ensure “full 
employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real income 
and effective demand, and expanding the production of goods and 
services,” to balance that against “allowing for the optimal use of the 
world’s resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable 
development, seeking both to protect and preserve the environment 
and to enhance the means for doing so”. Given the reluctance of the 
developing countries to have environmental issues considered at all 
by the WTO, this reference in the Preamble concludes by stating that
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the protection and preservation of the environment should only be 
undertaken “in a manner consistent with their respective needs and 
concerns at different levels of development.”
Further commitments can be found in other parts of the 
Uruguay Round Agreements. Whether they will prove to be effective 
or not remains to be determined. The General Agreement on Trade 
in Services (GATS) contains a provision that is identical to the Article 
XX (b) exemption in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT). Both the new Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 
(TBT) and Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) 
encompass regulations, standards and measures for the protection of 
the environment. The Agreement on Trade Related Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement specifically excludes the 
patentability of inventions that could “seriously prejudice” the 
environment. The revised Agreement of subsidies lists as non- 
actionable subsidies to promote the adaptation of existing facilities to 
new environmental requirements. The Preamble to the Agreement on 
Agriculture reiterates the commitment to reform agriculture in a 
manner that protects the environment, and subsidies under certain 
environment programmes are exempt from commitments to reduce 
overall support. Finally, two Ministerial Decisions were taken, on 
Trade and Environment and on Trade in Services and Environment, 
instructing the new Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE) to 
undertake further research.
The CTE was established within the newly formed World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) with an extensive work programme. Its broad 
mandate is to identify the relationship between trade measures and 
environmental measures in order to promote sustainable
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development, and to make appropriate recommendations on whether 
any modifications of the provisions of the multilateral trading system 
are required. The CTE was also given a detailed, ambitious work 
programme covering most of the key aspects describing the current 
situation.
The CTE are required to address:
• The relationship between the WTO rules and trade measures for 
environmental purposes, including in MEAs,
• The relationship between environmental policies relevant to trade 
and environmental measures with significant trade effects and the 
WTO rules,
• The relationship between the WTO rules and environmental 
charges and taxes, and with environmental product standards,
• The transparency of trade measures for environmental purposes,
• Dispute settlement in the WTO and in Multilateral Environment 
Agreements (MEAs),
• The effect of environmental measures on market access, and
• The issue of exports of domestically prohibited goods.
In a new spirit of openness, in September 1995 the WTO began 
to publish some of the papers of this Committee on the internet. The 
environmental and development communities did not accept this as 
sufficient, however. Documents were almost always released only 
long after the event, and they lacked much detailed analysis. They 
conveyed little beyond the lack of progress in its consideration of the 
issues under its work programme. According to the WWF, “since the 
flurry of discussions and negotiations ahead of the First WTO 
Ministerial in Singapore in 1996, which resulted in a ‘status quo’ report
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from the CTE, this committee has failed to make any detectable 
progress on WTO reform.” (WWF, 1999).
More recently meetings and symposia on trade, environment 
and development have been held by the WTO, in March 1997, March 
1998 and March 1999, with a view to broadening and deepening a 
constructive dialogue between the three communities of interest on 
the relationship between international trade, environment policies and 
sustainable development. In January 1999 the European Commission 
also held a formal consultation with the environment and development 
communities on the subject of trade and the environment.
While these symposia and consultations have been well 
attended and may have led to greater mutual understanding, the lack 
of tangible progress is beginning to concern a number of participants, 
(WTO Focus, March 1999). The WWF, for example, in their 
comments to the 1999 High Level Symposium on Trade and 
Environmnent expressed their “deep concern” about the apparent “low 
or zero commitment to action on the environment by WTO members”, 
(WWF, 1999). On the same occasion, Greenpeace complained of a 
“lack of transparency and adequate consultation with all stakeholders”.
Overall, then, efforts to reconcile the environmental and 
international trade communities has been slow. The radically differing 
priorities and analyses within the three communities has impaired 
progress.
Esty (1994) recognised that “some work has been done to link 
trade and environmental policymaking, [but] serious confusion and 
misunderstandings remain.” He argued that ”the trade and environment
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debate can...be seen as a clash of paradigms: the environmentalists’ law- 
based worldview versus the trade community’s economic perspective.”
(p. 37). Given this analysis of the problem, Esty’s proposed solution is 
somewhat surprising. In his view, “the optimal approach to making trade 
and environmental policies work to mutual advantage is...the 
establishment of a Global Environmental Organisation.” As we saw 
earlier, this proposal has subsequently been adopted by some key 
players from the international trade community. To help find a common, 
integrated way forward, the need for the involvement of environmental 
groups in international trade policy making was explained by Mabey 
(1998): “I would say it was because [of] a fundamental clash between two 
different world views. He went on to argue for the need to counter the 
“economic vision” with a vision of sustainable development and human 
rights.”
The environmental community has also influenced the course of 
the debate by the introduction of environmental reviews of trade 
agreements. In October 1992 the Canadian government published an 
environmental review of the recently concluded NAFTA, the first time a 
trade agreement had undergone an environmental review.
The review examined the “likely consequences of the 
environmental provisions of the Agreement...the impact of the NAFTA on 
Canada’s air, water, land and natural resources...the possibility of 
industry and investment leaving Canada for Mexico for environmental 
considerations...[and] future action on environmental co-operation.” It 
concluded that it was “unlikely that the NAFTA will have a significant 
impact on the environment in Canada....” The review concluded that, as 
a result of the NAFTA, “future economic development will be implemented 
with greater environmental awareness. It will be subjected to increased
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environmental monitoring and enforcement. In turn, additional resources 
that would flow from increased economic activity should enhance efforts 
to address environmental concerns in North America.”
As the Canadian government point out, the review differed from an 
assessment, because “ a policy such as a free trade agreement cannot be 
subjected to the same type of quantitative analysis associated with the 
assessment of a project such as construction of a dam, a mine or a 
factory. In fact, the potential environmental impacts of certain policies can 
be neither appraised nor fully anticipated in advance. The environmental 
effects of the NAFTA will depend on the trade action and investment 
decisions taken as a result of the Agreement.”
As novel as the Canadian environmental review may have been, it 
was insufficient in the view of the environmental community. In April 1998 
WWF International launched a project on the environmental assessment 
of trade liberalisation agreements. "The project focuses on the Uruguay 
Round Agreements and the extension of negotiations implied by the ‘built- 
in agenda’ and the possible Millennium Round. The purpose is to 
contribute to a better understanding of the trade-environment relationship 
by analysing the broad developmental, social and ecological implications 
of trade, their interlinkages, and to underline the need and develop the 
methodology for environmental and social assessments of trade 
liberalisation from the outset of negotiations.”
The WWF have adopted methodologies building upon the OECD 
1993 Procedural Guidelines on Trade and Environment. On the basis of 
these principles, they propose five main points should underlay the 
environmental assessment. The assessment should “be conceived as a 
dynamic and on-going process...initiated early in the policy cycle,...
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promote ‘win-wirT situations and strategies,...consist in promoting a 
transparent, open and public debate at different stages and levels of the 
negotiation process,...be based on empirical evidence, [and]...involve an 
assessment of social effects.”
Even with these far-reaching proposals being based on OECD 
procedural guidelines, they are unlikely to be taken up by governments in 
the near future. They may, however, have provided an impetus to the 
European Commission committing itself to the more limited Canadian 
“review” approach, and study “the likely impact on sustainable 
development of a Round based on the proposed Millennium Round 
agenda.” The US have also pledged to conduct an environmental review 
of the next round of multilateral trade negotiations, (USD, 1999).
As with the trade community, in the environmental community there 
is a growing, if still somewhat ill-defined view that a mutually satisfactory 
resolution of the trade and environment debate will only come about by 
working together, and by identifying and building a common 
understanding of the issues. This may entail and be advanced by some 
new institutional arrangements as proposed by Esty, the UNICE, Ruggiero 
and others, as well as by environmental reviews and assessments of 
trade agreements. Ultimately, however, a common, unified analysis, 
underpinned by common principles will be essential.
The development community has yet a different world view. It 
emphasises the perceived structural inequalities in the world economy 
and its institutions, and views with suspicion attempts by 
environmentalists to constrain their efforts to improve their economic well­
being. Sometimes, for them, suggestions that environmental priorities 
should take precedence over development priorities are seen as a new
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form of imperialism, (see, for example, Shahin, 1998). The concerns of 
the development community are those given voice by such official groups 
and organisations as the United Nations, especially UNCTAD, and the 
Group of 77, together with a large number of non-governmental 
organisations such as the Environment and Development Resource 
Centre and the International Institute for Environment and Development.
Flanders (1990) provided an early statement of the developing 
country analysis of the trade and environment debate. She argued that 
“Trade policies of the North have sought to increase prosperity through 
freer trade. Free trade, however, has contributed to the dependency of 
less-developed countries and the adoption of environmentally 
inappropriate policies. [Accordingly], essential to the debate are the views 
and needs of the Third World which must be made an integral part of the 
dialogue in the process towards ecologically sustainable trading 
systems...It is futile to attempt to deal with environmental problems much 
less those related to international trade, without a broader perspective 
that encompasses the factors underlying growth, inequality and poverty.” 
(P- 2).
This analysis was developed further in UNCTAD (1991). “The 
interactions between trade and the environment are manifold and 
complex, and they vary greatly among countries. Differences in the 
overall level of economic development, the economic structure, the size of 
the domestic market, the dependence on primary production and foreign 
exchange all have different implications for the domestic environments in 
developing countries. Also, there are large differences among countries 
and regions in the Third World with regard to climatic conditions, the stock 
and quality of renewable and non-renewable resources, population 
densities and existing levels of pollution and natural resource exploitation.
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Therefore, it is clear that any broad assessment of the interaction 
between trade and environment in the Third world has quite different 
implications for individual countries, (p. 4). From this perspective came 
the constant insistence of Third World countries that standards of 
environmental protection must be developed and enforced in a manner 
“consistent with the countries’ needs and concerns at different levels of 
economic development.”
A further theme of the developm ental analysis is the importance 
of “positive measures” in the enforcement of international environmental 
agreements and domestic measures with international trade effects. 
Positive measures are designed to facilitate environmental progress while 
at the same time assisting economic development by improving access to 
and transfer of technology, capacity building and access to finance. As 
explained by the Indian delegation to the 1999 WTO High Level 
Symposium on Trade and Environment, “poverty is the biggest 
environmental problem facing the world.”
Generally, throughout the 1990s, efforts to introduce environmental 
exceptions within the international trade rules have been faced with 
consistently strong opposition by developing countries. Their fear is of 
“eco-imperialism”. According to the Malaysian Prime Minister, “It is wrong 
that we [the South] should be made scapegoats for the sins of the North. 
The North is still subjecting us to imperial pressures”. (Financial Times,
30 April, 1992, p. 4). Likewise: “To them, it is the developed countries 
who have industrialised and grown over the past two hundred years, and 
who have caused today’s environmental problems. Developing countries 
see themselves as being asked to restrict their trade, thereby truncating 
their growth and development, as the mechanism to deal with a 
developed-country-created problem, and one which is being given higher
37
priority by high-income countries than poverty alleviation and growth in 
low-income countries.” (Uimonen and Whalley, 1997, p.67).
More importantly, however, for the purposes of this thesis, is the 
shift in the views of the three communities on the relative priorities 
between international trade and environmental concerns; from concerns 
about potential conflict, towards seeking points of agreement and 
conciliation. Like in the free trade community and in the environmental 
community, important indicators are becoming apparent that the 
development community too is looking for areas of common ground and 
analytical approach.
Shahin (1998) reports that “Rubens Ricupero, the Secretary 
General of UNCTAD, perceives this complex and cumbersome 
relationship, as two poles in a dialectical thesis, where the resulting 
synthesis should conciliate the two ends. Different from what many would 
like to conceive that the trade and the environment aspects are but two 
sides of the same coin, Ricupero stresses that linking trade to 
environment does not come as something natural. It necessitates 
tremendous sacrifices to reconcile these two ends, where environment 
should not be treated as a late consideration or an afterthought, because 
this will only render things more difficult. One should think of how to 
integrate environment in the decision-making process from the very 
beginning rather than attempting to rectify wrong-doing at the end by 
having recourse to sanctions and trade embargo.” Having said that, he 
reiterated that “technology, financing, market access, knowledge and 
expertise are essential for the preservation and protection of the 
environment.”
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Thus a slight shift in emphasis can be detected in all three 
communities away from ideological confrontation. Reflecting this, in 
addition to Ricupero, a more conciliatory, inclusive approach now appears 
to be gaining favour at the highest levels of international trade policy 
making.
Renato Ruggiero, as Director General of the WTO, sees the way 
forward in a conciliation of interest, as opposed to intellectual 
confrontation. He argued that “if we want to succeed...both the trade 
community and the environmental community...have to define the real 
challenges we face; and not create false obstacles. To pretend that 
environmental concerns stand in the way of free trade is to create false 
obstacles. To pretend that free trade stands in the way of environmental 
concerns is also to create false obstacles. And if we focus our attention 
on these false obstacles instead of the real problems that we face, we are 
losing time and resources without coming any closer to reaching our 
shared goals.” (Ruggiero, 1998). Likewise, Brian Wilson, UK Minister for 
Trade said that “protecting the environment and maintaining an open, 
non-discriminatory and equitable multilateral trading system are both 
essential to achieve our objective of sustainable development.” (Wilson, 
1998).
More recently Sir Leon Brittan, speaking for the European 
Commission, argued that “sustainable development must be placed at the 
heart of WTO decision making -  including within the Millennium 
round...we need to reconcile the competing demands of economic 
growth, environmental protection and social development. Pursuing any 
of these three at the expense of the other two will inevitably lead to an 
unbalanced approach. If we get the balance wrong in one direction or 
another, we will end up either with inadequate recognition in trade policy
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terms of legitimate environmental concerns, or with ‘green protectionism’”, 
(Brittan, 1999)
How then can these disparate world views of this complex problem 
be drawn together? Clearly a balanced accommodation of the interests of 
the three communities cannot exclude the interests of the powerful 
international trade community. At the same time environmental 
degradation poses the most serious challenge to the international trading 
system that it has faced; failure to accommodate environmental concerns 
successfully could well lead to erosion of the natural base upon which the 
economic system is built and, consequently, to its collapse9. More 
immediately, public confidence in the WTO and in the international trading 
system is imperilled.
Environmentalists, however, need to acknowledge the powerful 
commercial interests in maintaining the existing system, and the benefits 
as well as the problems that arise therefrom. Otherwise their efforts will 
give rise to unnecessary conflict and the development of less than optimal 
results. This occurred, for example, in the US and Canada with respect to 
the negotiation of the NAFTA; opposition by environmental groups was 
met with suspicion by the governments and business groups in favour of 
the agreement. A compromise, reluctantly proffered by the US 
Administration, was finally agreed to by the US Congress, whose approval 
was needed to authorise US participation in the negotiations, whereby 
environmental considerations would be considered in parallel to, not as
9 This has been well documented elsewhere. See for example, Lester R. Brown et al, State of the
World, (New York: W W  Norton & Company, Inc., various editions); World Resources Institute and 
International Institute for Environment and Development, World Resources 1986: An Assessment of the 
Resource Base that Supports the Global Economy, (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1986), and subsequent 
annual volumes; World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (London,
Oxford University Press, 1987).
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part of, the free-trade negotiations10. As a result of continued pressure by 
environmentalists during the negotiations, the NAFTA did make provision 
for some of the concerns raised about it, but suspicion between the trade 
interests and environmentalists remained strong.
Development concerns must also be given their full weight, 
otherwise efforts by the rich countries to impose solutions will face 
suspicion and resistance which could have been avoided; programs to 
address a number of crucial environmental problems could be quickly 
overwhelmed and negated by contrary or discordant actions by the poor. 
Across a wide range of important issues, such as global warming, 
stratospheric ozone depletion, and the maintenance of genetic diversity, 
the full participation of the poor in the formulation and implementation of 
appropriate solutions is crucial.
Alliances Amongst the Communities: Complicating the debate, 
these three communities may also form alliances with each other, three of 
which are of particular interest: alliances between the environmental 
community and development community; between the international trade 
community and the development community; and between the 
environmental community and protectionists.
Alliances between environmentalists and the development 
community, although often productive, may also break down. While 
recognising the increasing heterogeneity of the "South" (see Finlayson, 
1990), it is probably safe to argue that the poor countries have shown no 
more interest in environmental issues than the rich, indeed often less.
10 Further details of this compromise can be found in the Response of the Administration to Issues 
Raised in Connection with the Negotiation of a North American Free Trade Agreement, transmitted to the US 
Congress by President George Bush on May 1, 1991.
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It was the LDCs, for example, who sought and obtained agreement 
at the Governing Council of the UNEP, in May 1989, to qualify and 
expand the definition of sustainable development adopted by the General 
Assembly in 1987 to ensure that it does "not imply in any way 
encroachment upon national sovereignty...includ[es] assistance to 
developing countries in accordance with their national development plans, 
priorities and objectives...and does not represent a new form of 
conditionality in aid or development financing"11.
Understandably their primary concern is economic development, and the 
environmental concerns expressed by the rich provide the poor with 
considerable leverage in that regard. MacNeill et al (1991) observed that 
"[tjhis was evident in the 1989 session of the UN General Assembly.
Many in the Group of 77, which brings together most of the developing 
countries in the UN, saw an opportunity to hold the environment hostage 
to the resolution of certain equity, debt, technology transfer, trade, and 
other economic development issues" (p. 62). More recently, at a High 
Level Symposium on Trade and Environment sponsored by the WTO,
India “underscored the importance of common but differentiated 
responsibilities of countries toward the goal of environmental protection 
and sustainable development”, IICD, (1999).
Arising from these concerns, and having left behind much of their 
statist heritage, LDCs are increasingly at the forefront of efforts to promote 
open markets and trade liberalisation12, while it is the richer countries who 
are the more susceptible to growing political pressure by the
11 See, UNEP Governing Council Decision 15/2, Annex II, and the report of the Governing Council on 
the work its fifteenth session, UNEP/GC.15/12, paras. 54-60.
12 This was one of the main trade policy trends identified in the UNCTAD Trade and Development 
Report 1991. See UNCTAD Bulletin No. 11, September-October 1991, p. 7.
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environmentalists to impose trade restrictions to protect the environment. 
Accordingly, alliances between environmentalists and the development 
community can be expected to cover only a limited range of issues.
Likewise the international trade community and development 
community will not always be in accord. The fundamental areas of conflict 
in this regard were very much in evidence at the Indonesian conference in 
1994 to begin the negotiation of an Asia-Pacific Free Trade Area. This 
was especially the case in the relations between the US or the EU, and 
the Asia-Pacific or South American regions. On the one hand are 
concerns about possible neo-colonial dominance by the older and larger 
industrialised countries, while on the other hand are concerns about when 
developing countries should assume the full range of responsibilities and 
obligations of the international trading system.
A potentially more stable alliance, between environmentalists and 
protectionists, may also occur across a wide range of issues, as we shall 
discuss in this thesis. The primary concern that this alliance gives rise to 
is that environmental issues may be used as a legitimising cover to 
advance a narrow protectionist cause. Vogel (1992) has called such an 
alliance a Baptist and bootlegger alliance. The term arises from certain 
states in the US that maintain local prohibitions against alcohol. The 
Baptists support the prohibition for religious reasons, while the 
bootleggers support it because it underpins their income. Such covert 
protection needs to be guarded against if unnecessary economic costs 
and unnecessary resistance to needed environmental regulation are to be 
avoided. As Low (1992) argued, “issues relating to environmental policy 
and competitiveness are really about avoidance of the protectionist 
capture of ecological arguments”, (p.6)
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Attempts have been made toward reconciling these three broad 
communities of interest at the Meetings and Symposia on Trade and the 
Environment and Trade and Development sponsored by the WTO over 
the past two and a half years, as well as that held by the European 
Commission in March 1999. As already noted, however, the 
environmental community is growing impatient with the lack of 
“measurable progress”. Hopefully efforts will continue within the next 
round of multilateral negotiations. The European Commission, for 
example, in an informal discussion paper on their thinking on the aims and 
scope of the negotiations to be launched at Seattle in December 1999 
argue that, “trade and environment policies should play a mutually 
supportive role in favour of sustainable development. The extent to which 
existing WTO rules accommodate trade measures taken for 
environmental purposes is still, however, to a certain degree, in a situation 
of legal uncertainty. It is in the interests of both the global environment 
and the open trading system and hence of all WTO members to clear this 
up”, (European Commission, 1999).
Thus, it is increasingly recognised that it is vitally important that a 
balanced accommodation of all interests be found. Moreover progress in 
resolving the relationship between international trade and the environment 
requires the establishment of common ground; each group needs to be 
accommodated within a common analytical framework. As Burke (1998) 
argues, “we really are going to have to look for some way of achieving a 
much better shared analytical base for policy-making”.
This thesis contributes to the development of a common analytical 
framework by articulating neutral criteria for evaluating when it would be
legitimate to use trade measures as environmental policy instruments.
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Objectives and Summary
The links and overlapping areas of concern between international 
trade policy and environment policy are many and varied. At the same 
time there are a number of often competing interests at stake, each of 
which must be accommodated. Thus far, the debate on this issue has 
been characterised by a distinct lack of agreement on how to proceed, 
due to a lack of a common analytical framework; each of the main 
communities in the debate have sought to impose their agendas, priorities 
and analyses. In seeking to contribute to an accommodation of these 
communties, this thesis has two main purposes:
1) The first purpose is to determine whether or not there exists a 
legitimate role for international trade policy instruments in the conduct of 
environment policy.
This enquiry takes to be indisputable that the protection and 
maintenance of a healthy and stable environment must be accorded a 
higher priority than anything else including the maintenance of the 
international trading system to the extent that they are otherwise 
irreconcilable. Therefore, Chapter 2 examines the basis on which 
environmental standards should be established, and the extent to which 
they should be harmonised. To determine whether the use of trade 
policy instruments to achieve the necessary environmental standards 
should be considered legitimate, Chapters 3, 4 and 5 present and discuss 
three tests. It is argued that the use of trade-related environmental policy
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instruments (TREPI) could be considered to be legitimate only if it meets 
all three of these tests.
This three-part legitimacy test describes a decision-making 
process, and is a useful way of organising and analysing policy problems 
concerning the relationship between international trade policy and 
environment policy. In light of the discussion in Chapter 2, where 
inadequate environmental standards exist an environmental policy 
problem exists. The first question, then, is whether an authority has the 
right to respond to that environmental problem. Accordingly, Chapter 3 
examines the issue of international interdependency as it relates to the 
relationship between trade and the environment, and presents the first 
test of legitimacy: whether the authority proposing the use of trade policy 
instruments in the conduct of its environment policy is materially affected 
by what it seeks to address. If the authority does have the right to act in 
response to the environmental policy problem, the question then turns to 
defining the set of effective options. The issue here is whether trade 
policy instruments would be amongst such a set of options. Finally, are 
any trade policy measures that are contained in the set of effective 
options the "least-cost" of such options? If trade measures meet all of 
these criteria, then their use as environmental policy tools should be 
considered legitimate. Chapters 4 and 5 describe these second and third 
tests: whether the trade policy instrument in question would be effective, 
and whether it is the least-cost effective alternative. Chapter 6 considers 
three cases and demonstrates how this three-part test might be used.
By adopting the simple approach proposed in this thesis we avoid 
the fundamental conflict caused by the epistemological and analytical 
assumptions and biases of each of the three communities: the
international trade community, the environmental community, and the
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development community. Instead a more objective means of considering 
the complex of issues is proposed. The three tests are independent of 
any of the three communities and, in their simplicity, could be applied to a 
wide range of problems. Applied to the trade and environment issue, they 
demonstrate their objectivity by the conclusions they lead to: on some 
points they lend support to the interests of each of the three communities, 
while on others they do not.
2.) To the extent that an appropriate role for trade policy 
instruments in the conduct of environment policy is found, the second 
purpose of this enquiry is to consider whether or not, and in what ways, 
the current international trading system frustrates or facilitates such a use. 
Chapter 7 discusses, in three parts, the environmental effects of 
international trade liberalisation. In Chapter 8 the scope for possible 
amendments to the GATT system is explored with reference to the 
environmental provisions of the NAFTA. Finally, the use of domestic 
trade remedy laws as environment policy instruments is considered in 
Chapter 9. A summary and the main conclusions are in Chapter 10.
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CHAPTER TWO 
ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS
This enquiry begins by taking to be axiomatic that environmental 
needs are of a higher significance than, and where irreconcilable with 
must take precedence over, international trade needs. A complex, highly 
productive economic system may contribute to a happy and fulfilled 
existence, but without a healthy, stable natural environment existence 
itself is not possible. Accordingly, the first objective of this thesis is to 
describe the proper basis of environmental standards. This will show both 
the minimum standards necessary for sustaining the physical 
environment, and discuss when environmental standards should be 
differentiated and when they should be harmonised. To begin, it will be 
useful to review the three main economic functions of the environment13 — 
resource supply, waste assimilation, and other environmental services — 
and how these relate to the establishment of environmental policy.
1.) Resource Supply: Economic activity entails the 
consumption of natural resources, either as goods in themselves or as 
inputs for processed and manufactured goods and services. Three types
13
See also Jacobs, 1991, Ch. 1, and Pearce and Turner, 1990, Ch.’s 2-3.
48
of natural resources are provided by the environment: non-renewable, 
renewable, and continuing.
Non-renewable resources include minerals and fossil fuels. There 
is no consumption of these resources other than human consumption 
which permanently reduces the remaining supply. It is true that lower 
available supply may lead to higher prices and so make available supplies 
which were not economic at the lower price. Similarly, technological 
progress may make available supplies which had been hitherto 
unobtainable. Nonetheless, the total stock of the resource is reduced as it 
is consumed. Some non-renewable resources, such as some metals, are 
also recyclable. But while recycling extends the usefulness of the 
available stock, it cannot expand the available stock, nor replace any 
which has not or cannot be recycled; the natural limits of the total stock 
are unbreachable.14 Fortunately the main non-renewable resources, 
including minerals and fossil fuels, are in relatively plentiful supply.
Renewable resources are those which are naturally replaced or 
regenerated over time. If the human rate of consumption plus the natural 
rate of consumption is less than the rate of replacement then the available 
supply will not be reduced. Flora and fauna fall into this category as do 
the atmosphere and hydrosphere. If they are used faster than the rate of 
replacement the equilibrium stock of the resource may be re-established 
only if its ability to renew itself is not undermined, either by excessive 
depletion or damage to other key elements of the relevant ecosystem. To 
return to its equilibrium requires an appropriate period of under­
consumption to offset any over-consumption.
14 The limits to the long-term effectiveness of recycling are given by the Second Law of 
Thermodynamics much emphasised by the economist Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen (1971) By this it is 
recognised that as resources are used by the economy entropy is increased; they become increasingly 
dissipated, disordered, and so unavailable.
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Continuing resources are a small but important group which include 
solar, wind, tidal and geothermal energy, the consumption of which does 
not affect the remaining supply: effectively the supply is infinite.
2.) Waste Assimilation: Waste is produced at every stage of 
the production, distribution, and consumption of goods and services. The 
total amount of this waste is equal to the amount of natural resources 
utilised.15 Such waste is normally in the form of any of heat, gases, liquids 
or solids. An essential function of a healthy ecosystem is to reuse and 
recycle waste, but this capacity to assimilate waste is strictly limited. Just 
as with the sustainable use of renewable resources, respecting the limits 
of this assimilative capacity is the key to ensuring the sustainability of the 
service. Such limits can be expected to be a function of the 
characteristics of the relevant ecosystem, the waste to be assimilated, 
and the rate of flow of the waste into the environment. Like renewable 
natural resource use, the total flow of many forms of waste includes waste 
from natural sources and processes which must be included in 
calculations of assimilative capacity.
3.) Other Environmental Services: The environment also 
provides two main categories of other services. Difficult to incorporate 
into economic calculations, these are not always fully acknowledged.
They are nonetheless essential.
The first is the life support system. This includes such specific 
services as the maintenance of genetic diversity, stabilisation of
15 This we know from the First Law of Thermodynamics, the importance of which to economics was
first emphasised by the economist Kenneth Boulding (1966). This law affirms that we can neither create nor 
destroy energy and matter, we can only transform them and dissipate them.
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ecosystems, maintenance of the composition of the atmosphere, and 
regulation of the climate.
The second is the provision of amenities. These include 
recreation, aesthetic and spiritual enjoyment, and a source of ideas, 
knowledge and object of scientific study.
In the light of these three primary functions of the environment, two 
basic rules for the establishment of environmentally sustainable standards 
have been proposed, (see Pearce and Turner, 1990):
a. Utilise renewable resources at rates less than or equal to the 
natural rate at which they can regenerate. Likewise, waste flows 
must be kept at or below the assimilative capacity of the 
environment.
b. Optimise the efficiency with which non-renewable resources are 
used, subject to possible substitutions between renewable and 
non-renewable resources, and the effects of technological 
changes.
Figure 1 may help to understand sustainable environmental 
standards establishment by providing a graphical representation of the 
key relationships between economic activity and consumption of the 
environment.
In Figure 1. Y represents the level of economic activity, and E 
represents the environmental impact of that economic activity or, in other 
words, the consumption of the relevant environmental endowment.
Emax is the maximum sustainable environmental impact, as described
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by the two basic rules above; it is a given characteristic of the relevant 
ecosystem. The term f(trans), which is not necessarily linear, is the
f(trans)
Emax
Figure 1.
Y
sus. Ymax
environmental transformation function which describes the locus of best 
available options for the transformation of the environmental endowment 
into economic goods and services. Since zero economic activity would 
imply zero environmental consumption, this function begins at the origin. 
The slope is determined by the transformational efficiency of the 
available technology and economic organisation. Seen another way, 
f(trans) delimits the minimum environmental impact of various levels of 
economic activity; for any given Y it identifies the minimum resulting E. 
Choices may be above f(trans) but cannot be below it.
This highlights three matters which are crucial to ensuring 
environmentally sustainable activity:
First, regardless of cost, the limits of the environmental endowment 
described by Emax must be respected.
Second, the available transformational efficiency is vitally 
important. A less advanced economy with access to less efficient
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technology and organisation would have an environmental transformation 
function with a slope greater than that of a more advanced economy.
Third, this suggests that, with identical environmental endowments, 
for any desired level of economic activity the less advanced economy 
would cause more environmental problems than would the more 
advanced economy. It is important to recall that this refers to total 
economic activity. Accordingly, activities in a low per capita income but 
vastly populated area can have an equal, or even greater, environmental 
impact than activities in a high per capita income but sparsely populated 
area.
Only the environmental transformation function and the desired 
level of economic activity can be varied as a matter of policy. Emax, by 
contrast, varies naturally within and between jurisdictions, depending on 
the relevant economic activity. Accordingly, two approaches for 
environmental standards establishment are distinguishable.
One is to address environmental consumption taking the 
transformational efficiency as given, which may imply lower economic 
activity. Such standards may refer to depletion rates of natural resources 
or to the volume or rate of permissible emissions. If the actual 
transformational efficiency employed is less than the best available 
transformational efficiency, that is above f(trans), then environmental 
consumption can be reduced without corresponding reductions of 
economic activity. Otherwise f(trans) describes a direct relationship 
between the level of economic activity and the degree of environmental 
consumption.
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The second approach to establishing environmental standards is to 
address transformational efficiency. Here standards bring about 
environmental savings while retaining or increasing economic activity. 
Examples include fuel economy (miles per gallon) and particulate or other 
waste recapture or recycle rates. Any such increases of transformational 
efficiency imply that, for a given amount of environmental consumption, 
the corresponding level of economic activity is raised. Likewise for any 
given level of economic activity environmental savings would result from 
such transformational efficiency improvements. These types of 
environmental standards are not, of course, mutually exclusive.
Two broad categories of standards are now apparent: basic 
environmental standards, and supplementary environmental standards.
1. Basic Environmental Standards: Basic environmental standards 
conserve the economic functions of the environment, and are directed at 
economic activities above Emax. They are established with reference to 
the relevant ecosystem. Thus biospheric concerns could be addressed by 
globally harmonised basic environmental standards, while regional and 
local issues could be differentiated according to the regional and local 
environmental endowments and preferences. In practice, it may often be 
useful to harmonise local and regional environmental standards as well 
wherever the environmental effects of a particular economic activity do not 
differ greatly.
This approach implies an important limitation to the property-rights 
and other market-based mechanisms for environmental management, 
including the widely-accepted Polluter-Pays-Principle, (see Chapter 8). 
Because the functioning of the environment is independent of human 
preference, the equation of marginal social cost with net marginal private
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benefit to determine optimal pollution levels is not always tenable, (see 
Pearce and Turner, 1990). While such anthropocentric, market-based 
mechanisms may be seen to bring about an optimal allocation of 
resources below Emax, above that level they should be supplemented, or 
if necessary supplanted, by command-and-control mechanisms to the 
extent needed to ensure that the economy does not operate above Emax\ 
they should be the first line of defence, but not the only one.
2. Supplementary Environmental Standards: It cannot, of course, 
be assumed that the maximum economic activity consistent with the 
environmental endowment (at point A) will always be chosen. If the 
environment is seen as a positive good, then consumers may choose to 
forego other economic goods and services for a more pristine 
environment. In addition to basic environmental standards, some 
jurisdictions may choose to establish higher environmental standards. 
These supplementary environmental standards are choices below Emax 
and reflect additional local preferences. Such local preferences raise 
issues similar to those arising from different tastes and cultural 
preferences and should be accommodated.
In addition to the ecosystemic differentiation of environmental 
standards emphasised here, some commentators have suggested that 
environmental standards should be differentiated according to whether 
they are being applied to developed or to developing countries. It is felt 
that high standards enforced by the richer, developed countries would 
unfairly disadvantage the developing countries who are unable to afford to 
meet such standards. For example, in Chapter 2 of "Agenda 21", as 
agreed at the 1992 UNCED in Rio de Janeiro, governments agree on the 
importance of ensuring,
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"that special factors affecting trade and environment policies in the 
developing countries are borne in mind in the application of 
environmental standards as well as in the case of the use of any 
trade measures. It is worth noting that standards that are valid in 
the most advanced countries may be inappropriate and of 
unwarranted social cost for the developing countries." (para. 
2.22(g)).
Thus there is anxiety amongst the LDCs, and the "economies in 
transition", that environmental standards will be set so high by the 
developed countries that market access for their exports will be seriously 
impaired. Such concerns arise largely from the very limited resources 
available to these countries for environmental purposes. The provision of 
derogations from environmentally sustainable standards for their exports 
has been suggested as a solution. However, this view is too simple.
The question of whether or not market access restrictions should 
be used in support of environmental standards will be taken up later in the 
thesis. At this point, it is useful to distinguish between consumption- and 
production-related environmental standards.
Consumption-related environmental concerns: Consumption- 
related environmental standards are also referred to as product 
standards. They are about product characteristics, consumption-effects, 
and disposal. Consumption pollution is often far more dis-aggregated 
than production pollution; it is the result of the activities of billions of 
individual consumers. Often consumption-related standards are 
expressed in terms of pollution per unit. Many of the costs of 
consumption pollution are borne by the country consuming the goods or 
services in question, and the trade policy concerns which have arisen 
have focused mainly on market access. As the 1991 German recycling 
regulations suggest, however, some investment relocation issues may
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also arise16. Consumption pollution can also be of great consequence 
outside the country of consumption. Indeed a number of the 
environmental problems of greatest global significance, such as carbon 
emissions and stratospheric ozone depletion, are a consequence in large 
part of consumption pollution. Accordingly there will be interest in 
environmental standards establishment and enforcement in response to 
consumption pollution which has multi-jurisdictional effects.
At the same time, it would be difficult to argue that sub-standard 
products should be accepted simply because they originate in developing 
countries. It is likely that many such products, even if permitted entry to 
the market, would meet with consumer resistance. Accordingly we can 
expect that consumption-related environmental standards will be applied 
without regard to the origin of the product.
Production-related environmental concerns: These concerns arise 
from resource-base use, production processes, and distribution. Many of 
the resulting environmental effects occur entirely or predominantly in the 
country of production of the commodities or products in question. The 
trade policy concerns arising from production-related environmental 
measures have tended to focus on resource access, investment location, 
and the effects on relative competitiveness. Production-related 
environmental standards are sometimes referred to as production and 
process method (PPM) standards. This can be misleading, however, 
because PPM standards may also be directed at consumption-related 
environmental concerns; sanitary regulations affecting the production of 
imported foods, for example.
16 See The Economist June 15, 1991, pp.89-90, and the Financial Times June 28, 1991, p.6. A fuller 
account of this recycling initiative, and the concerns it has raised, is given in the Financial Times August 14,
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Whether or not trade measures could legitimately be used in 
response to production-related environmental concerns is a matter 
discussed in subsequent chapters. At this point, however, a few 
preliminary observations can be made.
As to the concerns about the trade effects of high standards in the 
industrialised countries, with production-related environmental standards 
we should first distinguish between traded and non-traded products. 
Clearly, environmental issues arising from the production of non-traded 
goods and services will not be affected by foreign market access 
restrictions in support of foreign environmental standards. Moreover, a 
broad range of the most pressing environmental issues in the LDCs are 
not associated directly or primarily with traded-goods production. These 
include access to clean water, sanitation services, adequate nutrition, 
birth control and other medical services, and education, as well as land 
tenure reform and facilitation of greater local participation in decision 
making. Accordingly we should not expect to find a direct conflict 
between many of these LDC environmental priorities and the product 
standards enforced in the developed countries.
Even with regard to trade goods, arguments for differentiating the 
application of production-related environmental measures according to the 
wealth of the country of production are inconclusive.
In the case of traded products it has been estimated that in 1980 
developing countries would have incurred direct pollution control costs of 
$5.5 billion to meet the prevailing US standards with respect to their 
exports of manufactures to the OECD countries, which were 
approximately $48 billion. This would have been 11.5 per cent of the total
1991, p.10.
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value. If the pollution control costs associated with the inputs to those 
manufactures is included the total required expenditure would have been 
$14.2 billion, an increase in the cost to 29.6 per cent of the value (UN 
1990, p. 105, fn.2). This can be compared with estimates of the pollution 
abatement costs to US firms as a percentage of the value of industry 
output. In 1988 these were of the order of only 0.54 per cent; ranging 
from 0.01 to 3.17 percent (Low 1992, Annex Table A, pp. 113-4).
Some Northern industrialists are concerned that their products may 
be unfairly disadvantaged with respect to those from the developing 
countries in the absence of off-setting measures. It appears then that 
these concerns are probably unfounded; regulations to enforce pollution 
abatement measures costing an average of only 0.54 per cent of the 
value of output, and at most only 3 per cent, should not be seen as a 
serious impairment of competitiveness. On the other hand, however, 
there may be substance to the concern that Northern environmental 
standards may place a disproportionate burden on LDC economies; 
pollution abatement costs of between 11 and 30 per cent are not 
insignificant.
If there is free trade, Anderson (1992) finds that LDC concerns 
about tightening pollution standards in the developed countries "are not 
justified if the advanced countries' imports are relatively pollution-intensive 
in their production (p.44, see also p.8). In other words, rising production- 
pollution standards in the advanced countries could benefit the LDCs, if 
such production shifted to LDCs with lower environmental standards and 
no obstacles to the trade of those products are raised. Indications of a 
shift of pollution-intensive production toward the LDCs are discussed in 
Lucas et al (1992).
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There are also indications that suggest that, even with restrictions 
on the trade of the affected products, the application of strict 
environmental standards by the developed countries may be to the 
advantage of the LDCs. UNCTAD (1991 b) argues that in the cases of 
raw agricultural materials, food products, minerals and metals, metal and 
wooden products, basic chemicals and chemical specialities, leather and 
textiles, motor vehicle engines, industrial and power equipment, and 
consumer durables, stringent environmental standards in the developed 
countries could provide significant benefits for the developing countries, 
(paras 39-45). In some instances simple and/or relatively inexpensive 
substitutions of inputs or processes are all that would be required; and 
such substitutions would benefit the developing country regardless of the 
external environmental standards considerations by being less pollution 
intensive and/or adding greater value. This would be the case with many 
raw agricultural and food products, as well as with textiles and some 
leather, metal and wooden products. With other products, while the costs 
of adjustment would be somewhat greater, most of the environmental 
benefits would accrue to the developing country. Such cases include food 
processing, and some leather, metal and wooden products. Where 
meeting the developed country standards is not feasible, and market 
access is impaired, benefits could arise from the resultant impetus to 
greater domestic processing, as with many metals and minerals, as well 
as from the further development of South-South trade. In this latter 
regard, "it is quite conceivable that for certain products a kind of dual 
world market will emerge: one of relatively expensive, high-tech, high 
quality, more environmentally advanced products in the developed world 
and another of relatively cheap products, less sophisticated or with a 
greater impact on the environment but adapted to the specific economic 
and environmental conditions in the developing world", (UNCTAD 1991b, 
para. 46).
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A further matter of concern when considering the special problems 
faced by LDCs in meeting Northern product standards is who precisely is 
producing the exports at issue. While a particular country may be very 
poor, the company in question is not necessarily also poor. It may be a 
large trans-national corporation (TNC), or another large foreign or local 
firm with the resources to meet the highest standards. The Mexican 
Maquiladora is a case in point, where many of the factories are branches 
of, or largely dedicated to, larger US firms including a number of 
transnational corporations. For such companies there should be no 
special consideration with respect to meeting the product standards 
necessary to access their developed country export markets. Where 
necessary, there could also be assistance with enforcement of the 
environmental standards of the host country. For foreign direct 
investment (FDI) this could be done by providing for enforcement of host 
country environmental regulations in the courts of the home country of the 
FDI, if the administrative capacity of the host country is inadequate.
This does not mean that there should not be any special or 
differential treatment for LDCs with respect to the relatively strict 
environmental product standards of the developed countries. Such 
treatment could be provided by the traditional means of preferential 
access, such as tariff reductions to offset the increased costs incurred to 
meet the high environmental standards, rather than by lowering 
environmental standards. Further reduction of tariff escalation, for 
example, would greatly help in this regard. As well environmental 
standards enforcement could be furthered by establishing facilities to 
promote new, modern investment in LDCs, by full payment for genetic 
materials, and by providing more generous financial and technological 
transfers, all of which would decrease the slope of f(trans) and provide
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substantial amounts of resources for environmental protection in the 
LDCs. This would enable them to meet the Northern standards better; 
standards which it is in the interests of the LDCs to meet as soon as 
possible.
That environmentally unsustainable environmental standards are 
not in the interest of the LDCs, even for a short period of time, can be 
demonstrated quite simply. Assume that urgent and effective action is 
taken to increase LDC development, and that over the next ten years 
global per capita income, and hence environmental consumption, is raised 
to the 1990 OECD average. Quite clearly the simple calculation of OECD 
per capita consumption times the global population shows that the 
resulting total environmental burden would be intolerable.
Conclusions
Environmental standards must be established with reference to the 
characteristics of the relevant ecosystem. Moreover, environmental 
sustainability requires that economic activities do not breach the limits of 
the ecosystem's capacity. Suggestions that environmental standards 
should also be differentiated according to income, between poor and rich 
countries, may be misguided. There appears to be little compelling 
reason for making such a distinction, and in some instances it may even 
be counterproductive. This does not mean that special and differential 
treatment for the products of the poorer countries cannot be provided in 
other ways. Nor does it mean that market access restrictions or other 
trade impairments should be employed unilaterally to enforce 
environmental standards. The issue of the legitimacy of using these and 
other trade related environmental policy instruments is the subject to 
which we now turn.
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE FIRST TEST OF LEGITIMACY
To establish, enforce and maintain sustainable environmental 
standards whenever environmentally unsustainable economic activities 
occur is held to be the proper purpose of environmental policy. In this 
enquiry, we are interested in whether trade measures can be legitimately 
used in the conduct of such environmental policy. This chapter looks at 
the interaction of the three structural features of the international system 
that give rise to and condition the relationship between trade and 
environmental policies. From this, a first test of the legitimacy of using 
trade measures as environmental policy tools is disclosed and examined.
To understand the relationship between international trade policy 
and environment policy we must first look at three fundamental aspects of 
the international system: the economic dimension, the ecological 
dimension, and the political dimension.
1. The economic dimension is composed of three interrelated 
elements: national, regional and global economic relations. Both national 
and regional economic relations have long histories of mutually
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interdependent development, with regional economic relations being 
understood mainly as the sum of their constituent national economic 
relations. Indeed, throughout history regional economies have been 
identified to a large extent simply as areas of particularly substantial 
international trade; national economies were the salient objects of 
analysis. At the same time international trade flows have historically been 
aligned with, indeed are often an integral part of, colonial political 
relations. National tariff structures have maintained and supported these 
nation-centred economic and political relations; historically, international 
trade has been rooted in the nation-state system. Technological 
advances in productivity, transportation, and communications have 
provided an impetus for, as well as facilitating the integration of, economic 
relations both within and between regions to give rise to a truly global 
economy.
In addition to the erosion of the salience of the nation state in 
international trade relations, the constitution of international trade has also 
changed. Until very recently, international trade consisted almost 
exclusively of crude goods for production -- raw materials and 
commodities -- on the one hand, and finished consumer goods on the 
other. Technological change during the 20th century, especially regarding 
information processing and telecommunications, has facilitated the 
expansion of international trade in terms of both volume and geographical 
coverage. At the same time, it has also caused a change to the 
constitution of international trade by causing and facilitating an increase in 
the trade of intermediate goods.
In other words, the production arrangements themselves expand 
beyond, and function without regard to political borders. This change to 
the constitution and scope of international trade means that the
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international economic system can increasingly be understood in its own 
right as a global economic system, rather than as traditionally portrayed: 
in terms of the interaction of its constituent parts. Political borders and 
economic "borders" are less and less the same. To an extent these 
global economic relations can be conceptualised as a border-less 
economic continuum with primary regions of activity corresponding to the 
European, North American, and Asia Pacific markets. The international 
trade system is an essential and integral element of this new transnational 
economic structure of production, distribution and consumption.
The development of this transnational economic structure has 
given rise to unprecedented levels of global economic interdependence. 
Local and regional economies continue to contribute much to the 
character of the global whole, while the global system is increasingly of 
crucial importance to the behaviour of local and regional economies.
Local and regional economic activities must be seen in light of this 
reciprocal interdependency, and much of economic policy analysis does in 
fact take account of it. A main purpose of regional integration programs, 
for example, is often to make the participating regions more competitive 
within the global economy and/or to enhance the region's economic 
negotiating leverage within it. Whether at the world scale or the regional 
or national scales, this means that analyses of the relationship between 
international trade and the environment cannot ignore the development of 
this global economic interdependency.
2. The ecological dimension has two main elements: the natural 
integration of ecosystems, and the scale of the human effects on those
systems.
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Natural environmental integration is similar to, though is not 
necessarily coextensive with, economic integration. Ecosystems are in 
some cases local, that is, they are within national political borders. In 
some cases they are regional, in that they cross national political borders 
and so cover more than one jurisdiction. Finally, there is the global 
biosphere. Each of these types of ecosystem is fully and fundamentally 
integrated with the others. This gives rise to a natural interdependency.
Added to this, the effects of the global economy have, in many 
instances, become so large that they are beginning to be on the same 
scale as fundamental natural processes. This provides an additional 
dimension to global ecological interdependency. Whether with regard to 
resource utilisation or waste assimilation, until recently the scale of 
economic activity meant that the environmental effects of that economic 
activity were effectively benign or were of largely local concern only. The 
economy functions on a global scale now and many environmental effects 
are no longer benign. Accordingly, global economic and ecological 
interdependency necessitate the development of new means of 
conceptualising and evaluating the environmental consequences of 
economic activities. Importantly, in so emphasising the international 
interdependency element of the trade-environment issue, it may also 
prove helpful in developing a sense of common cause to facilitate a more 
harmonious relationship between environmental and international trade 
concerns.
To an extent, ecological interdependency is not new. Few, if any, 
economies are ecologically self-sufficient; the natural resource needs of 
all but the smallest and most primitive economies are unlikely to be met 
by the local ecological capital. Throughout history two primary means 
have been used to meet this problem: nomadic migration, and trade.
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Nomadic migration means that the users of ecological capital move 
between resource bases. Trade, by contrast, involves the movement of 
natural resources amongst the various users. Accordingly, trade can be 
understood as an exchange of ecological capital. Ecological 
interdependency, then, can be understood in terms of the content of 
trade, as well as a product of the scale of economic activity.
3. Along with these economic and ecological dimensions a third, 
political dimension, is essential to understanding the relationship between 
international trade and environment policies. The last chapter 
demonstrated that environmental standards must be established with 
reference to the relevant ecosystem. However, within the transnational 
economic and ecological interdependencies, economic and environmental 
policy-making remain within the bailiwick of discrete, territorially-bounded 
authorities. There are few corresponding regional or global authorities 
with the authority to implement whatever policies may be appropriate at 
those levels.
The interaction of all three of these dimensions of the international 
system are essential to understanding the trade-environment relationship. 
The economic dimension transmits the economic effects of environmental 
policies as well as producing ecological effects which necessitate 
environmental policy responses. The ecological dimension transmits the 
ecological effects of environment policies and of economic activities. But 
the full scope of such effects are not necessarily contained within or 
coextensive with the territorially bounded authorities whose policies give 
rise to the effects, while no supranational sovereign authorities exist.
The interaction between these three structural features of the 
international system gives rise to the fundamental problem of how and in
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what ways territorially-bounded authorities can exercise their rights and 
responsibilities to manage their economic relations in an environmentally 
sustainable manner, while at the same time managing their environmental 
policies in an economically responsible way. Accordingly, it will be useful 
to develop a taxonomy of the jurisdictional aspects of the trade- 
environment issue. In turn, such a taxonomy will help to identify the first 
test of the legitimate use of trade measures for environmental purposes.
The First Test of Legitimacy
Disputes may arise over environmental standards or the trade- 
related environmental policy instruments (TREPI) used to implement 
them. Moreover, environmental measures may be implemented by and/or 
affect the country where the environmental consumption occurs and/or 
another jurisdiction, or the effects of the environmental consumption may 
be felt only in the country of origin, also in another jurisdiction, and/or in 
an extra-jurisdictional area.
Because neither economies nor ecosystems necessarily 
correspond with jurisdictions, a taxonomy of the jurisdictional distribution 
of the environmental concern and of the economic costs of any proposed 
countermeasures will be useful. There are two primary jurisdictional 
issues to be considered.
1. For jurisdictional issues which arise from the environmental 
effects of economic activities, there is the case in which there are 
environmental effects only in the country in which the economic activity 
occurs, and the case in which there are effects in another jurisdiction, or in 
an area under no single jurisdiction such as the oceans, the atmosphere, 
or outer space.
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2. A second set of jurisdictional issues arise from the economic 
effects of environmental policy measures. In this case the effects may be 
entirely local or there may be extraterritorial consequences.
For each of these sets of issues legitimacy may be indicated by 
whether or not one is materially affected by that which one is reacting to.
Accordingly,
The first test of legitimacy is whether an authority is materially
affected by what it proposes to act toward.
In principle this "affected by" test is analogous to the injury tests, 
including the de minimis standards, of countervailing and antidumping 
duty laws. Thus, one jurisdiction could not legitimately act against 
environmental concerns occurring entirely within another jurisdiction. 
Likewise, if a measure has no extraterritorial economic effects it should be 
considered legitimate. It is important to be clear that this taxonomy only 
discloses the first test of the legitimate use of TREPI. Two additional 
tests, described in subsequent chapters, must also be considered before 
the use of TREPI in any particular instance would be legitimate; all three 
tests are essential to determining the legitimacy of a proposed action.
There are three categories in this jurisdictional taxonomy: uni- 
jurisdictional, non-jurisdictional, and multi-jurisdictional.
1. Uni-jurisdictional issues occur when both the environmental 
damage and any costs of remedies are borne entirely within a single
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jurisdiction. These should not normally be the subject of international 
attention or scrutiny.
An exception may be where the consequences of consumption 
pollution occur only in the country of consumption but the consumption 
pollution measures are implemented by another country, such as the 
country of production. The transportation of toxic materials for recycling 
or disposal is an example. In this case agreement with the country 
affected would seem to be a necessary precondition of any measures 
being imposed.
2. Non-jurisdictional issues, by contrast, are those where 
environmental damages occur in an area outside any jurisdiction. Such 
areas include most of the oceans, the atmosphere, outer-space, and the 
land mass of Antarctica.
Of course, unilateral environmental measures could legitimately be 
implemented providing they do not entail any multi-jurisdictional economic 
costs. Examples of this type of issue include domestic requirements that 
nationals return all wastes produced while operating in extra-jurisdictional 
territories, against dumping wastes at sea, or imposing atmospheric 
emissions limitations on domestic products. In such cases it is unlikely 
that anyone would object. Unilateral trade restrictions impose costs on 
others, however, so they would be illegitimate. In part, this was the 
finding of the GATT panel on the Mexican tuna dispute. As a rule 
international agreement would be a necessary precondition to measures 
which entail economic costs accruing outside the jurisdiction of the 
authority implementing measures in response to non-jurisdictional issues. 
The trade-related measures sanctioned by the Montreal Protocol are a 
case in point.
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When dealing with non-jurisdictional issues, although the level of 
jurisdiction in the area may be equally non-existent for all parties, the level 
of legitimate interest in the area will vary. For example, there is no single 
authority with jurisdiction in the North Atlantic, but countries such as 
Canada and Iceland would clearly have a greater interest in the fisheries 
there than would Australia. While a "legitimate interest" in an area is 
certainly much less than recognised sovereign jurisdiction, with many non- 
jurisdictional issues there will be "shades of grey" as to who has what 
rights.
3. Multi-jurisdictional issues will be the most common and also 
probably the most difficult to resolve. Three sub-categories of multi- 
jurisdictional issues arise.
a) First, the environmental effects could be felt in more than one 
jurisdiction while the costs of remedying those effects, whether they arise 
from a measure being implemented or not being implemented, are borne 
entirely within the originating jurisdiction. An example of this type of issue 
would be transboundary emissions of acid rain. Here any remedial costs 
should simply be borne. If adequate or effective environmental measures 
are not implemented, for the countries suffering the consequences of any 
such non-localised pollution, resort to appropriate and effective 
compensatory or countervailing measures may then be justifiable. While 
current international trade rules permit only limited action against 
producers in response to methods of production, where such production 
pollution adversely affects another jurisdiction, proportional 
countermeasures may justifiably be undertaken. Legal justification could 
arise from the accepted right of countries to erect barriers to trade where 
necessary to protect the life or health of humans, animals or plants within
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it, (see GATT Article. XX(b), for example). Clarification of the question of 
legitimacy in a particular instance, however, would involve the additional 
consideration of the tests reviewed in Chapters 4 and 5. It is always 
preferable, moreover, that measures not be unilaterally imposed. To the 
extent possible, the use of multilateral dispute settlement procedures 
should precede and approve any measures which an authority may wish 
to resort to.
b) Second, environmental measures implemented in response to 
entirely local concerns may have extra-jurisdictional commercial effects. 
Natural resource conservation programs and waste disposal regulations 
are examples. In principle the extra-jurisdictional commercial effects in 
such instances are no different than those that arise from other domestic 
policy measures, and for which exceptions are provided in the 
international trade rules. Here also, criteria need to be established by 
which disputes may be resolved.
International economic effects could also occur because there are 
no environmental measures, or only weak ones. This is a frequently 
voiced concern with respect to imports from many developing and 
emerging economies, as was found, for example, during the negotiation of 
the NAFTA. In considering such cases, it is important to recall that the 
appropriate referent of environmental measures is the affected 
ecosystem. As well, necessary basic environmental standards should be 
distinguished from any optional supplementary environmental standards 
which some may perceive as desirable. Finally, specific environmental 
subsidisation -- those occasions where a firm or industry is externalising 
environmental costs within an otherwise adequate domestic 
environmental regime — and general environmental subsidisation -- where 
it is the jurisdiction as a whole which, by way of generally lax
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environmental standards or standards enforcement, is able to effect a 
general competitive advantage -  should also be distinguished. It could 
be argued that specific environmental subsidisation should be actionable 
by way of a multilateral dispute resolution mechanism. General 
environmental subsidisation, however, is less likely to be as susceptible to 
international arbitration. These issues will be considered during the course 
of this enquiry.
c) Third, both the environmental effects and the commercial costs 
of any remedial actions are felt in more than one jurisdiction. Examples 
are stratospheric ozone depletion, and atmospheric carbon 
accumulations. Here the optimal solution would involve the development 
of an agreed course of action by the parties affected. As it relates to non­
participants, any such arrangement should be subject to the same 
legitimising criteria as are applied to domestic measures.
Conclusions
The interaction between locally-, regionally-, and globally- 
interdependent economic and ecological dimensions of the international 
system, with discrete, territorially-bounded policy making authorities, 
provides a useful means by which to begin to understand the links and 
areas of common interest between trade policy and environment policy. 
Moreover, it suggests the first test of the legitimate use of TREPI; that an 
authority may legitimately act only when it is materially affected by that 
toward which it proposes to act.
CHAPTER FOUR 
THE SECOND TEST OF LEGITIMACY
The last chapter argued that the first test of the legitimacy of an 
action is whether or not an authority is materially affected by what it is 
reacting against. This chapter provides a further test of legitimacy. The 
second test asks: will the proposed action be effective? In this case we 
will be interested in whether trade-related environment policy instruments 
(TREPI) are effective means of achieving environmental policy objectives. 
The TREPI we will consider are border measures such as quantitative or 
financial import restrictions, or quantitative or financial export restrictions, 
and domestic measures such as subsidies and taxes.
The Second Test of Legitimacy
By the second test, use of a TREPI is legitimate only if it would be 
effective. To analyse the effectiveness of TREPI it is important to clarify 
the objectives which they are to achieve. There are four principle reasons 
why TREPI may be considered useful.
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INTEGRAL TREPI
Integral TREPI are trade measures used to address environmental 
concerns where international trade itself is a proximate cause of, or a 
major contributing factor to, that environmental concern. This would be 
the case, for example, where restrictions are placed on the international 
movement and transmission of dangerous or unhealthy products. Integral 
TREPI strictly control or prohibit the presence or distribution of the product 
itself. The motivation behind such measures is fundamentally grounded in 
concern about health and environment. There are three main types of 
integral TREPI:
First, integral TREPI may be imposed where the product itself is of 
concern. Examples include sanitary and phytosanitary regulations, as 
well as restrictions on the international transport of radioactive and toxic 
substances. The TREPI in these instances will be quantitative import and 
export restrictions. Because the product itself is dangerous or unhealthy, 
there is normally no demand for it and so little impetus for the 
development of a black market or any other restriction-evading activities. 
For the same reason only quantitative TREPI would be effective.
Second, integral TREPI could be applied in cases where it is use of 
the product that causes environmental damage; automobiles which do not 
meet specified emission standards, for example. Also in this category are 
regulations concerning waste treatment and disposal; that is, where 
products are denied market access unless they conform to certain criteria 
regarding the treatment and disposal of any wastes which may arise as a 
result of their being consumed. In these instances, where use of the 
product rather than the product itself gives rise to the environmental or
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health concern, some demand for substandard goods may be expected17. 
Financial TREPI would reduce the incentive for illegal trading, so they 
could also be effectively employed.
Third, integral TREPI can also be used for production-related 
concerns. These include measures to conserve natural resources, such 
as fisheries. Here it is not the product itself which is of concern. Rather, 
the harvest rate is unsustainable. Such over-exploitation is often the result 
of under-pricing or undervaluing of the product in question. The role of 
international trade in these cases can be demonstrated with an example 
involving trade in endangered species and derivative products.
A lower price in the domestic market relative to a foreign market, in 
the absence of barriers to trade between the two markets, creates an 
opportunity for arbitrage which profit maximising individuals will want to 
take advantage of. Because this opportunity exists only to the extent that 
no offsetting barriers exist between the two markets, international trade, 
as the nexus between the two markets, is seen to be an integral part of 
the problem. For such products, therefore, complete trade bans or severe 
trade restrictions are often proposed18.
Ironically, to the extent that demand for the product remains, by 
reducing the available supply such measures can give the product an 
even greater value. Reducing the official domestic price to zero and 
adding a risk premium for poaching to the foreign price, increases the
17
The May 8, 1996 edition of the Financial Times reports a study by the Royal Institute of 
International Affairs that argues that multilateral efforts to curtail the use of chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) gases 
are being undermined by smuggling from, primarily, Russia to various developed countries. The report 
claims that the US has the largest black market in illegal CFCs, with an estimated 9,000 to 18,000 tonnes per 
year being traded.
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arbitrage opportunity. As a result, black markets in these products will 
appear and undermine the effectiveness of the TREPI. It has been 
proposed, therefore, that where appropriate, property rights to the 
resource be ascribed, normally to the local population, and a controlled 
market established. This has the effect of improving the local 
management of the resource and of raising the domestic price relative to 
the foreign price. In turn, the higher domestic price reduces the arbitrage 
opportunity. When alternate sources of the product are available, such 
supply management schemes may require the support of quantitative 
import controls in order to stop the trans-shipment of unsustainably 
produced product. Otherwise, border measures would not be necessary.
SANCTIONS
A second primary objective of TREPI is as a sanction on the 
environmental policy of another jurisdiction. In such cases both 
quantitative and financial border measures have been employed. It is 
important to recall that the purpose of the sanctions may in fact be 
primarily domestic, such as satisfying a vocal interest group, or it may 
actually be to change the behaviour of another jurisdiction. To the extent 
that the sanction is largely for a domestic audience, it would seem 
reasonable that the least internationally disruptive measure possible 
should be chosen, and that that would not include TREPI. On the other 
hand, where the TREPI is imposed primarily to effect a change of policy in 
another jurisdiction, there is to date little evidence that it would be 
successful, so again they should be avoided in all but a very few 
circumstances.
18 This is not meant to obscure the possible existence of other relevant factors, such as the reduction
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There have been a growing number of cases where TREPI, usually 
import restrictions, have been used to bring about changes in the 
environmental policies of other jurisdictions. Usually these are with 
respect to production-related pollution issues. Examples include the 
landmark cases of US restrictions on the import of Mexican tuna, and 
proposed EC restrictions on the import of certain furs. Such TREPI 
probably cause economic hardship for the producers in the target country. 
That they will be effective in inducing a change in policy is, by contrast, 
very much to be doubted.
In general, it should be noted that research indicates that the 
effectiveness of unilateral sanctions over the post-war period has been 
declining and unimpressive for the most part. That said, Hufbauer,
Schott, and Elliot (1990) shows that to be at all effective, sanctions need 
to conform to a number of criteria. Important amongst these are that the 
offending policy can plausibly be changed, that the sender be very much 
more economically powerful than the target, that there is a high degree of 
trade interdependence between the sender and the target, that the 
products sanctioned impose the maximum cost on the target, that the 
target is not able to circumvent fully the sanctions, that the costs to the 
sender are not too onerous and, finally, that the sender is sufficiently 
patient,
Aside from the generally decreasing probability of success, there is 
no reason to believe that restricting the trade in a product that is 
associated with an offending environmental policy would have any useful 
effect in changing that policy. The product may not be of vital importance 
to the target, the sender's market may not be sufficiently important, the 
target country may not be able satisfactorily to change the policy, or the
of habitat by human encroachment.
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inefficiency of sanctions as a diplomatic tool may mean that greater 
environmental damage occurs while waiting for them to work than might 
have resulted from other more effective means. Although there may be 
instances where the unilateral use of TREPI as sanctions on the 
environmental policies of others may be effective, as a general rule they 
would appear to be ineffective.
These conclusions were confirmed in a study by the US National 
Association of Manufacturers, as reported in the March5, 1997 edition of 
the Financial Times. This study showed that the US had enacted 61 laws 
and executive actions since 1993 sanctioning the behaviour of 35 
countries. It concluded that unless the sanctions have international 
support they are largely ineffective.
The use of TREPI as sanctions also occurs in international 
agreements. Here they may be employed to ensure observance of the 
agreement by the signatories and/or to ensure that "free-riders" do not 
secure the benefits of the agreement without incurring corresponding 
obligations. TREPI as sanctions could also be used by international 
agreement in a particular instance. At least three main reasons suggest 
why the use of TREPI as sanctions in these ways may be rather more 
effective than otherwise. First, a large number of countries acting 
together could serve to fulfil a number of the requirements listed above for 
sanctions to be effective. Second, those inclined to join the international 
agreement would want an instrument to ensure that only those 
undertaking the obligations and paying the costs reap the benefits. 
Provision of such an instrument would therefore encourage membership 
of the agreement and so strengthen the sanctions threat provisions for the 
first reason just described. The third reason is that as the sanctions threat 
provisions are strengthened for the reasons just described, even those
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who are less inclined to join may do so in order to pre-empt being subject 
to sanctions.
While sanctions, considered as punishments and threats, do not 
have an impressive record of success, as rewards for appropriate 
behaviour they may be more promising. Such rewards could include, for 
example, tariff reductions or other market opening initiatives, or financial 
aid and technology transfers. These could be provided either as rewards 
for policy changes, or in conjunction with or to help facilitate policy 
changes. Regrettably this positive approach to international policy 
modification does not yet appear to have received much official 
consideration.
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ECONOMIC MOTIVES: COMPETITIVENESS
A third, and fundamentally economic, objective of TREPI is to 
equalise competitive disadvantages which may be seen to arise because 
of international differences in environmental policies. TREPI may be 
domestic or border measures designed to address either the cost to 
domestic producers of domestic environmental policies, or the relative 
cost differential, between domestic and foreign competitors, of 
environmental policies.
TREPI may be used to protect domestic producers from 
competition against those subject to less stringent environmental 
regulation. This is seen to be a case of compensating for production or 
operating cost disadvantages which may result for domestic producers
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subject to production-related environmental standards more onerous than 
those of their competitors. For example, US Representative Al Swift put 
forward a Bill in 199019 to "preserve the global environment" and "to make 
sure that our American-made products are treated fairly in international 
trade". Swift argued that "when foreign competitors pollute, they not only 
degrade the environment in which we all live, they also are able to 
undercut American producers by avoiding pollution control costs that our 
manufacturers rightfully have to meet."20
A relatively substantial amount of research has been conducted on 
this question over the past twenty or so years, albeit much with a US 
focus. This research suggests that overall, pollution abatement costs are 
a small portion of total industry costs and have an insignificant effect on 
output. However, the significance of competitive distortions will vary from 
industry to industry, with those associated with a significant amount of 
production pollution being the most susceptible.21 Low (1992), for 
example, examines pollution abatement and control expenditures in 1988 
by 123 industries in the US His research supports earlier work on this 
question, finding that "the maximum 'charge' resulting from pollution 
abatement and control activities amounted to just over 3 percent of output 
for the dirtiest industry (cement), and only 18 out of 123 industries, at the 
3-digit level of the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC), incurred 
expenditures greater than 1 percent of output. The weighted average for 
all industries was 0.54 percent", (Low (1992) p. 106). Similarly, private 
sector expenditure on pollution control in the UK in 1988 has been 
estimated to be greater than 1 per cent of turnover in only the three most
19
H.Res. 371, introduced in the US House of Representatives March 29, 1990.
20
News Release by Congressman Al Swift, May 24,1990, "Swift Resolution Urges Our Trading
Partners To Do Their Part To Clean Up The Environment".
21
Dean (1991), pp.8-13, provides a review of the literature on this issue, most of which has examined 
the competitive effects of the environmental regulatory regimes of the 1970s and early 1980s.
81
“pollution-sensitive” industries22, and never more than 1.5 per cent 
(ECOTEC, 1991, Table 5.1). The conclusions of the investigation in the 
third case study in Chapter 6 of this thesis are consistent with these 
findings; they too find that the cost to UK agriculture of environmental 
regulation has a negligible commercial effect on the industry. To the 
extent that environmental regulation is strengthened over the coming 
years, and so becomes a more significant component of the cost 
structures of the relevant industries, these research results may be 
superseded. Nonetheless, there does not yet appear to be any 
compelling evidence to support the fear that production-related 
environmental standards, at the level enforced in the US or the UK, are 
competitively disadvantageous.
Indeed stricter production-related environmental measures may 
make firms more competitive. Such measures may lead to production 
techniques which are more efficient in their use of resources 
(ACOST,1992, pp. 7-8), and/or consumers may prefer the "greener" 
products. Also important is the distinction between "cleaner technology" 
and "end-of-pipe technology". The former emphasise reducing the 
demand for raw materials and energy as well as the prevention as 
opposed to the treatment or disposal of pollutants or other wastes. The 
latter are technologies or processes which treat or abate the 
environmental effects of existing processes. ACOST (1992) argue that 
"the application of end-of-pipe or monitoring technologies, rather than 
cleaner technologies, is particularly likely to lead to increased process or 
production costs, at least in the short term", (p. 8). In general terms, then, 
the introduction of "cleaner technologies", whenever possible, is to be 
encouraged. However, more research is needed into whether greater 
costs will lead to decreased competitiveness or whether greater efficiency
22
Chemical industry, metals industry, and food processing industry.
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will lead to increased competitiveness, and for which industries.
Research is also needed to ensure we are able to maximise the possibility 
of the second of these two possibilities being the result for the greatest 
number of industries.
Regarding the matter of relative competitiveness then, two groups 
must be distinguished: those who may suffer, a relatively small group, 
and the majority of industries who can be expected to benefit from the 
implementation and enforcement of high environmental standards. The 
preliminary evidence23 suggests that the industries most susceptible to 
competitiveness effects arising from environmental factors are those that 
are the most energy and/or resource intensive. These include cement, 
pulp and paper, ferrous and non-ferrous metals, chemicals, forestry, 
mining, and energy production and products. These industries are also all 
capital intensive, highly cyclical and, in the developed countries, they are 
largely mature. At the same time, they tend to be those which are 
developed early in the economic development process. Accordingly, 
while they may be in the minority of industries, we can expect them to be 
the source of most of the trade-environment disputes concerning relative 
competitiveness.
Clearly for those firms which can expect to benefit from higher 
environmental standards the application of border TREPI would be 
unhelpful. For those industries which are susceptible to competitiveness 
problems, however, modest forms of transitional assistance may be 
politically necessary. Accordingly, any TREPI which may be employed in 
support of domestic environmental standards should be restricted to 
domestic TREPI, such as subsidies to help with pollution abatement 
and/or structural adjustment costs.
23
See the various articles relevant to this matter in Low (1992), for example.
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ECONOMIC MOTIVES: INVESTMENT LOCATION
A corollary to the relative competitiveness concern is that TREPI, 
especially quantitative import restrictions or bans, are necessary to reduce 
the possibility of investment relocating from areas where there are high 
environmental standards to areas where lower environmental standards 
obtain (see, for example, Shrybman 1990b). Much of the concern of 
environmentalists, trade unionists, and others opposed to the North 
American Free-Trade Area negotiations, for example, arose from their 
fear that such trade and investment consequences might result from the 
lower level of Mexican environmental standards and enforcement.24
Two issues are central to this problem. First, we need to consider 
the relative capacities of the ecosystems at issue. Natural differences 
between ecosystems mean that there must be corresponding differences 
in the relevant environmental policies. Second, we need to consider the 
relative rate at which the environmental resources would be utilised. As 
shown in Chapter 2, an LDC with a lower transformational efficiency, 
f(trans), will consume more of the environmental endowment per unit of 
output than would a more advanced economy. Accordingly, for a given 
level of output more of the world's resources are used; it can be seen as 
an economically less efficient allocation of global resources.
Some research covering a broad selection of industries suggests 
that there is little evidence overall that industrial relocation in response to 
environmental regulatory differentials has been significant. To the extent 
that they exist, such relocation effects appear to be a function of the
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extent to which production-related environmental management costs 
constitute a significant component of the firm's overall cost structure.
Other crucial variables are the industry-specific incidence of significant 
international environmental regulatory differentials and low impediments 
to the trade of the products (see Ugelow (1982), Dean (1991), pp. 14-16, 
and USTR (1991) pp. 132-43).
USTR (1991) identified four conditions which would have to be met 
to justify a firm relocating in response to environmental regulation:
1.) environmental compliance costs must constitute a significant 
portion of total operating costs;
2.) the relevant trade barriers must not be significant;
3.) compliance cost gains must exceed the costs of relocation; 
and
4.) international compliance cost differentials must be sufficiently 
significant to encourage investment relocation.
Accordingly, in principle, TREPI would be effective in addressing concerns 
about investment location of certain industries.
Just as with the research on competitive distortions arising from 
environmental regulatory differentials, however, this research indicates 
only that industrial relocation in response to environmental regulatory 
differentials has not yet been significant, not that it will not become so if 
environmental regulations are strengthened faster in some jurisdictions 
than in others and the resulting growing differentials constitute an 
increasing share of total industry costs. Indeed, there is a growing body 
of evidence that such displacements are already occurring.
24
See, for example, Inside US Trade, Feb. 22, 1991, pp.9-10; Mar. 8,1991, pp. 1, 21-22; Mar. 29,
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Research by the Thailand Development Research Institute (see 
The Economist 16 Nov. 1991, "Asia's Emerging Economies: Survey", p. 
21) suggests that increased environmental regulatory differentials 
amongst a number of the countries of south-east Asia may have been an 
important cause of investment location decisions by pollution-intensive 
industries between 1987 and 1989. Similarly, while UNCTAD (1991b) 
argues that environmental regulation has not led to any discernible effect 
on international trade patterns, they suggest that there is some evidence 
that some investment shifts are taking place, "particularly in the 
processing of metal commodities" and that "it is expected that this trend 
will continue" (p. 11). Lucas et al (1992) also find evidence to support the 
hypothesis "that stricter regulation of pollution-intensive production in the 
OECD countries has led to significant location displacements, with 
consequent acceleration of industrial pollution intensity in developing 
countries" (p. 80).
But such research remains inconclusive. As USTR (1991) 
concludes, "Although relocation of investment to avoid stricter 
environmental restrictions may be a plausible outcome of differences in 
environmental standards and enforcement, and such movement has 
taken place in some instances, the phenomenon does not appear to be 
widespread" (p. 142). Where such effects are found, they will again tend 
to be associated with the same energy and/or resource intensive 
industries identified in the preceding subsection, (see GATT 1992, pp. 20- 
21).
As we have seen throughout this section, where economic motives 
are central, the extent to which differences in environmental standards
1991, p. S3; and Apr.26, 1991, pp. 3-5.
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contribute to the problems being addressed is crucial. The low 
environmental standards of concern will be mainly in countries where 
many other factors may also be at play, including low labour, health and 
safety standards, and possibly also significantly lower tax and 
administrative costs. Labour costs, for example, typically account for 
about 70 per cent of the cost of producing manufactured goods. It may be 
the case, therefore, that the environmental standards component is 
insignificant. If so, it would not itself give rise to material external effects 
and so would not pass the first test of legitimacy articulated in the 
preceding chapter. Un-bundling the environmental element will be 
extremely difficult, if not impossible. Accordingly, while TREPI would be 
effective countermeasures they would also be very easily caught up with 
other issues and so provide a ready vehicle for damaging, protectionist 
trade actions. As a result, while they may be effective in certain 
circumstances, they would also impose costs on the rest of the economy 
which must be taken into account when considering their use. Special 
precautions with the use of TREPI in these cases are essential.
IV
SUSTAINABLE WELFARE MAXIMISATION
An important economic effect of an open trading system is that a 
pattern of economic activity obtains which is economically optimal; that is, 
it constitutes an efficient use of global resources. In turn, this distribution 
facilitates maximum economic growth. But, as Chapter 6 will show, for 
economic growth to be environmentally sustainable, offsetting, primarily 
domestic, environmental measures must be in place. If an appropriate 
regime is not in place the environmental effects of economic growth are
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not always benign. Accordingly, neither is the associated pattern of 
economic activity.
A counterintuitive implication of this is that the economically most 
efficient use of global resources may not necessarily be environmentally 
optimal. To the three purposes of TREPI already reviewed, therefore, a 
fourth objective may now be added: a possible role for TREPI is 
elucidated in the pursuit of sustainable welfare maximisation. What is 
meant by “sustainable welfare maximisation”?
Leaving aside for the moment the environmental considerations, 
received orthodoxy holds social welfare to be a positive function of 
economic activity. Since economic activity is the sum of production and 
consumption, welfare is increased or decreased as production and 
consumption are increased or decreased. Because TREPI are normally 
product-specific we can then ask what effect TREPI have on the 
consumption or production of the good or service affected. In other 
words, what effect does the use of the TREPI have on welfare?
The idea of sustainable welfare maximisation holds that, with 
respect to substitutes, we should maximise the consumption and 
production of the least environmentally damaging goods and services. 
Alternatively this could be stated as minimising the production and 
consumption of the most environmentally damaging substitute goods and 
services. Either version could be followed, although ideally both would 
be. This could be accomplished, for example, by employing more efficient 
production processes, utilising better designs, producing longer lasting or 
more reusable products. In reducing the production and consumption of 
environmentally damaging goods and services the associated 
environmental problems will be ameliorated. Below Emax such
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production and consumption switching would be constrained by 
consideration of the relative economic costs. Above Emax, however, we 
can propose a rebuttable presumption that the environmental costs of not 
switching outweigh the economic costs of switching.
Introducing these environmental rules, the simple welfare function 
reads as follows: sustainable welfare is positively related to increases in 
the least environmentally damaging production and consumption, and to 
decreases in the most environmentally damaging production and 
consumption. Maximising this sustainable welfare function subject to the 
Emax constraint will yield the greatest possible economic welfare at the 
same time as the least possible environmental damage. Recalling Figure 
1, we know that within a given ecosystem improvements to the relevant 
environmental transformation function will effect such welfare gains. 
Similarly operating below or, if above closer to, Emax, whether within a 
given ecosystem or, in the case of production, by relocating to a more 
robust ecosystem, will also effect such environmentally benign welfare 
gains. At the limit, this proposal would lead to production and 
consumption at point A of figure 1.
To analyse the effect of the TREPI on sustainable welfare entails 
answering two interrelated questions: what is the effect on the production 
or consumption of the product, and what is the effect on the international 
distribution of that production and consumption? These effects can be 
adduced from results well established in the literature on international 
trade and welfare (Meade, 1955, provides a classic reference).
A principal effect of import restrictions will be to raise the price of 
the product in question. From the perspective of the domestic (DOM) 
producer this is analogous to a subsidy while for the producers in the rest
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of the world (ROW) it is analogous to a tax. On the other hand, from the 
DOM consumers’ point of view, it acts like a tax while for the ROW 
consumer it is like a subsidy. Accordingly, the import restriction will 
provide domestic producers with an incentive to increase their production. 
Domestic consumers, by contrast, will tend to reduce their consumption 
of the product. For the ROW the results will be the reverse. The 
tendency then is for consumption of the product to shift to the ROW while 
production shifts to the DOM market. Such shifts may or may not have 
the effect of leading to a more environmentally sustainable global 
configuration of production and consumption. It would depend on the 
particular product affected. Likewise we cannot determine, a priori, what 
the aggregate environmental effect will be.
Thus it is not clear whether import restrictions would be appropriate 
for production-related environmental issues and for consumption-related 
concerns. The extent to which import restrictions imposed for production- 
related environmental concerns would be appropriate depends on 
whether any increased production is generated by technology sufficiently 
benign to compensate for any increased pollution, and /or if any shifts of 
production are to a more robust ecosystem. Similarly, if the import 
restriction is imposed for consumption-related environmental issues, to 
the extent that the affected ROW ecosystem is less robust than that of the 
DOM the overall environmental consequences of any increased 
consumption will be unwanted. Moreover, if the consumption-related 
environmental concerns include multi-jurisdictional or non-jurisdictional 
issues then again the import restriction may not ameliorate the situation; 
indeed it may make matters worse. Of course if the ROW ecosystem is 
more robust than the DOM ecosystem then the environmental 
consequences of the shift of consumption from the DOM to the ROW  
would be desirable.
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With export restrictions the price of the affected product will be 
lowered. Being analogous to a domestic subsidy, there will tend to be an 
increase in domestic consumption. For this reason parallel domestic 
restrictions are needed if overall use of the product is to be lowered. 
However, the effect on domestic producers will be in the same direction 
as would that of a tax and so lead to a decrease in domestic production. 
At the same time, export restrictions will operate like a tax on ROW 
consumers of the affected product and like a subsidy for the ROW 
producers of competing product. Clearly the same concerns regarding 
DOM/ROW shifts of the production and consumption of the affected 
product that where posed in the case of import restrictions would need to 
be considered here also. For example, export restrictions on a natural 
resource as part a natural resource management program would have a 
negative overall effect if the restricted supply was simply replaced with 
that of another supplier using less environmentally sustainable harvest 
techniques or harvesting in a less robust ecosystem.
A domestic production subsidy can be expected to increase 
domestic production. However, its effect on prices and consumption is 
less clear. To the extent that the market is competitive some of the 
subsidy will be passed through to the consumer leading to increased 
consumption. Depending on the price elasticity of demand for the 
product, however, an amount of excess production may result which 
would need to be exported. In the case of a domestic consumption 
subsidy, by contrast, the consumer price will decline causing an increase 
in consumption. Because this generates only indirect price signals to the 
producer, however, production may remain unaffected and an increase of 
imports would result.
91
A domestic production tax can be expected to be passed on to the 
consumers to the extent the relevant market permits. Such higher 
consumer prices will tend to depress demand for the domestic product 
and so lead to lower domestic production. In the absence of border 
restriction such as an offsetting import surcharge, however, ROW product 
at the lower world price will be imported and replace the higher priced 
domestic product. This would tend to shift the incidence of production 
pollution to the ROW, the advisability of which again depends on the 
relative robustness of the DOM ecosystem and the ROW ecosystem.
A consumption tax, on the other hand, will raise the consumer price 
and so reduce consumption of the target product. Again, however, there 
are only indirect producer price signals. Production may remain 
unchanged, or slightly reduced, above domestic demand and increased 
exports would be required.
From this brief discussion it is clear that for production-related 
environmental concerns the effect of both import restrictions and 
production subsidies is to increase production of the affected product in 
the domestic economy (DOM) and to decrease its production in the rest of 
the world economy (ROW), suggesting a shift in the distribution of 
production towards the DOM. By comparison the tendency of export 
restrictions and production taxes is to cause a decline in the production of 
the affected product in the DOM and an increase of production in the 
ROW, suggesting a shift in the distribution of production toward the ROW.
For consumption-related environmental concerns, import 
restrictions and consumption taxes both depress consumption in the DOM 
while expanding it in the ROW, implying a change in the pattern of
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Table 1.
Summary of the Effect of TREPI on Sustainable Welfare
TREPI
DOM ROW
Cons Prod Cons Prod
Import Restriction
—
+ + -
Export Restriction +
— —
+
Production Subsidy 0/+ + ? 01-
Production Tax 0 /- - ? 01+
Consumption Subsidy + 0/+ 01- ?
Consumption Tax - 07- 01+ ?
consumption towards ROW. Export restrictions and consumption 
subsidies will have the opposite effect of increasing DOM consumption 
and decreasing it in the ROW, with corresponding shift of consumption 
into the DOM. Bearing in mind that, a priori, the environmental 
consequences of these results cannot be determined, they are 
summarised in Table 1.
Clearly the degree to which the ROW is affected by the TREPI will 
be proportional to the size of the market share of the jurisdiction imposing 
the TREPI, measured in terms of its percentage of the total world market 
for the product at issue. But what is more, the effect of the domestic 
TREPI are neutral or in the same direction for both consumption and 
production, while the effects of border TREPI on consumption and
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production are in opposite directions. To the extent that such actions are 
otherwise seen to be legitimate and would lead to operating closer to 
Emax, border TREPI may be more useful for inducing international re­
distributions of production and/or consumption. However, the domestic 
TREPI may be the most effective for increasing the consumption and/or 
production of the product in question within the DOM jurisdiction. 
Nonetheless, both to lessen the problem of distinguishing environment- 
related border measures from protectionist border measures and because 
it would probably be more effective and efficient anyway, internationally 
co-ordinated domestic TREPI should be preferred to border TREPI; 
whenever possible international co-operation and co-ordination is to be 
preferred. But this suggests that an explicit facility in the international 
trade rules would need to be provided for environment-related subsidies 
as well as taxes. Exceptions for subsidies would probably not need to be 
very wide, however, since, as MacNeill, Winsemius and Yakushiji (1991) 
suggest, much environmental policy can be effected by way of non- 
discriminatory environmental taxes and markets (pp.37-41).
It is important to recognise that the effects of TREPI which we have 
just described can be seen either in terms of the implementation of the 
particular TREPI or its removal. While the preceding analysis was done in 
terms of the introduction of TREPI, it could also have been done in terms 
of their removal, in which case the effects would largely have been 
opposite25.
Just as imposing TREPI can be used effectively in the conduct of 
environmental policy, so too can they exacerbate environmental 
conditions and need to be removed or replaced. For example, excessive 
subsidisation of agriculture by many OECD governments has led to
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overproduction of agricultural products and damage to the rural 
environment. Similarly under-pricing of resources throughout Eastern 
Europe over recent years, both for domestic and industrial use, has been 
a primary factor in the environmental degradation that has occurred there. 
For the LDCs, much of the environmental damage they suffer results from 
underdevelopment exacerbated by tariff escalation in the industrialised 
countries.
Whether environmental benefits will result from the introduction of a 
TREPI or from the liberalisation of the particular market will depend upon 
the product in question; a priori generalisations are not possible. It can 
nonetheless be tentatively concluded that, as UNCTAD (1991b) suggest, 
"trade policy should follow a two-way path. One path is the removal of 
distorting trade barriers that obstruct fair trade and efficient resource use. 
The other path should make way for the use of non-distorting 
environmental and trade instruments that put a premium on sustainable 
resource use subject to the trade principle of equal treatment of domestic 
and foreign suppliers" (para. 64).
Conclusions
In this chapter we have been concerned with whether or not, in 
those circumstances where an authority may act, TREPI would be 
effective instruments. To find out, we have looked at each of the four 
main reasons why they may be employed.
First, the use of TREPI may be integral to the problem. For 
consumption-related issues where it is the product itself that is of concern 
only quantitative TREPI would be most effective; where it is the use of the
25
Some interesting research on these issues has been published in Anderson and Blackhurst (1992),
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product that gives rise to the problem then financial TREPI might also be 
effective. For production-related environmental problems, quantitative 
import restrictions were found to be of potential use only to avoid the 
trans-shipment of unsustainably produced product in those cases where 
alternate sources of the product were available. Otherwise trade 
measures were found to be inferior to domestic measures.
Second, the TREPI could be used as sanctions. Here either 
quantitative or financial TREPI could be used, but where the sanctions are 
unilaterally imposed they are unlikely to be effective. Multilateral^ 
imposed sanctions, by contrast, are more likely to be effective. In either 
case the options considered should include rewards for policy or 
behaviour modification, not just punishments for a failure or refusal to 
change.
Third, TREPI could be used to offset commercial distortions which 
may result from differences between environmental regimes. Whether 
with regard to competitive disadvantages or investment relocation 
concerns, there is as yet little evidence that such commercial distortions 
are significant for most industries. At the same time, there is evidence 
that higher environmental standards may provide a competitive advantage 
across a wide range of industries. Nonetheless, it is clear that all TREPI 
would be effective to different degrees in offsetting any commercial 
distortions which do arise. Their use in this way, however, must be 
severely restrained at this time because it is not yet possible to un-bundle 
the environmental effects from other effects.
Fourth, TREPI could be used in the furtherance of environmentally 
sustainable development. Again, all TREPI would be to differing degrees
see especially Part 2.
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effective. Domestic TREPI, however, are shown to be preferable to 
border TREPI. Moreover it is important to recall that environmentally 
sustainable development can be advanced either by the implementation 
or the removal of trade measures.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE THIRD TEST OF LEGITIMACY
The taxonomy in Chapter 3 emphasised the jurisdictional issues an 
authority should consider before employing TREPI for environmental 
purposes, and disclosed a first test of when the use of TREPI may be 
considered to be appropriate. In Chapter 4, this was followed by a 
discussion of a second test: whether the TREPI would be an effective 
instrument. But whether in any particular case TREPI should be used 
requires a third test of legitimacy: is the TREPI the least-cost effective 
alternative that is available?
In determining whether or not a policy option is the least-cost 
option, it is crucial whether that policy option would have a direct effect on 
to the issue of concern. If the policy option is only indirectly effective it 
can be expected to incur greater costs than would an option that had a 
direct effect. Here then, we are interested in whether the TREPI is being 
used to address a problem caused by international trade itself, or whether 
trade measures are being proposed to address a problem originating 
elsewhere. If the problem is with international trade itself, TREPI can be
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considered optimal policy instruments; lower cost equally effective 
alternatives probably do not exist.
In the last chapter we saw that integral TREPI were employed in 
response to problems which would not exist in the absence of 
international trade, or where international trade was an important 
contributing aspect of the problem. There were three instances of this. 
First, where the product itself is of concern, international trade is the 
means by which the offending product arrives in the jurisdiction of the 
affected authority. Second, where it is the use of the product, again 
international trade is the means by which the offending product arrives in 
the jurisdiction of the affected authority. Finally, in the case of certain 
production-related environmental problems, although other factors may 
also be at play, international trade is demonstrably a significant 
contributing factor. In this latter case, however, where there is a single 
source of the product, trade measures are likely to be inferior to domestic 
measures, and where alternate sources of the product are available only 
import restrictions to curtail trans-shipments of unsustainably produced 
product would be useful. Accordingly, in the first two instances where 
trade is the proximate cause of the problem at hand, we may assume that 
TREPI are least-cost effective available alternatives and should be 
considered to be legitimate. In the third case, while trade is seen to be an 
important contributing factor, alternate, more effective domestic policy 
options to improve the management of the affected resource may be 
available. Indeed, trade measures could be counterproductive and so 
should be considered with the utmost caution.
Where the international trading system is not the proximate cause 
of the problem at hand the use of TREPI would also be legitimate if it was 
the only effective option available or if it was shown to be the least-cost of
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the available options. The discussion in the last chapter suggested two 
instances were this may be the case: multilateral sanctions and 
sustainable welfare maximisation.
If all nation-states agreed to the use of trade measures as 
multilateral sanctions within a universally subscribed international 
environment agreement it can reasonably be assumed that they are the 
least-cost effective available option; that the collective benefits outweigh 
the individual costs. If the agreement enjoys less than universal 
subscription, costs imposed on non-signatories may out-weigh the 
benefits gained. The use of TREPI as multilateral sanctions may, 
however, be the only effective option available for the implementation of 
the international environmental agreement. In such a case, and provided 
they adhere to a number of principles, they should be considered 
legitimate. These principles will be discussed later in this Chapter. In 
Chapter 7 they will be considered again in more detail, as will the issue of 
multilateral environmental agreements.
Where import restrictions are legitimately imposed as sanctions, 
financial import restrictions should be preferred to quantitative import 
restrictions for at least two reasons. First, quantitative import restrictions 
provide economic rents for quota holders and, as such, generate financial 
transfers from domestic consumers to foreign producers. In the case of 
financial import restrictions, such as tariffs, the resulting financial transfers 
from domestic consumers remain in the domestic economy. A second 
concern with quantitative import restrictions is they tend to increase the 
market power of domestic producers by reducing the competition in the 
domestic market. In the extreme case where there is only one domestic 
producer and imports are prohibited a competitive market would be 
transformed into a monopolistic one with the possibility of reduced
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production at higher prices. For these reasons, financial import 
restrictions are preferable to quantitative import restrictions.
We also saw in the last chapter that the application or withdrawal of 
TREPI in the furtherance of sustainable welfare maximisation would be 
effective, although a clear preference for domestic measures was shown. 
The use of border-TREPI for this purpose, as well as being less effective 
than domestic measures, is unlikely to be the least-cost option since they 
would normally have only indirect effects on the environmental concern.
In cases where the domestic measures would otherwise be subverted by 
imports, however, border measures may be a necessary supplement.
Regarding domestic measures, taxes are usually to be preferred to 
subsidies. This is because taxes are more likely than subsidies to be 
passed on to the ultimate consumer, and so advance the Polluter Pays 
Principle (see Chapter 8). As a result taxes can be expected to be more 
effective environmental policy instruments than subsidies. Furthermore, it 
is not a small consideration that domestic taxes are normally less subject 
to international dispute than subsidies.26 We can conclude, therefore, that 
sustainable welfare maximisation may legitimately be furthered by the use 
of domestic taxes and, to a lesser extent, by domestic subsidies. 
Otherwise, while individual exceptions may exist, the use of TREPI for the 
furtherance of sustainable welfare maximisation should not be approved 
of.
Significant concerns have already been raised in the last chapter 
about the potential costs of using TREPI to address the commercial 
effects of environmental regulations. It can be concluded, therefore, that
26
Except when the domestic tax is seen to be inadequate or otherwise less than like taxes imposed 
in other jurisdictions, and so is seen to be providing a subsidy.
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only in the case of integral TREPI for consumption-related issues and 
possibly with the use of TREPI as multilateral sanctions are the conditions 
of the third test normally met and their use legitimate. The use of 
domestic measures, especially taxes, to further sustainable welfare may 
also meet the conditions of the third test, but normally not border-TREPI.
In all cases, and certainly where a priori generalisations are 
difficult, policy-makers should adhere to a number of governing principles. 
Three such principles are particularly important.
The first principle which should inform policy making is that of 
transparency.
It is vitally important that both the establishment and enforcement 
of environmental standards be fully transparent. This means the full 
public disclosure of all aspects of the environmental standards 
establishment process, together with an independent determination of the 
legitimacy, including both the costs and the benefits, of those standards. 
Development of the maximum degree of transparency is of considerable 
importance not least because when establishing either production-related 
or consumption-related environmental standards local producers or 
consumers will tend to have an advantage. This advantage arises from 
their better knowledge of and access to the regulatory authorities who, in 
turn, may for political or other reasons tend to establish standards in such 
a way as to minimise any adverse effects on the local producers or 
consumers. While this is probably unavoidable, foreign competitors or 
consumers may be, or consider themselves to be, adversely affected as a 
result. Therefore it is important that unnecessary and avoidable 
international trade friction be kept to a minimum by, amongst other things,
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establishing the greatest possible degree of transparency in the standards 
establishment and enforcement processes.
Fully transparent environmental standards provide third parties with 
the opportunity to become acquainted with new standards at an early 
stage and, as a result, they have the opportunity to try to change those 
standards. This has the effect of developing a sense of trust and 
credibility regarding the new standards. In addition, it can be expected 
that the number of disputes about those standards will be fewer than 
otherwise.
While it is important that the environmental standards 
establishment process be as transparent as possible, it is also important 
that the standards established conform to two further principles: 
proportionality, and non-discrimination.
The second principle which should guide policy makers is that of 
proportionality. If an option would be effective, would it be proportional to 
the intended objective? Are alternative or less disruptive means of 
achieving the same ends available?
There are two ways of considering the principle of proportionality. 
The first focuses on the environmental standard itself. In this we wish to 
know whether or not the standard is unnecessarily high in light of the 
costs which will be incurred in attaining it. Clearly this could only be 
addressed fully on a case by case basis, in light of the particular 
circumstances. Nonetheless some guidance as to the what an 
"appropriate" level for an environmental standard might be was provided 
in Chapter 2.
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The second application of the proportionality principle is to the 
implementation of the particular environmental standard. In this we are 
interested in whether the means chosen for attaining the standard is the 
least disruptive available. Although in practice the individual 
circumstances of the issue being addressed are critical to deciding 
whether a less disruptive measure is available the discussion on ranking 
of TREPI earlier in this Chapter provides assistance. As well, in 
Chapter 7, we consider some practical applications of the proportionality 
principle to a number of GATT provisions.
The third of the principles is the central GATT principle of non­
discrimination.
If the environmental effects causing concern occur largely within 
the jurisdiction of the authority implementing the TREPI there may appear 
to be a strong argument in support of the legitimacy of the use of the 
TREPI. But such measures can readily be used to disguise protectionist 
actions. In the Canadian province of Ontario, for example, the legitimate 
environmental objective of achieving a given level of recycling of beer 
bottles was pursued by the implementation of a 10 cent surtax on 
imported US beer (which is sold almost exclusively in cans), thereby 
continuing the long-standing and much disputed government policy of 
protecting the provincial beer industry. It will be important that any 
allowance for these TREPI be counterbalanced by an obligation to employ 
in a non-discriminatory manner the least trade restricting measures 
necessary to achieve the desired environmental objective. To do 
otherwise would be to give rise to unnecessary and provocative economic 
costs falling on others, and so give them the right to respond 
appropriately.
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The two main provisions in international trade agreements to 
ensure non-discriminatory behaviour are the “most favoured nation”
(MFN) clause, and “national treatment”. Both of these provisions are core 
principles of the GATT and will be discussed in detail in Chapter 7. 
Therefore, a very brief explanation will suffice here.
MFN: Essentially this requires that the goods and services of any 
foreign state must be treated at least as favourably as those of any other 
state. There are two types of MFN obligation: under conditional MFN a 
privilege is granted only in connection with the granting of a reciprocal 
privilege; unconditional MFN, by contrast, requires that a privilege 
granted to one party is granted to all other parties without receiving a 
reciprocal privilege.27
national treatment: The second principle of non-discrimination is 
that of national treatment. While the MFN obligation requires equality of 
treatment between other nations, the national treatment obligation 
requires that imported goods, once they have cleared customs and other 
border procedures, must be treated no worse than domestic goods are 
treated. Provision of national treatment serves to prevent the application 
of domestic taxes and regulatory policies as covert protectionist 
measures.
Conclusions
We have concluded that the use of integral TREPI would be 
legitimate for consumption-related environmental concerns, as would the 
use of TREPI as multilateral sanctions, and the application of domestic 
taxes and, to a lesser extent subsidies, to further sustainable
27
For a fuller discussion of the MFN obligation see Jackson (1989), pp. 136-140.
105
development. We have also reviewed briefly three principles by which 
the probability that a measure will be the least cost and least disruptive 
alternative available is increased: that its development and provisions are 
fully transparent; that it is proportional to the problem being addressed, 
both as to its purpose and the means of attaining that purpose; and that it 
is not applied in a discriminatory way.
CHAPTER SIX 
THE LEGITIMACY TESTS IN PRACTICE
Having described the three-stage legitimacy test it will be useful to 
illustrate how it could work in practice. Three case studies will be 
examined. The first case study will look briefly at where integral TREPI 
were proposed and the second where TREPI were proposed as 
sanctions. As these two cases are based on actual trade disputes they 
rely on the arguments and empirical evidence contained in the relevant 
GATT panel reports and press reports. As such, they are relatively brief.
The final case will provide a more extended empirical analysis of 
the proposed use of TREPI for commercial reasons: where environmental 
and animal welfare regulations have led to increased calls by UK farmers 
for countervailing trade restrictions. With agricultural products accounting 
for 12% of international trade in goods yet the focus of nearly half of all 
international trade disputes, and given agriculture’s special relationship 
with the natural environment, it is notable that no empirical research has 
been done on the commercial effect of environmental regulation on 
agriculture. The results presented here thus seek to make a further
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contribution to the debate over the relationship between trade and the 
environment.
In each of the three cases we will first describe the issue and then 
examine it in terms of the three legitimacy tests.
Case 1: Thai Cigarettes - Integral TREPI
Issue: Under the terms of its 1966 Tobacco Act, Thailand 
prohibited the import of cigarettes without a licence. Since 1966, import 
licences had been issued only three times: in 1968-70, 1976 and 1980.
In addition to what became an effective import ban, the Government of 
Thailand also imposed discriminatory internal taxes on foreign cigarettes. 
In their defence, Thailand claimed the need to protect the health of its 
citizens; their actions were designed to reduce the quantity of cigarettes 
consumed and, because they believed the additives in foreign (primarily 
American) cigarettes made them more harmful, to improve their quality.
In 1989 the United States objected that Thailand’s actions were 
contrary to GATT obligations and requested a dispute settlement panel to 
examine the matter in light of the provisions of the GATT. The panel 
found in favour of the United States and their report was adopted in 
November 1990.28
First Test: Is the authority materially affected by what it proposes 
to act toward?
Quite clearly the aim of Government of Thailand to curtail cigarette 
consumption passes this test. The state of public health is indisputably a
28
For a complete description of this case, see the Report of the Panel in GATT (1991b).
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matter of considerable importance to the public authorities and it is now 
widely accepted that cigarette consumption is injurious to health. As to 
the matter of the quality of the cigarettes, Thailand’s assertion that the 
particular additives contained in imported cigarettes make them more 
harmful than domestic cigarettes would require supporting scientific 
evidence. While no unequivocal evidence was made available to the 
GATT dispute panellists, it was noted that both the World Health 
Organisation and the American Health Foundation had expressed 
concerns about additives used in American cigarettes. It is reasonable to 
expect one authority to exercise more caution than another about possible 
adverse health effects; demands for unequivocal, universally accepted 
evidence of harmfulness should not be made a barrier to prudent action 
by a responsible government. Accordingly it would be legitimate for that 
authority to act to protect its citizens against such effects.
Second Test: Would the proposed action be effective?
Since the Government of Thailand unilaterally revoked the 
discriminatory internal taxes, we will test only the legitimacy of the import 
restrictions. The question then becomes whether the import restriction 
would be an effective way of reducing cigarette consumption and of 
increasing the quality of cigarettes.
A restriction on imported cigarettes cannot be expected to reduce 
cigarette use if domestic production is not also restrained. Rather 
consumers will simply switch to the domestically made cigarettes. 
Therefore, the import ban is not an effective way of reducing cigarette 
consumption and, therefore, not a legitimate action. However, an import 
restriction could be an effective way of improving the quality of cigarettes
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consumed if the imported ones contain harmful additives which are not in 
the domestic ones, as was alleged in this case.
Third Test: Is the TREPI the least-cost effective option?
Because the trade restriction affects all foreign cigarettes rather 
than only those that contain the additives of concern, it is not a least-cost 
effective option. To pass this test, the trade restriction would need to 
affect only those cigarettes that contained the specified additives.
Conclusion: The import restrictions imposed by the Government of 
Thailand are not legitimate. In the absence of appropriate domestic 
production restraints, an import restriction to control the quantity of 
cigarettes consumed fails the second legitimacy test, and because it 
would affect all foreign cigarettes rather than just those containing the 
additives of concern, it fails the third legitimacy test.
Alternately, it can be suggested that an import restriction that was 
imposed together with domestic production restraints, and a ban on the 
import of cigarettes containing additives scientifically shown to be harmful 
would be legitimate means of addressing the public health concerns 
about smoking.29
Case 2: Leg-hold Furs - TREPI as Sanctions
Issue: The European Community proposed an import ban on furs 
from wild animals caught with leg-hold traps, claiming that such methods
29
Very similar issues to those in the Thailand Cigarettes case were at stake in the beef hormone 
dispute between the US and the European Union, and the same conclusions would be reached in applying 
the three-part legitimacy test. For an excellent description of this dispute see Vogel (1995). This WTO  
Dispute Settlement Panel Report is available at the WTO website: http://www.wto.org.
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are cruel and inhumane. Canada and the United States have objected to 
the measure and consultations have been ongoing with a view to 
resolving the dispute. No formal dispute settlement has yet taken place.
First Test: Is the authority materially affected by what it proposes 
to act toward?
Any suffering that the European Community claims to wish to avert 
occurs outside of its jurisdiction and as such it is not materially affected by 
what it proposes to act toward. For this reason its proposed measure 
would fail the first legitimacy test. If the European Community could 
demonstrate unequivocally that it is motivated by “moral outrage” it may 
then be accepted that it is, in that sense, materially affected. No such 
demonstration has yet been made.
Second Test: Would the proposed action be effective?
As argued in Chapter 4, it is not usually the case that trade 
restrictions are effective means of inducing a change in the behaviour of 
others. As “acceptable” alternative trapping methods have not yet been 
developed, the loss of the important European market would most likely 
depress fur prices. This would cause considerable hardship for trappers, 
who are normally very poor people with no alternative source of income. 
While the European Community is a major market for furs, other 
significant markets exist, however, so a European import ban might not in 
itself stop the practice that it was supposed to stop. In the event both 
Canada and the US indicated their intention to phase out the use of leg- 
hold traps. The role played by the threatened European ban, however, 
remains uncertain. If it was found to have played a role in causing the
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phasing out of leg-hold traps it has taken a long time to bring about that 
effect.
Third Test: Is the TREPI the least-cost effective option?
Assuming that the threatened ban was the main reason for the US 
and Canada phasing out the use of leg-hold traps, it would not be the 
least-cost effective option. If the European position was really based on 
solid ethical foundations reflecting domestic popular opinion, a fur 
labelling system would be sufficient, perhaps in conjunction with a public 
information campaign. The expression of moral preferences is more 
properly the right of individuals, not of governments. As well, international 
negotiation and assisting with the development of alternative “humane” 
trapping methods would be a better means of achieving the aim of 
reducing the suffering of trapped animals, while avoiding causing 
avoidable hardship to poor and economically vulnerable trappers.
Conclusion: While the threatened import ban may have played a 
role in bringing about the phase-out of leg-hold traps by Canada and the 
US, it failed the other two legitimacy tests. Recalling that before a TREPI 
can be considered legitimate it must pass all three tests, the proposed 
European import ban on furs caught with leg-hold traps must be seen as 
illegitimate.
112
Case 3: The Effect of Environmental and Animal Welfare
Regulations on the Competitiveness of UK Agriculture -
Commercial TREPI
Issue:
Farmers, like other businessmen, will often complain about 
regulations. Many of them, they will argue, are unnecessary; many impair 
their competitive position. The central complaint is almost always that the 
regulations impose unwarranted or anti-competitive costs on their industry. 
More recently regulations to achieve environmental and animal welfare 
objectives have come in for particular criticism from UK agriculture for 
imposing burdensome costs "that our competitors don't have to bear". As a 
result, calls are made for the imposition of import restrictions to counter the 
perceived competitive unfairness.
First Test: Is the authority materially affected by what it proposes 
to act toward?
This is a rapidly developing situation, with new regulations being 
proposed every year. For example, new regulations affecting the size of 
battery cages are expected in 1998. Accordingly, this analysis focuses only 
on the main existing regulations, as at the end of 1997, that are estimated 
to have the largest individual commercial impact.
To help identify all of the UK and implemented EU regulations 
currently affecting UK farmers, a preliminary list was compiled from the data 
base at the Cabinet Office's Regulation Unit. This list was cross-referenced 
and augmented by research in the MAFF and House of Commons Libraries
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of all regulations since 1993. This latter research was particularly important 
because since 1993 all proposed regulations have had to be accompanied 
by a Compliance Cost Assessment (CCA) providing an analysis and 
estimates of the commercial impact of the proposed regulation on the 
affected industry. The estimates in these CCAs were, whenever possible, 
developed on the basis of information and advice provided by the industry 
concerned. A total of 224 regulations were identified dating back to 1925. 
Of these, 160, or over 70%, were since 1993 and required the completion 
of a CCA.
The regulations were first grouped into six categories according to 
the primary objective of the regulation: disease control, animal health, food 
safety, animal welfare, environment and other. Disease control includes all 
those that aim to contain and control the spread of disease in farm animals. 
Animal health includes those that are directed at ensuring the maintenance 
of the health of farm animals. Food safety regulations are those aimed at 
ensuring that harvested products or the meat of slaughtered animals are 
safe for human consumption. Animal welfare regulations aim to ensure that 
the treatment of farm animals meets certain standards of animal husbandry, 
including freedom from unnecessary suffering or abuse. Environmental 
regulations are those concerned with the protection or maintenance of the 
natural, physical surroundings within which the farmer operates. The Other 
category contains those regulations which did not fit any of the preceding 
categories. Almost entirely these relate to the maintenance of quality 
standards of seeds, the regulation of seed varieties or to plant-breeders’ 
rights.
Next the regulations were grouped according to whether they would 
affect the arable/horticulture sector, the livestock sector or both. In turn, the
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arable/horticulture sector was subdivided into five types: cereals, potatoes, 
horticulture, all arable and horticulture, and other. The livestock sector was 
subdivided into seven types: all cattle, dairy cows, pigs, poultry, sheep and 
goats, all livestock, and other.
Although with some of the regulations a degree of subjectivity was 
necessary to classify them, it appears that some 83% of regulations apply 
to the livestock sector while 27% apply to arable/horticulture30. Figure 1 
shows the subsectors of arable/horticulture that are affected by regulation. 
Some 78% of these regulations are applicable to all arable and horticulture.
Figure 2: UK Agricultural Regulations by Sector - Arable/Horticulture
Horticulture Other
3% 7%
Potatoes
5%
1
Similarly with livestock. Figure 2 shows that half of all livestock 
regulations affect the whole livestock sector, while those specifically 
affecting
30 Twenty-one regulations apply to both livestock and arable/horticulture.
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Figure 3: UK Agricultural Regulations by Sector - Livestock
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All Cattle and Dairy Cows account for an additional 32%. This figure 
includes 24 regulations relating to BSE. If BSE-related regulations are 
excluded the number falls to 20%.
Figure 3 shows the distribution of UK agricultural regulation 
according to objective. As can be seen, over half of all regulations are 
there to help protect the industry from crop or livestock disease. A further 
quarter are aimed at protecting the human food supply. Together with the 
small number of "Other" regulations covering mainly issues regarding seed 
quality, it is apparent that over 85% of all regulation affecting UK agriculture 
are providing essential services to farmers that would or could not be 
provided by the private sector alone.
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Figure 4: UK Agricultural Regulations by Objective
Disease Control 
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Animal Health 
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The final two main categories of regulatory objectives are 
Environmental and Animal Welfare. These account for 7% and 6% 
respectively. Of these 29 regulations, 21 were implemented since 1993 
and had CCAs completed.
Environmental Regulations: There are 16 agricultural regulations 
that have environmental protection as their main objective, seven of which 
affect the whole of agriculture. A further six affect primarily livestock.
Of these 16 regulations, all but four either have little or no direct commercial 
impact, have effects that are primarily downstream of the farm, or entail 
cross-compliance requirements. The downstream industries affected 
include fertiliser manufacturers and developers of novel foods. The four
Food Safety 
26%
Other 
Environment jo/0
7%
Animal Welfare
6%
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regulations containing cross-compliance requirements relate to the Beef 
Special Premium, Suckler Cow Premium, Sheep Annual Premium, and the 
HLCA. Certainly these cross-compliance requirements can entail costs for 
producers. However, it can be assumed that such costs will be less than 
the value of the subsidy, otherwise the producer would not claim it.
There are three environmental regulations that the CCA estimates 
indicate may have a direct, commercially significant effect on UK farmers.
It must be emphasised that the figures provided by the CCAs are 
averages only; some farm businesses will see a smaller impact, while 
others will suffer larger costs. Similarly, it is not possible to evaluate 
whether these regulations affect all the same farms or different ones. Most 
likely there will be some overlap. Regardless, a sense of proportion can be 
deduced from the available figures.
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Table 2: The Crop (Residues) Burning Regulations
Arable
Total Sectoral Output, 1996 - £ millions 3042
Estimated Sectoral Impact31 - £ '000 14,000
Number of Affected Holdings, 1996 31,600
Percent of Total Holdings 40%
Value of Affected Output - £ millions 1217
Percent of Total Sectoral Output 40%
Estimated Affected Net Farm Income32 - £ millions 267.62
Impact as Percent of Total Sectoral Output 0. 46%
Impact as Percent of Affected Output 1.15%
Impact as Percent of Est. Net Farm Income 5.2%
Average Impact per Holding - £ 443
a.) The Crop (Residues) Burning Regulations aim to improve air 
quality by restricting the traditional agricultural practice of burning post­
harvest crop residues. Effective since 1992, they affect mainly the arable 
sector. Assuming average conditions on heavy soil, for cereals they have 
an estimated industry-wide impact of £14 million.
31
The estimated sectoral impact assumes that non-recurring costs are depreciated over 10 years. 
Accordingly, the recurring costs are added to one-tenth of the non-recurring costs to get the figure used.
32 Estimated net farm income was derived by takhg the ratio of the relevant total farm output values 
and net farm incomes published by MAFF in the annual Farm Business Survey. This was done for each of 
the yearsl 994/5, 1995/6 and 1996/7, and the average was then taken. The resulting average ratio was then 
applied to the relevant affected sectoral output figures.
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b.) The Nitrates Directive restricts emissions of nitrates in 
designated nitrate-vulnerable zones (NVZ). It affects most livestock
Table 3: Nitrates Directive
Poultry Pigs Beef Dairy
Total Sectoral Output, 1996 £ millions 1934 1316 1962 3514
Estimated Sectoral Impact33 - £ '000 360 1686 134 1910
Number of Affected Holdings, 1996 235 555 422 310
Percent of Total Holdings 0.78% 2.9% 0.6% 0.8%
Value of Affected Output - £ millions 135 132 24 95
Percent of Total Sectoral Output 7% 10% 1% 1%
Estimated Affected Net Farm Income34 - 
£ millions
15 15 3 20
Impact as Percent of Total Sectoral 
Output
0.02% 0.13% 0.01% 0.05%
Impact as Percent of Affected Output 0.3% 1.3% 0.6% 2.0%
Impact as Percent of Est. Net Farm 
Income
2.4 % 11.3% 4.5% 9.6%
Average Impact per Holding - £ 1532 3038 317 6161
producers whose farms are in an NVZ. In the dairy sector 310 of the 574 
farms in NVZs are expected to incur an annual cost of £1,910,000 or an
33
34
See footnote 30. 
See footnote 31.
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average of £6161 each. In the beef sector 422 of the 713 farms in NVZs 
are expected to incur additional annual costs of £134,000 or an average of 
£317 each. In the pigs sector, estimated annual costs are approximately 
£1,686,000 or an average of £3038 per farm. Similarly in the poultry sector 
operations in NVZs are expected to incur total compliance costs of 
£360,000 or £1,532 each. Arable producers are also affected although 
the directive
Table 4: IPPC
Poultry Pigs
Total Sectoral Output, 1996 £ millions 1934 1316
Estimated Sectoral Impact35 - £ millions 6 5
Number of Affected Holdings, 1996 539 435
Percent of Total Holdings 2% 2%
Value of Affected Output - £ millions 1162 514
Percent of Total Sectoral Output 60% 39%
Estimated Affected Net Farm Income36 - , millions 130 58
Impact as Percent of Total Sectoral Output 0.3% 0.4%
Impact as Percent of Affected Output 0.5% 1.0%
Impact as Percent of Est. Net Farm Income 4.6% 8.6%
Average Impact per Holding - £ 10853 12110
35 See footnote 30.
36 See footnote 31.
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only restricts the use of inorganic fertilisers to the amount necessary to 
meet crop requirements. Therefore, applications in excess of this would be 
uneconomic. As a result, arable farmers with good agricultural practices will 
not be significantly affected.
c.) The Integrated Pollution Control Directive (IPPC) aims to 
reduce pollution arising from agriculture. It affects mainly large intensive pig 
and poultry operations37.
In the pigs sector total compliance costs are £5,268,460. Breeding 
operations would incur costs of £5150 per farm, while finishing operations 
would incur costs of £12,950 per farm. Similarly in the poultry sector total 
compliance costs for layers are £4,130,441 or £12,650 per farm, while 
total costs for broilers are £1,720,660 or £14,400 per farm.
Animal Welfare Regulations: Of the 13 regulations, four were from 
before 1993 and so did not have CCAs done. However, all would have had 
only indirect or downstream effects on farmers. Of those brought in since 
1993, four regulations were found to have either nil or negligible commercial 
effects, while a further four had only downstream effects. That left only one 
regulation, the Welfare of Livestock Regulations, that has a CCA showing a 
significant direct commercial impact on farmers.
The Welfare of Livestock Regulations affect mainly three types of 
livestock: calves, poultry, and pigs. As to calves, these regulations re­
enact the 1987 Welfare of Calves Regulations that effectively banned the 
use of "veal crates", and set out minimum space allowances for group 
housed calves. These minimum space allowances are effective 
immediately for new installations and to all others from 2004. Accordingly,
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they will not have any significant commercial effect on existing calf 
operations at this time.
Table 5: The Welfare of Livestock Regulations
Laying
Hens
Pigs
Total Sectoral Output 1996 £ millions 437 1316
Estimated Sectoral Impact38 - £ millions 16.7 7.9
Number of Affected Holdings, 1996 750 4000
Percent of Total Holdings 2.7% 41%
Value of Affected Output - £ millions 387 1250
Percent of Total Sectoral Output 91% 95%
Estimated Affected Net Farm Income39 - £mil!ions 43.5 140
Impact as Percent of Total Sectoral Output 3.8% 0.6%
Impact as Percent of Affected Output 4.2% 0.63%
Impact as Percent of Est. Net Farm Income 38.4% 5.6%
Average Impact per Holding - £ 22,267 1975
Since 1987 newly installed or renovated battery cages have been 
subject to construction and size requirements laid out in the Welfare of 
Battery Hens Regulations. Effective 1 January 1995, under the Welfare of
37 The Directive applies only to operations above certain size thresholds. These are 750 breeding
sows, 2,000 finishing pigs of over 30 kg live-weight and/or 40,000 poultry places.
38 See footnote 30.
39 See footnote 31.
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Livestock Regulations these requirements will apply to all cages. There 
were approximately 27,782 laying flocks in the UK in 1995, of which only 
the 750 battery cage flocks that account for 91% of total UK production are 
affected. With a total annual cost to the industry of an estimated £16.7 
million, which means an average cost of £22,267 per affected flock.
With regard to pigs, these regulations re-enact the Welfare of Pigs 
Regulations 1991 that phase out by 1 January 1999 the use of tethers and 
close confinement systems, and implement an EC Directive regarding 
minimum space allowances applicable to all holdings from 1 January 1998. 
The total industry cost of these requirements is about £7.9 million, or an 
average of £1,975 for each of the estimated 4,000 affected holdings.
Conclusions: As we saw earlier in this part, the bulk of regulation 
directly affecting UK agriculture provides positive benefits to the industry by 
ensuring the delivery of commercially valuable services that would not 
otherwise be available. Of those few regulations affecting the agricultural 
industry whose main objective is the protection and maintenance of the 
natural environment or animal welfare, the total impact on the industry as a 
percentage of the total sectoral output is, with only one exception, less than 
0.6%. When we look at the effect of the regulations as a percentage of 
affected output, again with one exception, the figures do not rise to 
significant levels. The exception in both cases is that of the effect of the 
Welfare of Livestock regulations on laying hen operations. Unfortunately 
the statistics available on the egg sector are particularly unreliable due to 
the very high level of concentration in the industry.
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Of greatest general significance are the effects of the regulations as 
a percentage of estimated net farm income. Some qualifying remarks need 
to be made however.
The effects of two of the three environmental regulations, as a 
percentage of estimated net farm income, are significant. While in both 
cases the impact of the regulations is very small at the industry level, with 
the IPPC the impact also represents a substantial proportion of total 
sectoral output. With the animal welfare regulations the impact as a 
percentage of estimated net farm income is most significant with laying hen 
operations. However, this is because net farm income is extremely low. 
The actual average impact per laying hen flock is about £22,267. In the 
case of pigs the impact is £1,975, or 5.6% of estimated net farm income.
It should to be re-emphasised that these results are based on 
averages; there is an undetermined range of individual experience around 
the average. For example, the examples given in Appendix 2 of the CCA 
for the Welfare of Livestock Regulations (1994) all estimate costs for 
individual operations that are significantly higher than that given in Table 5. 
Even with those regulations that have small estimated effects, for some 
operations the actual effects may be severe. Moreover, we have only 
considered the current regulations that are estimated to have the largest 
individual commercial impact. Certainly regulations in combination could 
also pose significant cumulative costs. Such combinations of regulations 
would vary with different circumstances and so have not been considered 
here. Importantly, it is also likely that the burden of environmental and 
animal welfare regulations will grow over the coming years. As that 
happens these results will be superseded. Finally, it should also be recalled
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that the estimates used, while developed with input from the affected 
industry, are those of the government department responsible for 
implementing the regulations concerned. As such they may tend to 
understate the actual commercial impact.
While the range of actual experience and possible future increases 
in environmental regulation were not considered, neither were the 
competitive advantages that increasingly accrue to those meeting the 
highest standards. There are two main advantages. First, it is sometimes 
the case that higher environmental standards are met by adopting 
production methods that are more efficient in their total use of resources, 
thus delivering net savings for the producer. Second, as the development 
of product traceability and Farm Assurance programmes suggests, the 
application of high environmental and animal welfare standards can deliver 
initial competitive advantages in marketing of food products, both by 
differentiating products and by attracting price premia. Unfortunately, as 
such standards are codified by regulation, increasingly they become base­
line requirements and the price premia are eroded. Provided the pace of 
new regulations is not too great, while the price premia decline they provide 
a degree of assistance with adjusting to the new standards. Clearly 
appropriate labelling requirements would help to maximise the extent and 
longevity of these premia.
Although in most cases the regulations considered in this analysis do 
not have a significant effect at the industry level, certainly intensive 
production systems, and egg producers in particular, appear to carry the 
largest costs. With further legislation affecting battery hen operations 
imminent, and pressures continuing for yet higher environmental and 
animal welfare standards, these costs can be expected to increase. To the
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extent that these regulations, or their equivalents, are implemented equally 
throughout Europe, any competitive disadvantage that they might entail is 
reduced. Non-EU imports, however, especially to the growing catering 
trade where the lowest price is often the most important selling feature, may 
be able to increase their market share at the expense of domestic 
producers.
Second Test: Would the proposed action be effective?
Certainly international trade restrictions on products produced to 
lower standards would be an effective way of off-setting the commercial 
disadvantages that would otherwise arise.
Third Test: Is the TREPI the least-cost effective option?
Although certain producers will no doubt suffer commercial 
disadvantages from the regulations considered in this analysis, at the 
industry level the effects appear to be generally insignificant at this time. 
Accordingly, while import restrictions would help offset competitive 
disadvantages due to environmental or animal welfare regulations, if they 
were generally permitted producers would also find that their access to 
international markets was increasingly restricted. The costs would quickly 
exceed the benefits, and the net effect would be that everyone would be 
less well off.
Are there any other effective options? Obviously one option is to 
fight the implementation of the regulations in the first place. The growing
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strength of the constituency behind these regulations, however, suggests 
that there is little reason to think that such a strategy on its own would be 
successful. Appropriate government action at the domestic level provides 
another alternative. For example, accelerated depreciation rates and other 
forms of tax assistance could help defray the additional costs that 
environmental and animal welfare regulations impose on producers. 
Similarly direct payments could be made for achieving particular 
environmental objectives. Certainly, international trade law recognises the 
legitimacy of government assistance to producers, within limits, for meeting 
the costs of conforming to environmental standards. It may be possible to 
have this facility improved upon, and widened to include animal welfare 
standards as well.
Finally, if they are to accept higher environmental and animal welfare 
regulations, producers must be able to label their products appropriately so 
that consumers can express their preferences more fully. If governments 
require producers to use particular production methods, whether to meet 
environmental or animal welfare standards, and to compete against imports 
produced to cheaper standards, producers must be allowed to capture all of 
the commercial advantages available. This includes especially the 
additional price premia that consumers will pay for properly labelled 
differentiated goods. With a proper labelling system, farmers will be better 
able to adopt profitably new production systems and differentiate their 
products for domestic consumers from the commodity products that 
dominate internationally traded goods.
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Conclusion:
The use of import restrictions to offset the commercial effects on 
UK agriculture arising from environmental and animal welfare regulations 
would not be legitimate at this time. They would be disproportionate, and 
alternative, lower cost effective options are available. It is entirely 
conceivable, however, that more substantial differences could arise, and 
the resulting commercial effects would then be larger. A facility for the 
use of trade restrictions may then be needed. In this event, for reasons 
discussed in the last chapter, financial border measures are the preferred 
option of economists.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LIBERALISATION AND THE ENVIRONMENT: 
AN EXAMINATION IN THREE PARTS
Before proceeding to examine the compatibility of the GATT and 
the legitimate use of TREPI, it may be useful first to consider the 
interactions between international trade liberalisation and the environment 
by considering the composition of trade, systemic and intervention effects, 
and the effects of economic growth. An examination of these interactions 
is of interest and relevance to this thesis because international trade 
liberalisation is the raison d’etre of the GATT, and many of them can be 
quite significant.
PART 1
Composition of Trade
Perhaps the simplest way of looking at the effects of international 
trade liberalisation on the environment is to look at the content of trade.
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On the one hand, the world-wide market for environmental protection 
technologies has been estimated by the OECD at $250 billion. This is 
expected to double over the course of the next 5 to 10 years. Clearly to 
the extent that the international trading system facilitates the development 
and transmission of such technologies environmental benefits can be 
expected to accrue. For example, trade policies regarding investment 
measures and the protection of intellectual property rights will affect the 
development and transfer of environmental technologies appropriate to 
the needs and conditions of much of the developing world. These types 
of trade policies would have mainly an indirect effect on environmental 
problems, and so, as was argued in the last chapter, they should not be 
implemented as environmental policy measures.
International trade is also conducted in hazardous and toxic materials, 
and in endangered species. In such cases trade is integral to 
environmental problems and so, as argued in the last chapter, trade 
measures could legitimately have a role as environmental policy 
instruments.
PART 2
Systemic and Intervention Effects
A second way of looking at the effects of international trade 
relations on the environment is to divide them into two primary types: 
systemic effects and intervention effects. Systemic effects arise from the 
existence and functioning of the international trading system. Essentially
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they are the product of individual private interactions, and are seen to 
result from market failures. Intervention effects, by contrast, are a 
consequence of public policy measures.
Systemic Effects
The importance of markets to environmental efficiency is 
demonstrated by comparing the relative performance of market 
economies with those of the former Eastern bloc where resources were 
allocated according to central plans. In 1983 energy use per unit of GDP 
in Hungary and Romania was more than twice that of the United States 
and nearly five times that of France and Sweden (World Resources 1986, 
Table 8.2, pp. 292-3). Similarly, sulphur dioxide emissions per unit of 
GNP in 1982 were 40 times as high in Czechoslovakia, and 35 times as 
high in East Germany, as they were in Japan (Chandler 1987, Table 10-3, 
p. 187)40. During the mid-1980s, although the Soviet Union was the 
world's largest producer of steel, it was nearly last in terms of the energy 
efficiency of that production, using 31 gigajoules of energy per ton 
compared to the 19 gigajoules per ton used in Japan (ibid., p. 183).
Although the operation of markets can be understood to be a 
primary influence, in part these differences in resource-use efficiency are 
also explained by the efficiency of the capital employed and by the level of 
development (ibid., pp. 182-3). We know, for example, that while the 
developing countries have the lowest carbon emissions per capita they 
have the highest per unit of GDP (Grubb, 1992, p. 17). Similarly with 
agriculture, in 1985 the average grain yield in tons per hectare in the 
Soviet Union was 1.6, the same as Pakistan and India. This was a third
40
The Japanese figure is for 1980.
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that of the United States (4.8), and only slightly more than one quarter of 
that of Japan (5.8) (Wolf, 1987, Table 8-2, p. 142. See also World 
Resources 1986, Table 4.4, p.47).
Thus Chandler (1987) is right to argue that "[a] clear demarcation 
... exists between market-oriented and centrally planned economies in 
energy as well as agriculture. Where governments directly control 
industrial production, energy efficiency is low. Centrally planned 
economies would probably create more goods and services with a given 
level of resources if they relied more on markets. But that does not mean 
that markets alone can keep nations within the bounds of sustainable 
development" (p. 183).
The central and most important feature of markets are prices. But 
prices are, in principle, just a ratio, in a common unit of account, of the 
aggregate relative preference between any two goods or services. 
Therefore, the fundamental difficulty with a reliance on freely operating 
markets is that the functioning of the environment is independent of 
human preference while markets are nothing more than reflections of 
human preferences. Within the limits of environmental capacity, markets 
alone may well provide for optimal mediation between the many 
competing human preferences. At the limits of environmental capacity, 
however, the market on its own does not and cannot be relied upon to 
reflect all of the relevant variables.
Markets fail, giving rise to international systemic effects, because of 
their inability to value fully, and the failure of economic actors to 
internalise fully, all the environmental costs of their activities. It is held 
that if all the environmental costs of economic activities were valued and
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internalised fully the optimal level of environmental consumption would 
obtain. This is because thereby the marginal external costs and the 
marginal net private benefits would be equalised.41 An important purpose 
of market-based solutions to environmental problems is to correct for 
these market failures and so facilitate reaching or approximating this 
equilibrium. Doing so, it is believed, will ensure that economic activities 
are environmentally sustainable. The OECD's widely accepted "Polluter 
Pays Principle", for example, is grounded in such a belief.
The other primary advantage of market-based approaches is that 
they are often the most efficient means of reaching the objective. 
Whereas "command and control" methods of environmental management 
impose environmental standards, together with monitoring and 
enforcement sanctions, market-based approaches modify the incentive 
structure. Since Adam Smith it has been widely accepted that an 
objective brought about as a result of private motivation will be at a lower 
cost than if it were brought about by collective compulsion.
There are two main classes of market-based approaches: open 
and closed. With the open system the incentive structure is modified, 
perhaps by levying a consumption tax, but without explicit environmental 
targets. Bottle deposit schemes and energy taxes would be examples. 
The closed systems also regulate the incentive structure but do so within 
explicit environmental targets. Tradable emissions permits and resource 
extraction quotas are examples. But not all environmental problems can 
be addressed satisfactorily by incentive structure modification. Under a 
closed system the required scheme may prove to be complicated and 
unmanageable, while under an open system a low price elasticity of
41
Pearce and Turner (1990) provide a good introduction to this approach in Chapters 4-5.
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demand for the product at issue would tend to minimise the resulting 
behaviour modification. Accordingly, market-based approaches to 
environmental problems, while necessary, will not be sufficient to ensure 
that economic activities are environmentally sustainable. To ensure that 
economic activities respect the capacity of the relevant ecosystem direct 
public sector interventions will be needed; "command and control" 
methods will need to supplement and reinforce market-based methods. 
This will be the case for addressing both the environmental consequences 
of domestic economic activities as well as those arising from the 
international economy.
"Command and control" mechanisms are also employed, 
sometimes inappropriately, as a result of public pressure on authorities to 
"do something". As well, they may provide a spur to private action.
Finally, in some cases, they may prove to be more efficient than market- 
based mechanisms since collective action is sometimes preferred to 
private action, especially whenever property rights are not or cannot be 
ascribed. Accordingly public sector interventions to introduce and 
facilitate both market-based and "command and control" mechanisms are 
both necessary and desirable.
Intervention Effects
It should be recognised that the degree of environmental 
conservation which can be brought about by public interventions may be 
lessened as a direct result of the existence and functioning of the 
international trading system. Exporters generating production pollution 
may seek to minimise the degree to which public interventions constrain 
their ability to externalise environmental costs. They will argue that this is
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necessary to retain or enhance their international competitiveness. 
Similarly those jurisdictions which establish high consumption pollution 
standards may face opposition from domestic importers and foreign 
exporters as a result of the concomitant market access restrictions.
In considering the environmental implications of international trade 
interventions, it must be recalled that almost all of those currently in place 
were implemented for economic reasons. Accordingly their environmental 
consequences are incidental and do not support a conclusion that 
interventions are necessarily deleterious to the environment. They do 
nonetheless elucidate some of the ways in which trade policy 
interventions can affect the environmental sustainability of economic 
activities. Two such ways are apparent: by affecting the efficiency of the 
economy, and by affecting the development path of the economy.
i) Efficiency Losses
The ways in which trade policy interventions impair the efficiency of 
the economy have been well established and described in most 
international economics textbooks. These are equally applicable whether 
the intervention is implemented for protectionist reasons, to foster 
economic development, or for any other purpose. Quantitative and 
financial border restrictions may be implemented to affect the distribution 
of production and/or consumption, and have been used extensively in the 
pursuit of economic development. They were, for example, a crucial 
element of the increasingly discredited import substitution policies 
followed by most LDCs over the post-war period, and by the industrialised 
countries before them, and remain a central feature of the trade policy 
measures employed by both developed and developing countries alike.
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Similarly domestic interventions such as subsidies and taxes distort 
relative pricing and so diminish the allocative efficiency of the market.
By thus impairing the efficiency of the economy the environmental 
consumption per unit of output may be greater than otherwise. Export 
restrictions, for example, on a natural resource, implemented to foster a 
domestic processing industry and so retain for the domestic economy 
more value from that resource, may have deleterious environmental 
consequences. Domestic income may rise as a result of the intervention 
and so facilitate greater environmental protection measures. However, to 
the extent that the domestic processors are less efficient than their foreign 
competitors more natural resources will be extracted per unit of processed 
output than would have been the case before the export restriction was 
implemented. Whether or not the marginal increase in revenue available 
for environmental protection is sufficient to offset the resource use 
efficiency losses is not susceptible to a priori generalisations.
Accordingly, whenever any intervention is to be implemented, an 
evaluation of both the benefits and the economic efficiency losses 
resulting from it needs to be undertaken. We shall return to this later.
ii) Development Distortions
It may be argued that a central purpose of international trade policy 
is to affect the course of the economic development of the participants. It 
constitutes the "rules of the game", the framework within which 
international trade takes place. As such it tends to favour the aspirations 
and interests of the industries with the greatest influence. These will be 
almost exclusively in the industrialised countries. One main group of 
these are the industries associated with the early stages of economic
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development, including agriculture, and clothing and textiles. These are 
long established and well organised to protect their interests. 
Consequently competition from LDCs in these areas is met with a plethora 
of obstacles to trade. By so frustrating their development interests, the 
incomes of the LDCs are less than they otherwise would be.
Consequently the inefficiencies of environmental consumption associated 
with the earlier stages of development remain. At the same time 
resources in the industrialised countries are misallocated to these 
industries.
Trade policy with respect to the most advanced sectors of the 
economy also affects the path of economic development and has 
environmental consequences. Developments regarding the protection of 
intellectual property rights (IPRs) are a case in point. On the one hand, it 
can be argued that increasing restraints on the international transmission 
of intellectual property will affect the ability of LDC industrialists to employ 
the most efficient technologies available, thus again frustrating their 
development efforts to the detriment of the environment. Moreover I PR 
protection may impair both the development and the international 
transmission of other technologies appropriate to the economic 
development needs of the LDCs. On the other hand, increased protection 
for intellectual property may enhance innovation and so foster the 
development of environmentally benign technologies. Similarly it may be 
argued that encouraging foreign direct investment will facilitate the 
international transmission of "best available" technologies.
Tariff escalation by the developed countries presents a further, 
specific problem. From the perspective of the industrialised countries, 
tariff escalation serves the dual purpose of facilitating access to supplies
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of unprocessed natural resources while skewing the distribution of higher 
value-added manufacturing and processing towards themselves. 
Together with the deteriorating terms of trade for unprocessed goods, 
tariff escalation forces LDCs to ever greater levels of exploitation of their 
natural resource bases just to maintain a given income, while impairing 
their ability to develop export-oriented value-added industries. Other 
import management measures, such as quotas, “voluntary export 
restraints” (VERs), “orderly marketing arrangements” (OMAs), etc. which 
are implemented by the industrialised countries, in addition to impairing 
their own economic efficiency by protecting uncompetitive industries, also 
frustrate the industrialisation efforts of the LDCs.
As a result, LDCs are "trapped" into exporting mainly raw materials 
and low value-added goods in ever greater volumes in order to import 
manufactures from the industrialised countries. This ever deepening 
development crisis is seen as one of the key causes of environmental 
degradation in the poorer countries. Thus trade policy interventions, such 
as tariff escalation and other forms of import management not only impair 
economic efficiency they also constrain and distort the path of economic 
development of much of the world.
PART 3
An Examination of Some Effects of Economic Growth
In the view of some analysts liberalised trade relations are an 
essential prerequisite to environmentally sustainable economic activity.
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For others an open multilateral trading system is seen as a threat to 
proper environmental management. To cast light on this debate this part 
of the chapter will examine some of the effects of economic growth 
associated with international trade relations.
Since international trade both facilitates and gives rise to greater 
economic growth, and since it is widely held that international trade 
liberalisation is an important source of economic growth, the 
environmental consequences of liberalised international trade relations 
can be elucidated by examining the environmental effects of economic 
growth. Of course many other economic variables also provide sources of 
economic growth. Similarly, international trade relations have 
environmental effects other than those associated with economic growth. 
But the importance of the close interrelationship between international 
trade relations and economic growth means that many of the important 
environmental effects of international trade relations are disclosed by 
analysing the environmental effects of economic growth.
In 1972 concern about the environmental consequences of current 
economic activities was first highlighted with the publication by the Club of 
Rome of The Limits To Growth. A central conclusion of this report was 
that,
"[i]f the present growth trends in world population, industrialisation, 
pollution, food production, and resource depletion continue 
unchanged, the limits to growth on this planet will be reached 
sometime within the next one hundred years. The most probable 
result will be a rather sudden and uncontrollable decline in both the 
population and industrial capacity." (Meadows et al, 1972, p. 23)
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Similar views were expressed again in the 1980 US Global Report to the 
President which concluded that,
“[i]f present trends continue, the world in 2000 will be more 
crowded, more polluted, less stable ecologically, and more 
vulnerable to disruption than the world we live in now. Serious 
stresses involving population, resources, and environment are 
clearly visible ahead. Despite greater material output, the world's 
people will be poorer in many ways than they are today." (see 
Simon and Kahn, 1984, p.1)
In both of these cases, as indeed in others, the predictions were 
based on present trends and were accompanied by urgent calls for 
substantial political-economic policy and behavioural modifications, often 
emphasising the necessity of general limits to economic growth. Such 
modifications, it was argued, were needed to ameliorate the future 
problems.
Subsequently such prescriptions, and to an extent the underlying 
diagnoses as well, became largely discredited. By 1987, with the 
publication of the Brundtland Report, the emphasis shifted from arguing 
the need for general limits to economic growth to an argument that 
included a key role for economic growth. Thus,
"Our report... is not a prediction of ever increasing environmental 
decay, poverty, and hardship in an ever more polluted world among 
ever decreasing resources. We see instead the possibility for a 
new era of economic growth, one that must be based on policies 
that sustain and expand the environmental resource base. And we
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believe such growth to be absolutely essential to relieve the great 
poverty that is deepening in much of the developing world. ... 
technology and social organisation can be both managed and 
improved to make way for a new era of economic growth." 
(Brundtland, 1987, p. ES-1)
In Brundtland (1987) the desirability of this " new era of economic 
growth" is qualified by the need for it to be sustainable; "that it meets the 
needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs". They emphasise, however, that 
"sustainability",
"does not imply limits -  not absolute limits but limitations imposed 
by the present state of technology and social organisation on 
environmental resources and by the ability of the biosphere to 
absorb the effects of human activities." (p.ES-7)
In practical terms the essentially hopeful message of the 
Brundtland Report, and its central guiding principle of "sustainability" is 
extremely complicated42. As with earlier reports, implementation of the 
Brundtland recommendations "will require a fundamental change in 
existing policies and practices." (World Resources Institute, 1992, p. 12)
While the nature of such a fundamental change remains ill- 
understood, subsequent analyses have adopted the positive correlation 
between economic prosperity and environmental well-being. 
Correspondingly, trade liberalisation is viewed as environmentally
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beneficial because of its economic growth promoting effects. Paragraph 
2.19 of Agenda 21 is typical in this regard:
"An open, multilateral trading system makes possible a more 
efficient allocation and use of resources and thereby contributes to 
an increase in production and incomes and to lessening demands 
on the environment. It thus provides additional resources needed 
for economic growth and development and improved environmental 
protection."
Similar arguments are proffered by the WTO and the OECD (see GATT, 
1992, and OECD, 1992).
Empirical support for such views was provided by Grossman and 
Krueger (1991). In a study of atmospheric sulphur dioxide levels at 
various points throughout the developed and developing world since 1976 
they found that income growth had been associated with lower levels of 
pollution over significant ranges of per capita income. World Bank (1992) 
provides complementary evidence that the problems of urban airborne 
particulates, and number of individuals without safe drinking water or 
adequate sanitation are ameliorated at higher income levels (figure 4, p. 
11).
Radetzki (1992) summarised as follows the principal arguments in 
support of the view that increasing economic activity, as a result of 
liberalising trade, is associated with improved environmental conditions:
42
For a useful discussion of some of the complexities inherent in the idea of sustainable development
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"(a) All human activities by necessity alter the virgin environment. 
But a majority of these alterations involve conscious efforts to improve by 
making the environmental conditions better suited to human needs.
(b) Negative external effects, a common cause of environmental 
damage, become increasingly circumscribed through widening property 
rights and regulation of the use of commons, as the density of economic 
activity increases.
(c) The economic structure tends to change in ways that reduce 
environmental resource inputs per unit of output, as national economies 
mature. There is a shift from heavy industries and investments in physical 
infrastructure, to high-tech industries and services, and the latter activities 
cause little wear on the environment.
(d) The income elasticity of demand for environmental services is 
high. Rich consumers are more willing than poor ones to spend 
substantial parts of their income for safeguarding high environmental 
standards." (p. 134)
On closer scrutiny two primary trends emerge: one where a 
number of environmental problems, those associated with the earlier 
stages of economic development, are ameliorated with income growth; 
the other where income growth exacerbates a number of environmental 
problems, those associated with the more mature stages of economic 
development. Some desirable effects, such as the availability of 
adequate food, safe drinking water, and sanitation, tend to rise with 
rising per capita income (see World Resources Institute, 1992, Table 
16.3 and infra, Table 6). Similarly, rising incomes are associated with 
declining population growth, decreasing air and water pollution, and 
intensity of energy use (infra, Tables 6, 8 and 9). But rising incomes are
see World Resources Institute (1992), Chapter 1.
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also positively correlated with, amongst other things, total natural 
resource and energy use, fertiliser and pesticide use, carbon dioxide 
and CFC emissions, demand for protected wildlife and wildlife products, 
and waste production (see infra Tables 7, 8 and 9; World Resource 
Institute, 1992, Tables 21.5 and 20.2; and World Bank, 1992, pp.53-4).
There are also indications of a small third category, which may 
include urban concentrations of airborne particulates and sulphur 
dioxide (World Bank, 1992, pp. 10-11), water borne faecal coliform, and 
energy use by the transport sector (Tables 3 and 4 below). In this 
category the relevant statistics at first rise with per capita income and 
then decline, describing an inverse U-shaped relation43. The issues in 
this instance would be those associated with what might be called the 
"satanic mills" stage of economic development. Lucas et al (1992) 
provide evidence that total industrial emissions at first increase with 
GDP growth and then decline. However, they attribute the eventual 
decrease to a declining share of manufacturing in GDP rather than to 
cleaner manufacturing activity. Regardless, it appears clear that 
increasing income, ceteris paribus, tends to alter the composition of 
environmental consumption44, rather than simply to reduce it; some 
environmental issues are ameliorated with rising income, while others 
are exacerbated.
43
The small sample of statistics on air pollution collated in Table 7 do not support this inverted U
hypothesis. Rather they indicate a steady decline with rising income.
44
Environmental consumption means the use of any of the three primary economic functions of the 
environment. These are: 1. A source of renewable and non-renewable natural resources; 2. A means of 
waste disposal; and 3. A provider of other services including maintenance of a life support system, 
(maintenance of genetic diversity, stabilisation of ecosystems, maintenance of the composition of the 
atmosphere, and regulation of climate), and provider of amenities, (recreation, aesthetic enjoyment, and a 
source of knowledge and scientific study).
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This then raises the problem of transition. To illustrate, consider 
the issue of carbon dioxide emissions. In 1989 the low and middle 
income countries were responsible for 2013 million tons, or 0.50 tons per 
capita, of the global output of 5822 million tons. The high income 
countries, by comparison, were responsible for 3.26 tons per capita. 
Assuming that the lesser developed countries improved their efficiency 
from the 614 tons per million dollars of GDP in 1989 to that of the high 
income countries, 186 tons per million dollars of GDP, if their income were 
to rise to the OECD average their total output of carbon dioxide would 
increase by more than six-fold and global output would treble (World 
Bank, 1992, Table A.9). Clearly this would be an unsustainable burden 
on the global atmosphere. Therefore, if economic growth, and so 
liberalised international trade relations, are to be environmentally 
sustainable, if we are not simply to go "from the frying pan into the fire", 
we will need to have as clear as possible an understanding of the 
problems of transition; of the environmental effects of economic growth.
Many analysts, when recommending the environmental benefits of 
economic growth through international trade liberalisation, also advocate 
the corresponding need for appropriate non-discriminatory domestic 
environmental programs. There is an ongoing debate over the extent to 
which it may be necessary for such measures to involve trade restrictions 
or otherwise affect the international trading system. However, to manage 
properly the transition issue, at a minimum the following concerns must be 
fully addressed.
First, resource-use efficiency gains may be outweighed by 
increases in output. As an economy matures improvements in the 
marginal efficiency of capital and labour, through improvements in
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technology and organisation, may facilitate decreases in environmental 
consumption without any corresponding decrease of output. For 
example, the primary energy requirements per unit of GDP in the OECD 
declined by 24.6% between 1970 and 1988 (OECD, 1991, p.55). But 
such marginal efficiency gains must be compared with the rate at which 
output is growing. If the rate of growth of output exceeds that of the 
efficiency of production then, while environmental consumption per unit of 
output may be declining, total environmental consumption will be 
increasing. This was the case between 1950 and 1985 when world 
carbon emissions declined from 538 kilograms per $1000 of GNP to 408 
kilograms per $1000 of GNP. Because the Gross World Product grew 
from 2.94 trillion dollars to 12.68 trillion dollars (in constant 1980 dollars), 
however, the total carbon emissions more than trebled from 1583 million 
metric tons to 5180 million metric tons (Brown and Wolf, 1987, Table 11-2, 
p.55). Accordingly technological advance per se is not sufficient to 
ensure that environmental consumption levels will be sustainable.
Second, while it may be true that property rights will circumscribe 
many of the negative environmental effects of economic activities as 
economic activity becomes more dense, they are not always a practical 
option across the full range of environmental issues. In some instances 
they may not be politically feasible. More fundamentally, property rights 
necessarily incorporate a right to exclude others from use of the resource. 
For some issues such exclusion is not practically possible.
Where they are an option property rights may, by skewing the 
relative values of environmental assets, lead to over-specialisation and so 
to environmentally unsustainable arrangements and activities. The 
ascription of property rights adds economic value to a resource. In the
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case of renewable resources this will tend to increase the available 
stocks. The relative viability of competing organisms would, thereby, be 
distorted45. From the point of view of the ecosystem, the ascription of 
property rights has a similar effect to that of subsidies in the economic 
system.
The argument that high environmental quality has a high income 
elasticity of demand also requires qualification. As income rises a 
proportion is set aside for the acquisition of environmental services. 
Indeed it is possible that this marginal propensity for environmental 
services increases with income. Three questions, however, are 
immediately apparent.
First, rising income may lead mainly to changes in the spatial 
distribution of environmental consumption. There is a need to ascertain 
the extent to which the rising demand for high quality environmental 
services, associated with rising incomes, brings about only a local 
redistribution of environmental costs; those who can afford to will enjoy a 
relatively high quality environment and consumption level while shifting 
the environmental costs of their lifestyle onto those who are less well-off. 
Similarly, economic maturation and shifts from heavy to high-tech and 
service industries may only cause a change in the international 
distribution of environmental consumption, not of the total level. Indeed in 
the absence of appropriate technological transfers such shifts may result 
in increased total environmental consumption.
45
W e see this, for example, when predators (such as wolves) or other “undesirable” species are 
culled to make way for increased stocks of commercially valuable species (such s  deer and elk). Similarly, 
economically unproductive wet-lands are drained, destroying the indigenous local ecosystem, to provide 
additional commercially valuable land.
148
Lucas et al (1992) provide evidence in support of the hypothesis 
that such an international shift of pollution-intensive economic activities 
may occur with rising income. They provide data which confirm an 
inverse U-shaped relation between industrial pollution intensity and 
income. But they also conclude that,
"The decline which is observed in total industrial emissions relative 
to GDP at higher income levels is a result of the declining share of 
manufacturing in GDP rather than a result of any shift toward a 
cleaner mix of manufacturing activities." (p.80)
Taken together with the rapidly growing pollution intensity in the LDCs and 
the steady tightening of environmental policies throughout the OECD over 
the past two decades, these results are suggestive, though not 
conclusive, evidence of the displacement of pollution intensive industry 
toward the LDCs, rather than a "greening" of economic activity in the 
OECD (ibid., p.80).
Before proceeding two points need to be stressed. First, there is 
little empirical evidence for the hypothesis that tighter environmental 
regulation in OECD countries is leading to a displacement of pollution­
intensive production capacity to LDCs and NICs. Second, from an 
environmental perspective, any such migration of capital is to be 
welcomed if the environmental capacity in the new location is better able 
to accommodate the production-related environmental demands of the 
facility.
The second question is whether the aggregate marginal 
environmental conservation resources available from increased economic
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output will be sufficient to compensate for the increased environmental 
consumption required for that economic output; is the marginal propensity 
to provide for environmental conservation high enough? The post-war 
history of the OECD countries suggests that, notwithstanding 
technological improvements, excessive environmental consumption has 
been a consequence of the economic activity underlying the rising 
incomes of those who currently voice environmental concerns. As already 
suggested, rising incomes provide the resources needed to alleviate most 
of the environmental consumption problems associated with the early 
stages of development -- those currently faced by most of the developing 
countries. However, it is less than clear that the marginal resources 
available from such rising incomes are sufficient to compensate for the 
resultant aggregate increased environmental consumption, 
notwithstanding the significantly increasing marginal efficiency of 
environmental consumption. Indeed the current environmental crisis 
suggests strongly that they are not.
Transportation is a case in point46. Increasing economic activity 
gives rise to increasing cargo transport (which rose by an average of 9.3% 
annually in the last decade) and business travel. Rising personal incomes 
lead to rising car use (which rose world-wide by 993% between 1970 and 
1988, and by 96% in the OECD over the same period (OECD, 1991, 
p.61)) and tourist travel. Air traffic volumes increased by an average of 
7.7% annually between 1978 and 1988, and arrivals at ports of entry grew 
from 25 million in 1970 to 360 million in 1987. Yet, notwithstanding 
significantly increased efficiencies in both fuel use and emissions, 
transportation currently accounts for 30% of all energy consumed, 70% of 
all carbon monoxide emissions (which are about half of all green house
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gas emissions), 50% of all nitrogen dioxide, hydrocarbon and lead 
emissions, and 25% of all carbon dioxide emissions (the most important 
green house gas). In the case of cars, fuel use per vehicle declined 
between 1973 and 1982 by 21.4% in the IEA countries. However, the 
34.7% increase in the number of cars over the same period meant that 
there was a net increase of 5.9% in fuel consumption (World Resources 
Institute, 1986, p. 106). Thus while GDP per capita in the OECD grew 
between 1973 and 1985 by 21 %, and so provided additional resources 
for environmental conservation, and while great progress was made in the 
efficiency of environmental consumption by the transport sector, it 
remains the case that, as with its consumption of energy, "the contribution 
from the transport sector to total emissions of air pollutants is ... higher 
than in the past" (OECD, 1991, p. 60). Transport sector emissions of 
pollutants also remain "high compared to the contributions from other 
sectors" ibid., p. 60). In short, it appears that the environmental effects of 
the growth in output were greater than both the efficiency gains and the 
effects of the aggregate marginal environmental conservation resources 
made available by the rising incomes.
A further issue is that of the application of the marginal resources 
available for environmental conservation; whether the application of these 
resources corresponds to the distribution of the increased environmental 
consumption which gave rise to them. There are two dimensions to this 
issue: international and domestic.
International trade can in part be understood in terms of exchanges 
of environmental capacity. Accordingly the environmental effects of an 
economy are not all coincident with it, and so the resources available for
46
See Gabel (1992) for an interesting examination of the environmental effects of the transport
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environmental conservation are not necessarily coincident with the 
environmental consumption that gave rise to them; international trade 
facilitates an asymmetry of environmental costs and benefits.
The failure of the financial negotiations at the UNCED suggests 
that a significantly lesser proportion of income is available for 
environmental problems where the costs of the problem or the benefits of 
the expenditure are not felt directly or proportionately by those providing 
the resources. Conversely, where the environmental problem is of direct 
consequence the available resources will be more commensurate to the 
task. Those who are able can be expected to ensure that their immediate 
surroundings are as pleasant as possible. To the extent that 
environmental conservation is seen as a consumption good or service, 
they may also devote some resources to other non-local environmental 
issues.47 However, fewer conservation resources may then be made 
available for the less "attractive", though no less important, non-local 
environmental issues. But not all environmental problems are, or can be 
made to be, of such direct relevance to those able to provide the 
resources to deal with the problems. So we cannot be confident that 
those who are best able to, those who benefit most from the 
environmental consumption, will distribute the resources which they make 
available for environmental issues so as to correspond to their 
environmental consumption, or in any other manner which could be 
considered to be optimal or otherwise appropriate.
The domestic dimension has two primary aspects. First is the 
issue of whether or not the necessary political will exists, especially in
sector.
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some LDCs and NICs, to ensure that the marginal resources provided by 
economic growth are directed toward ameliorating the environmental 
consequences of that growth. It is interesting to note, for example, 
Charnovitz's observation that "recent economic growth in LDCs has not 
often led to commensurate improvements in child labour practices" 
(Charnovitz, 1992, p. 347)48 The second aspect draws into question the 
appropriateness of public opinion as a guide to environmental policy.
In the absence of adequate information dissemination and/or 
democratic infrastructure there cannot be any assurance that the 
distribution of resources between environmental issues and other issues 
reflects popular preference. In most LDCs and NICs the local elites who 
will be making such decisions will not often themselves be exposed to the 
same level of environmental degradation as the majority of the population, 
and so may have different priorities and assign resources accordingly. 
Given this, a paper originally presented by UNCTAD to a Seminar on 
Trade in Relation to Environment and Development, in Oslo, in 1991, is of 
interest. It provides little support to the belief that a commensurate 
proportion of the marginal resources provided by economic growth will be 
targeted at environmental issues when it argues that,
"[tjhough there are many cases of severe environmental 
degradation in developing countries, it can be maintained that 
generally adequate environmental protection can be achieved with 
less stringent control measures than required in the industrialised 
countries, at least for the next 10 to 20 years.
47
The desire to "enjoy" whales, dolphins, elephants, and/or baby seals, for example, means that
private resources are provided for their conservation.
48
Charnovitz cites M. Weiner (1991), The Child and the State in India (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press) in support of this statement.
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Comparative trade advantages might even be strengthened if 
environmental quality standards are going to lag behind those in 
developed countries because of the difference in socio-political 
values with regard to the trade-offs to be made between 
environmental quality objectives and economic growth." (UNCTAD, 
1991a, paras. 49-50)
In many LDCs and NICs the benefits of economic growth accrue 
disproportionately to a small elite who, in turn, do not share 
proportionately the burden of the environmental degradation resulting 
from that economic growth. Therefore, in addition to the lack of 
democratic representation of the preferences of the poor majority, the 
governing elite have a powerful pecuniary motive for promoting a trade-off 
between environmental degradation and economic growth which is 
unlikely to accord with that which would be chosen in the absence of 
these two distorting factors; when low environmental quality standards are 
proposed for the LDCs, the question arises of whose socio-political values 
are being represented. With some LDCs and NICs, then, can be less 
confidence than that placed in the industrialised democracies that the 
environmental conservation resources available as a result of economic 
growth will be distributed according to local preference.
While the distribution of resources in democratic regimes will to 
varying extents reflect popular preferences, this should not be confused 
with what is ecologically desirable. Urbanisation too is positively related 
with aggregate income growth (see Table 1 below). But urbanisation is 
also a key factor in the growing alienation of modern societies from nature 
and natural cycles. Increasingly sentimentalism and romanticism are the 
dominant factors informing popular opinion concerning environmental
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issues. The popular views largely responsible for the policies and actions 
of democratic societies, including for the conduct of international 
environmental relations, are formed and conditioned within the almost 
entirely artificial construct of urban life; ignorant of and largely unaffected 
by its ecological consequences, urban opinion, though it will remain quite 
properly influential, cannot on its own be a reliable basis upon which to 
found environmental policy.
This part of the chapter has shown that there is compelling 
evidence of environmental improvements being associated with the rising 
incomes which result from liberalised international trade relations; the 
problems associated with the earlier stages of economic development are 
ameliorated. However, in light of the environmental problems which can 
arise at later stages of development it has also shown that there is a need 
to ensure that economic development does not mean that one set of 
problems are simply exchanged for another.
In particular this part has disclosed five issues which need to be 
considered if economic growth is to be environmentally sustainable.
First, output increases must not exceed efficiency improvements.
Second, ascription of property rights, while in many instances 
helpful, is not always possible and can even exacerbate problems.
Third, rising incomes may result only in shifts in the location of, 
rather than reducing, environmental consumption.
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Fourth, there is no a priori reason to believe that the marginal 
resources made available by increased economic activity will be sufficient 
to compensate for the environmental consumption required for that 
activity.
Finally, even if the resources are sufficient, it cannot safely be 
assumed that they will be distributed appropriately, either internationally or 
domestically.
Two principal conclusions can be drawn: First, we have seen that 
it is misleading to argue simply that economic growth as a result of 
liberalised trade relations will ameliorate the environmental problems 
associated with the earlier stages of development. Without appropriate 
countervailing environmental measures the environmental problems 
associated with the earlier stages of development will only be exchanged 
for those associated with later stages. Second, we have seen once 
again49 that domestic measures are normally more appropriate than trade 
restrictions for use as environmental policy instruments.
49
See the discussion on sustainable welfare maximisation in chapter 4.
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
TREPI AND THE GATT
Having earlier examined a three-part test for determining when 
TREPI might be legitimately used, in this chapter we examine the major 
TREPI in relation to the international trade rules regime. In particular, we 
will be interested in whether or not, and in what ways, the GATT hinders 
or facilitates the legitimate use of TREPI. How could the GATT rules be 
improved or augmented?
Recall that the principles in the third test of legitimacy were 
designed to lead to the least economic cost effective alternative, while 
fundamentally the GATT is designed to bring about the greatest economic 
benefit. These two approaches are complementary; economic benefit 
maximisation presupposes cost minimisation, while cost minimisation 
facilitates benefit maximisation. Therefore we can begin by reviewing the 
basic principles of the GATT. Bhagwati (1992) identifies four such basic 
principles:
First, the GATT is a rules-based system; second, the GATT 
provides for non-discriminatory multilateralism; third, the GATT is
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maintained on the basis of mutuality and a balance of concessions; and 
fourth, any disputes that arise are subject to impartial adjudication.
A degree of common ground between these principles and those of 
the third legitimacy test is clear. First, a rules-based system and the 
principle of transparency both imply objective criteria, known beforehand, 
by which situations can be evaluated. Second, both Bhagwati and the 
third test cite the importance of multilateral non-discrimination. Third, the 
bases of mutuality and a balance of concessions are concordant with the 
principle of proportionality. Fourth, impartial adjudication of disputes 
again reflects the principles of transparency, non-discrimination and 
proportionality.
The commonality between Bhagwati's four principles and the 
principles of the third legitimacy test suggests that a proposed measure 
found to be legitimate according to the three tests of legitimacy of 
chapters 3 to 5 should also be seen to be consistent with the spirit and 
primary purpose of the GATT. Accordingly, whenever any potential 
conflict is found to exist between such a measure and any provisions of 
the GATT, those provisions of the GATT should be amended.
In the following examination of the major GATT provisions which 
may have a direct effect on environmental policy measures, the scope for 
possible amendments or modifications will be considered by comparing 
them, wherever possible, with any parallel provisions in the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
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Article I
The fundamental principle of the GATT is the Most Favoured 
Nation (MFN) Principle of Article I:
"With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed 
on or in connection with importation or exportation or imposed on 
the international transfer of payments for imports or exports and 
with respect to the method of levying such duties and charges, and 
with respect to all rules and formalities in connection with the 
importation and exportation and with respect to all matters referred 
to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article III, any advantage, favour, 
privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any 
product originating in or destined for any other country shall be 
accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product 
originating in or destined for the territories of all other contracting 
parties."
Immediately of interest is the matter of defining "like product". This 
term or variants of it appear some sixteen times in the GATT Articles as 
well as in the GATT Codes elaborating the provisions of the GATT. It 
does not have any agreed definition, and can be interpreted somewhat 
differently in each instance. For our purposes here the definitional 
nuances are not crucial, however. John Jackson's interpretation, within 
the context of Article I, will serve as a satisfactory starting point:
"...while treatment can differ if the characteristics of goods 
themselves are different, differences in treatment of imports cannot 
be based on differences in characteristics of the exporting country
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which do not result in differences in the goods themselves"
(Jackson (1989), p. 138).
This raises the difficult issue of distinguishing goods on the basis of 
their underlying process and production methods (PPMs). While the 
GATT permits discrimination between goods whenever their inherent 
characteristics differ, no such accommodation is available with respect to 
distinguishing goods on the basis of their PPMs. This basic distinction in 
the GATT can be traced to a 1953 GATT dispute over a 7.5% Belgian 
excise tax on imported goods from countries that did not have a social 
program of social allowances equivalent to that in Belgium. The panel 
distinguished between taxes applied to products, which they held to be 
consistent with the GATT, and taxes applied to the conditions surrounding 
the manufacture of products, which they held to be inconsistent with the 
GATT (see Esty, 1994, pp. 265-266).
This then suggests a fundamental asymmetry in the GATT 
between the role which trade policy may play with respect to 
consumption-related environmental concerns and with respect to 
production-related environmental concerns.50 Moreover, since production- 
related environmental concerns are those which give rise to the concerns 
about relative competitiveness and investment location, a failure to correct 
this asymmetry will lead to further undermining of the GATT and to 
additional growth of aggressive unilateralism by the stronger trading 
partners. Neither of these possibilities are in the interests of the smaller 
countries, especially the LDCs, or indeed ultimately of the larger countries
50
It might be suggested that some important consumption-related environmental concerns are not 
adequately accommodated either, especially those relating to the effects of use and of disposal, but as we 
shall shortly discuss the GATT Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade provides further latitude for these 
issues.
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either. The problem of correcting this asymmetry, of developing principles 
for the accommodation of PPMs, should not be underestimated. But the 
dangers to the multilateral system of not doing so should not be 
underestimated either. We will return to this matter in more detail when 
we examine the GATT Code on Technical Barriers to Trade, below.
Article III: National treatment
Trade restrictions may be used in cases where the border measure 
in question is necessary for the enforcement of an internal measure 
consistent with Article III. In such instances, the border measure may be 
regarded as an internal matter subject to the national treatment 
obligations of Article. III. In a bilateral dispute concerning lobsters from 
Canada, for example, the US successfully argued51 that the US 
prohibition on the importation of undersized lobsters from Canada fell 
under Article III, not Article XI. 1, in being "a measure affecting the internal 
sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution, or use of 
products...applied to an imported product at the time of importation" 
(Canada-US Trade Commission, 1990, p.25). The minority view held that 
Article. Ill is relevant only if the measure in question "is not a prohibition 
and applies to foreign products which have entered the domestic market 
of the importing country and are in competition with domestic products. It 
will fall within Article XI if it prevents or restricts importation in the first 
place", (Canada-US Trade Commission, 1991, pp. 78-9). Thus the US 
were able to implement quantitative border restrictions that they 
considered to be necessary to support their lobster management efforts.
51
Three of the five panellists concurred with the US view.
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The possibility of implementing quantitative border restrictions 
under Article. Ill should not be overstated. In the first instance the 
panellists were not unanimous in their views of the applicability of Article. 
Ill, as opposed to Article. XI, to the facts of the matter. Second, although 
the panel considered GATT Articles, it did so because they had been 
adopted into the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement. Accordingly, while 
the dispute panel convened under the Canada-US Trade Commission 
took as relevant to its deliberations GATT jurisprudence, its interpretations 
do not contribute to that jurisprudence and so are of only limited relevance 
outside that bilateral context. Nonetheless, these interpretations would be 
reviewed by any GATT panel considering a similar case and would 
influence, if only unofficially, the interpretations given to these Articles by 
those panellists.
While the jurisprudence may be inconclusive as regards 
quantitative border measures and Article. Ill, it is somewhat clearer 
regarding border charges. In the Superfund case the US successfully 
argued that a tax they imposed on certain imported substances was a 
border tax adjustment corresponding to internal taxes on the like 
substances. In this case the taxes were imposed primarily to fund the 
cleanup of a number of hazardous waste sites. The French objected to 
the US tax claiming that, given the acceptance of the Polluter Pays 
Principle which requires the full inclusion by the producer of the 
environmental costs in the product, it amounted to double taxation. The 
Panel rejected the French arguments and, importantly, concluded that 
whether a "tax is levied on a product for general revenue purposes or to 
encourage the rational use of environmental resources, is ... not relevant 
for the determination of the eligibility of a tax for border tax adjustment" 
(GATT, 1988b, para. 5.2.4). Accordingly, where a jurisdiction implements
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an internal environmental measure in the form of a tax on certain 
products, the GATT facilitates the imposition of a corresponding border 
tax on the like products in order that the domestic producers not be 
competitively disadvantaged.
Article. XI
Article XI. 1 provides a general prohibition on the use of both 
quantitative import and quantitative export restrictions.
Quantitative Import Restrictions
Quantitative import restrictions(QRs) are measures to control the 
quantity of a good imported, and are the most often used trade instrument 
in the conduct of environment policy.52 They include quotas, discretionary 
or non-automatic licensing procedures, mixing requirements, and 
prohibitions or embargoes.53 QRs may be used to implement either 
consumption-related or production-related environmental standards.
As we saw in examining the purposes of TREPI, in principle both 
quantitative and financial border restrictions can be implemented in 
response to either the environmental or the economic effects of allegedly 
inadequate or inappropriate environmental standards or enforcement 
abroad. Accordingly, two main types of such border restrictions can be 
distinguished. The first are environmentally motivated in that the border
52
Of the 17 GATT, EC, and CUSTA cases reviewed in Appendix C of Esty (1994), 12 involved
quantitative import restrictions.
53
GATT sources of information on the use of this instrument include the TBT notifications, the QR 
notifications, and various TPRM reports.
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restriction is used directly in response to the environmental consequences 
of the trade transaction. This would be where the good itself is dangerous 
to health or the environment, or where the border restriction is used to 
effect an economic penalty or disincentive for foreign interests in order to 
induce them to change their environmental policies. The second type of 
border restrictions are economically motivated. These are meant to cause 
a countervailing penalty in response to economic disadvantage being felt 
as a result of environmental policy differences. It will be noted that an 
important difference between these two types is that in the first case the 
magnitude of the restriction would be whatever is necessary to effect the 
desired change, which may be more or less than that needed to 
compensate for the commercial distortion at issue in the second case.
Quantitative Export Restrictions (QERs)
Like quantitative import restrictions, quantitative export restrictions 
are also prohibited by Article XI. 1 of the GATT. Export restrictions, 
however, have been much less resorted to,54 and have different 
objectives. Here again the distinction between production and 
consumption concerns is important.
Production-related QERs are often used for economic development 
purposes, including for natural resource and environmental-preservation 
purposes. The Canada-US salmon and herring disputes are examples of 
QERs being implemented ostensibly in support of production-related 
standards, specifically those for resource conservation. Such objectives 
raise quite different issues than are contained in consumption-related
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standard QERs, such as the draft protocol on domestically prohibited 
goods and other hazardous substances.
Consumption-related QERs, by contrast, are often related to waste 
disposal issues. Whenever the waste has a commercial value, domestic 
industries which consume that waste may be accused of benefiting from a 
subsidy. If, on the other hand, the waste has no commercial value or is, 
in fact, dangerous, then the issue of "prior informed consent" becomes 
relevant.
Article XI Exceptions
Article Xl.2(c)i may provide an exemption for certain types of 
environmental measures from the general GATT prohibition against 
quantitative import restrictions contained in Article XI. 1. It permits the 
imposition of
"[i]mport restrictions on any agricultural or fisheries product, 
imported in any form, necessary to the enforcement of 
governmental measures which operate; (i) to restrict the quantities 
of the like domestic product permitted to be marketed or produced, 
or, if there is no substantial domestic production of the like product, 
of a domestic product for which the imported product can be 
directly substituted".
Subject to the maintenance of the MFN and national treatment 
obligations, this Article would appear to facilitate the enforcement of either
54
The proliferation of Voluntary Export Restraints (VERs) is an obvious counter-argument to this 
point but, in reality, VERs are not “voluntary”. They are imposed under pressure of the importing country,
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production or consumption standards applied to agricultural or fisheries 
products in any form. A government may wish, for example, to restrict or 
prohibit certain methods of agricultural production such as intensive 
monocultural cropping, veal crates, poultry batteries, or BST, possibly by 
way of, or in conjunction with, a program of incentives55 for alternate 
means of production. If it were found necessary to restrict56 the import of 
like or substitute products produced by such means in order that the 
measures are effective, Article Xl.2(c)i may provide legitimacy. Import 
restrictions on agricultural or fisheries products may be found to be 
necessary because the domestic producers’ costs are raised relative to 
their foreign competitors by the imposition of the government regulation . 
This may arise as a result of reduced efficiencies of production or 
increased adoption by the producer of pollution or other environmental 
costs. To the extent that the latter reflects the application of the Polluter 
Pays Principle such restrictions may be justifiable.
It is important to recall, however, that there are only limited grounds 
in GATT for differentiating "like products" on the basis of the method of 
production. Accordingly adherence to the MFN obligations could require 
that the import of all like products, however and wherever produced, 
would have to be restricted. As this would lead to a disproportionately 
large amount of trade being restricted, to ameliorate this problem while 
facilitating the imposition of such environmental measures a transparent 
and non-discriminatory labelling system should be considered.
and so are really another form of quantitative import restriction.
55
It is interesting to note that the original drafters of the GATT "agreed that it was not the case that 
subsidies were necessarily inconsistent with restrictions of production and in some cases they may be 
necessary features of a government program for restricting production" (Havana Reports, p.90, para.22).
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Otherwise, it may be necessary to consider how the MFN obligation could 
be modified. As we shall see, the GATT Code on Technical Barriers to 
Trade and GATT Article XX distinguish otherwise like products on the 
basis of their method of production, and GATT Article XX provides for only 
a conditional MFN obligation. Thus there are precedents. MFN treatment 
is a core principle of the GATT, however. As a result, any derogation 
from it, to accommodate instances where it may be useful to distinguish 
between otherwise like products on the basis of the method of production, 
would need to meet strict conditions for its use.
Technical Barriers to Trade
1. Product Standards:
The WTO Code on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) requires that 
standards be prepared and implemented in a non-discriminatory manner, 
and that they "shall not be more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil a 
legitimate objective, taking account of the risks non-fulfilment would 
create. Such legitimate objectives are, inter alia, ...; protection of human 
health or safety, animal or plant life or health, or the environment" (TBT 
Article. 2.2).
The NAFTA contracting parties are permitted to establish and 
enforce whatever environmental and health product-standards they 
determine to be appropriate, including standards higher than those 
established or recommended by international agreements (NAFTA Article. 
904/5 and 713). The importation of goods or services not meeting such
56
Only import restrictions would appear to be permissible in light of the 1982 GATT panel report on 
the Canada-US tuna dispute which found that "the provisions of Article Xl:2(c) could not justify the
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requirements could be prohibited. This right is contingent on the 
requirement that the standards are non-discriminatory (including both 
national treatment and most favoured nation treatment), and that they do 
not constitute unnecessary obstacles to trade. A measure is deemed not 
to constitute an unnecessary obstacle to trade if "the demonstrable 
purpose of the measure is to achieve a legitimate objective", and is non- 
discriminatory in that regard (NAFTA Article. 904.4). The definition of 
"legitimate objective", in NAFTA Article. 915, specifically does include 
"protection of human, animal or plant life or health, the environment... and 
sustainable development," and specifically "does not include the 
protection of domestic industry." So the principal conditions surrounding 
the preparation and implementation of standards are similar between the 
NAFTA and the TBT, although the NAFTA definition of "legitimate 
objective" is arguably slightly broader, by including the term "sustainable 
development", than that contained in the TBT.
The provisions governing the level of the standards which the 
parties may establish are in an important respect quite dissimilar. The 
TBT requires Parties to use any relevant existing international standards 
unless the use of such standards would be demonstrably "ineffective or 
inappropriate" (TBT Article. 2.4). Standards established for a legitimate 
objective, as listed in TBT Article 2, and conforming to any applicable 
international standards "shall be rebuttably presumed not to create an 
unnecessary obstacle to international trade" (TBT Article. 2.5). This has 
led some environmentalists to suggest that there will be downward 
pressure on product standards to those of international norms, which may 
well be less than some authorities may wish to establish and enforce.
application of an import prohibition" (GATT, BISD 29S/91, p. 107).
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The NAFTA similarly provides that a standards-related measure 
that conforms to an international standard shall be presumed to be non- 
discriminatory and not creating an obstacle to international trade, (NAFTA 
Article. 905.2). But, unlike the TBT, the NAFTA gives explicit latitude to 
the Parties to establish standards higher than international standards 
whenever they determine such higher standards to be appropriate 
(NAFTA Article. 712,13; and Article. 904.1,2 and 905.3).
There is no apparent reason why the TBT should not explicitly 
provide the same flexibility in the establishment and enforcement of 
standards as does the NAFTA. In both cases where the standards are in 
conformity with international norms they are presumed to be legitimate, 
where they deviate from those norms conditions attach. Thomas and 
Tereposky (1993) suggest that the GATT provisions may already take 
account of the concern about downward pressure on standards, but 
concede that, at a minimum, the use in the GATT of the express language 
of the NAFTA would "clarify the existing language", (p.32).
2. Production and Process Method (PPM) Standards:
It could be argued that both the NAFTA and the TBT provisions on 
standards, being similar in this respect, apply equally to product and PPM 
standards. Consider NAFTA Article.904.1:
Each Party may... adopt, maintain or apply any standards- 
related measure, including any such measures relating to safety, 
the protection of human, animal or plant life or health, the 
environment or consumers, and any measure to ensure its 
enforcement or implementation. Such measures include those to
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prohibit the importation of a good of another Party or the provision 
of a service by a service provider of another Party that fails to 
comply with the applicable requirements of those measures or to 
complete the Party's approval procedure."
The question arises about the scope of this provision, and in 
particular the scope of the term "standards-related measure". This is 
elucidated by NAFTA Article. 915 where it defines "standard" to mean, 
inter alia,
" rules, guidelines or characteristics for goods or related processes 
and production methods, or for services or related operating 
methods, with which compliance is not mandatory. It may also 
include or deal exclusively with terminology, symbols, packaging, 
marking or labelling requirements as they apply to a good, process 
or production or operating method;"57
Accordingly it would appear that the NAFTA permits the adoption, 
maintenance or application of trade restricting "environmental measures" 
relating to standards, including PPM standards. The TBT contains 
essentially the same provisions in this regard. Arguably, however, the 
TBT closes the loophole by its requirement in Article 2.3 that no 
standards-related measures shall be maintained if the "objectives can be 
addressed in a less trade-restrictive manner." Thus even if the objective 
of the measure is solely environmental, indeed especially so, the TBT 
disallows PPM standards because a less trade restricting means of
57
A "standards-related measure" is defined there to include also a "technical regulation or conformity 
assessment procedure". The former is essentially the same as a standard except, importantly, compliance is 
mandatory. A "conformity assessment procedure" means “any procedure used, directly or indirectly, to 
determine that a technical regulation or standard is fulfilled ... but does not mean an approval procedure".
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addressing the concern, such as international negotiation, can be 
suggested. This is appropriate because, as shown in Chapter 4 in regard 
to extraterritorialism, trade restrictions are very inefficient ways of affecting 
foreign environmental policies. In the NAFTA, providing that such PPM 
standards are non-discriminatory, their only hurdle is that "the 
demonstrable purpose of the measure is to achieve a legitimate 
objective". Bearing in mind that the term "legitimate objective" is rather 
more broad in the NAFTA than in the TBT, however high this NAFTA 
hurdle may turn out to be it would appear to be rather lower than that in 
the TBT.
Some comfort is obtained by the inclusion of the TBT into the 
NAFTA (NAFTA Article 903), to the extent that it is not inconsistent with 
the provisions of the NAFTA (NAFTA Article 103). While the NAFTA 
safeguard appears to be somewhat weaker than that in the TBT it is not 
clear if this would be seen as an inconsistency or not. It is also not clear 
why in both the TBT and the NAFTA the definitions of standards would 
include PPM standards if the intent of the text is to foreclose their use.
To clarify this issue the definitions of standards in both the TBT and 
the NAFTA should be redrafted to provide for a basic prohibition on the 
use of trade measures to enforce PPM standards directed at non­
domestic production-related environmental concerns. Accordingly, non- 
discriminatory quantitative export restrictions in support of the 
conservation of both renewable and non-renewable domestic natural 
resources, as provided for in GATT Article. XX(g), would continue to be 
allowed. However, PPM standards that aim to regulate production-related 
environmental concerns occurring outside of the jurisdiction of the
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authority setting the standard would be an extraterritorial application of 
policy and as such should be prohibited in the GATT.
By contrast, non-discriminatory PPM standards related directly to 
consumption-related environmental concerns would be permitted because 
they are aimed at environmental issues occurring within or arising from 
the area under the jurisdiction of the authority enforcing such standards. 
Such consumption-related PPM standards may refer to the physical 
product and so could come under the part of the definition referring to 
"characteristics for a good or service". Examples of this sort would 
include sanitary and phytosanitary regulations relating to the production of 
food and of pharmaceuticals; where the production process affects the 
nature and characteristics, such as wholesomeness or effectiveness, of 
the product. Similarly, non-discriminatory consumption-related PPM 
standards may be applied to non-domestic production processes to the 
extent that those production or process methods have domestic 
environmental consequences arising from the use or disposal of the 
product. Such standards may, for example, be used in support of efforts 
to minimise packaging and/or to encourage the consumption of reusable 
or recyclable goods; while they affect PPMs employed outside of the 
domestic jurisdiction they may legitimately do so because the object of the 
PPM standards, the environmental costs of consuming the goods made 
by those PPMs, occur within the domestic jurisdiction.58
It might be argued that, attached to the basic prohibition against 
the use of trade measures to enforce non-domestic production-related 
PPM standards, there should be an exception to provide for trade-related 
environmental measures in those instances where the PPM standard at
58
This is consistent with the conclusions in chapter 5 regarding integral TREPI.
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issue is seen to cause environmental problems in ecosystems in 
international regions. Ecologically unsustainable fishing in the oceans 
would be an example of this sort of issue. There is, however, no apparent 
reason to assume a priori that trade measures would be at all useful, let 
alone optimal, in addressing such environmental problems. Precisely the 
same arguments would apply that were noted in Chapter 4 in regard to 
sanctions.
Some exceptions do, however, need to be considered. First, 
temporary non-discriminatory quantitative import restrictions may 
exceptionally be permitted in the case of substantial economic injury 
sustained as a result of significant increases in domestic production- 
related PPM standards. Normally PPM differences would properly be 
addressed by non-discriminatory labelling requirements alone. However, 
to increase the likelihood of authorities implementing significantly higher 
domestic PPM standards, allowance for temporary safeguards against 
competing imports would at least be politically, if not economically,59 
desirable. This could perhaps be facilitated by amending GATT Article 
XIX accordingly. In light of the conceptual similarities, GATT Article 
Xl.2(c)i may provide a precedent. Second, where domestic environmental 
taxes are levied, unless equivalent foreign taxes are in place, 
compensatory import levies and/or export refunds may be permitted. 
Without border restrictions internal enforcement of appropriate
59
Economic orthodoxy holds that the benefits of import restrictions to the protected industries will be 
outweighed by the costs that those restrictions impose on consumers and that, as a result, there will be a net 
loss of economic welfare. However, if as a result of the higher PPM standards the domestic environment is 
improved then the benefits of such environmental improvements to the citizens (consumers) must also be 
factored into the welfare calculations. Any welfare losses will, as a result, be less. Indeed there may even 
be cases where there are net welfare gains.
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environmental policies would be undermined by imports. This would be 
consistent with the GATT, as the "Superfund" case made clear.60
Aside from these two exceptions, the basic prohibition against the 
use of trade measures to enforce non-domestic production-related PPM 
standards may be moderated in one further way. In the rules of origin of 
the NAFTA, expenditures incurred to meet environmental abatement 
requirements are eligible costs for the purpose of calculating North 
American content, and so for determining whether a product benefits from 
the tariff preferences of the NAFTA. Effectively this means that goods 
meeting certain PPM standards may benefit from the lower internal tariffs 
of the NAFTA while those which do not would not so benefit.
Multilateral^, higher PPM standards could be encouraged by the 
provision of a preferential tariff rate for goods meeting specified, legitimate 
PPM standards. This would be on the basis of publicly available, 
scientifically justifiable, and transparent criteria, and would be designed to 
provide an offset for additional costs incurred in meeting the higher 
standards. Because these criteria would be with reference to the 
ecosystemic characteristics of the producer a derogation from the MFN 
principle may be needed. In principle, such an exception would be similar 
to that permitting discrimination under GATT Article XXIV. As well, since 
this would only be a result of trade liberalising actions such an exception 
would be otherwise consistent with the objectives of the GATT.
60
A fuller discussion of border charges and taxes is provided in Chapter 8.
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Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement
While the TBT applies to manufactured goods, the Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Agreement (SPS) applies to plant and animal materials. It 
is, therefore, of particular relevance to the trade in agricultural products.
The basic objective of the SPS is to provide a discipline on the 
application of sanitary and phytosanitary (S&P) measures; to ensure that 
they do not “constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination 
between Members where the same conditions prevail or a disguised 
restriction on international trade” (SPS, Preamble). Unlike the TBT were 
PPMs are not permitted, the SPS defines S&P measures as including, 
inter alia, processes and production methods (SPS, Annex A, Art 1).
The two basic obligations are that S&P measures are non- 
discriminatory and are necessary. Non-discrimination is meant in the 
usual GATT sense, while necessity means that measures can only be 
applied to achieve S&P objectives based on scientific principles and not 
maintained against scientific evidence, (SPS, Art. 2).
In addition to the two basic obligations the SPS requires S&P 
measures to be harmonised with international standards as far as 
possible, including, in particular, the standards established by the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission, the International Office of Epizootics and the 
organisations in the International Plant Protection Convention. Moreover, 
“Members shall accept the sanitary and phytosanitary measures of other 
Members as equivalent, even if these measures differ from their own or 
from those used by other Members trading in the same product, if the 
Member objectively demonstrates to the importing Member that its
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measures achieve the importing Member’s appropriate level of sanitary or 
phytosanitary protection”, (SPS, Article 4.1)
Although S&P measures are to be harmonised with international 
standards whenever possible, the SPS also permits the application of 
measures which would result in higher levels of protection provided they 
do so on the basis of an objectively conducted risk assessment. In other 
words S&P measures may establish higher standards than those provided 
by the relevant international standards if there is scientific justification for 
doing so. The SPS agrees that “there is scientific justification if, on the 
basis of an examination and evaluation of available scientific information 
in conformity with the relevant provisions this Agreement, a Member 
determined that the relevant international standards, guidelines or 
recommendations are not sufficient to achieve its appropriate level of 
sanitary or phytosanitary protection”, ( SPS Article 3.3 footnote 2).
Scientific evidence and objective risk assessments are obviously 
crucial to ensuring that S&P standards higher than internationally agreed 
standards are not applied on spurious grounds. At the same time, 
however, this approach raises a number of issues. For example, the 
same difficulty arises here as with the application of any other 
environmental standard. Just as there is a concern that the TREPI may be 
used as a disguise for protectionism, debate about the validity of the 
scientific evidence could also be used to object to standards higher than 
the internationally agreed ones. The disputes over the banning of certain 
hormones in beef by the European Community is a case in point61. A 
further problem arises from the fact that Codex Alimentarius standards 
can be adopted by majority vote if unanimity cannot be found, potentially
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undermining the assurance of safety intended by the standard. Similarly, 
by increasing the international legal status of these standards the system 
of voting for them could become politicised, undermining the objectivity of 
the standards.
Article XX:
Article XX provides an exemption to the GATT rules affecting trade 
in goods. In the new General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) 
Article IV is the parallel provision covering trade in services. The following 
discussion focuses mainly on Article XX, but is equally applicable to 
Article IV.
Article XX was drafted long before concern for the environment 
became a salient issue. It should not, therefore, be expected that its 
provisions adequately cover current environment-related issues and 
concerns. To ascertain where it may require amendment or clarification, it 
is necessary to examine its provisions in the light of its drafting history and 
the interpretations of various GATT panels. Article XX is comprised of a 
preamble and ten categories of exceptions. We will focus on the two most 
relevant of these: Article XX(b) and Article XX(g).
First, it is important to note that there does not appear to be 
agreement on the relationship between Article XX and the MFN and 
national treatment obligations of the GATT. Carol Nelder-Corvari from the 
Canadian Department of Finance argues regarding Article XX that "in 
many cases the internal regulations and those on trade could not be
61
For the background to the “Beef-Hormone” dispute see Vogel (1995). The report of the WTO
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made identical and therefore the exemption from the non-discrimination or 
the national treatment principle was required" (Nelder-Corvari, 1989, p.4). 
Jeanne Grimmett from the US Congressional Research Service quotes 
John Jackson as arguing that Article XX contemplates a modification of 
the general MFN and national treatment obligations, "allowing departure 
from the strict language of Article I...and Article III... to the extent 
necessary to pursue the goals listed in Article XX, but not to the extent of 
non-MFN discrimination or protection of domestic production, if either is 
not necessary to pursue those listed goals" (Grimmett, 1991, p.9). The 
OECD, meanwhile, argues that the preamble to Article XX effectively 
reiterates the MFN principle, and that "other GATT principles would 
presumably remain applicable, in particular national treatment as laid 
down in Article III" (OECD Trade Committee, 1990a, p.20).
The preamble to Article. XX contains the two generally applicable 
conditions:
1. The measure must not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate 
"between countries where the same conditions prevail". This would seem 
to permit the imposition of measures which discriminate between 
countries where the same conditions do not prevail. In turn this suggests 
that only limited or qualified MFN treatment is required with respect to 
Article. XX.
2. The measure cannot be a "disguised restriction on international 
trade". In the US-Canada Tuna case, in which the US argued 
that "the motivation for the United States action was in no way 
trade related" (GATT (1983), para.3.9), the panel concluded
dispute panel can be found at the WTO web site: http://www.wto.org
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that "the United States action should not be considered to be a 
disguised restriction on international trade" because the import 
prohibition "had been taken as a trade measure and publicly 
announced as such" (GATT (1983), para. 4.8).
Subsequent interpretations provide further illumination. These 
interpretations are best examined within the context of the particular 
paragraphs with respect to which the respective cases dealt.
Paragraph (b) provides for measures "necessary to protect human, 
animal, or plant life or health".
Clearly the first issue is whether or not this paragraph 
encompasses measures implemented with respect to the "environment". 
This issue has not been addressed directly by any dispute panels. Since 
environmental concerns were not an issue at the time the GATT was 
drafted there is no reason to assume that the parties who concluded the 
GATT meant it to cover environmental measures (see also Shrybman 
(1990), p.27). At the same time, there is nothing to stop the present 
Contracting Parties from ascribing to this provision their understanding 
that it does now cover environmental concerns. In a draft discussion 
paper by the GATT Secretariat on the parallel GATS provision, Article 
XIV, this appears to have been the case when it states that,
"the common understanding of Parties, based on the opinion of the 
GATT legal service division, is confirmed that measures necessary 
to protect human, animal and plant life and health are understood 
to include measures necessary to protect the environment" (C2-
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ART, Revised Secretariat draft based on discussions, 29/11/91, 
P-3).
Nonetheless, at its first meeting, the Council for Trade in Services 
decided to request the newly formed Committee on Trade and 
Environment to determine if any clarification or modification of GATS 
Article. XIV is required. Unfortunately, there is no corresponding 
ministerial direction regarding clarification of GATT Article. XX.
Confusion over the intent of the Contracting Parties may also arise 
from the fact that in both the GATT and the GATS, as provided in the final 
texts, no specific mention is made of the environment, while in the both 
the Tokyo and Uruguay Round TBT agreements, paragraph 2.2 provides 
an exemption for technical regulations necessary for the "protection of 
human health or safety, animal or plant life or health, or the environment". 
It could be argued that the present Contracting Parties, having considered 
the issue, intended to differentiate between the various agreements as 
regards environmental concerns by specifically mentioning the 
environment in some while not mentioning it in others.
Such ambiguities were addressed in the NAFTA by stating clearly 
in Article. 2101.1 that
"The Parties understand that the measures referred to in GATT 
Article XX(b) include environmental measures necessary to protect 
human, animal or plant life or health, and that GATT Article XX(g) 
applies to measures relating to the conservation of living and non­
living exhaustible natural resources."
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The EC have expressed the concern that the term "environment" is 
too broad and may facilitate extraterritorial application of environmental 
measures, ("EC Proposal on Trade and Environment", in Inside US Trade 
- Special Report, 27 November, 1992). Such a concern could easily be 
dealt with by stating explicitly that any exceptions are applicable only to 
the extent that the measures at issue are applied only within the 
jurisdiction of the implementing authority.
The next issue concerns whether or not the measure in question is 
in fact "necessary". This is effectively the same issue as that contained in 
the second proviso of the preamble. An interpretation of the term 
"necessary" was reaffirmed in the US-Thailand Cigarettes case, (para 
74).62 Although the original interpretation was in the context of Article 
XX(d) this panel saw no reason why it should not be equally applicable to 
Article XX(b). Accordingly,
"a contracting party cannot justify a measure inconsistent with other 
GATT provisions as "necessary" in terms of Article XX(d) if an 
alternative measure which it could reasonably be expected to 
employ and which is not inconsistent with other GATT provisions is 
available to it. By the same token, in cases where a measure 
consistent with other GATT provisions is not reasonably available, 
a contracting party is bound to use, among the measures 
reasonably available to it, that which entails the least degree of 
inconsistency with other GATT provisions"
In light of the trade liberalising purpose of the GATT, this "least 
inconsistent" rule can be generalised as a "least trade disrupting" rule.
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In their complaint about the US tuna ban, Mexico referred to this 
rule when they objected that the US measure was not "necessary" 
because alternate, GATT-consistent measures were available, specifically 
international co-operation. In the US view it was the very fact that the 
measure was in respect of life outside of their jurisdiction which left them 
with no other reasonable alternatives. The panel commented on these 
interpretations within the context of their discussion on the crucial issue of 
whether Article XX(b) covers measures necessary to protect human, 
animal or plant life or health outside of the jurisdiction of the party 
imposing the measure.
The panellists were convinced that the drafting history indicated 
that the authors of Article XX(b) had "focused on the use of sanitary 
measures to safeguard life or health of humans, animals or plants within 
the jurisdiction of the importing country". Moreover, in the panellists view, 
the conditions attached to Article XX(b) refer to the trade measure at 
issue not to the life or health standard affected by that trade measure. 
Accordingly the panellists
"...considered that if the broad interpretation of Article XX(b) 
suggested by the United States were accepted, each contracting 
party could unilaterally determine the life or health protection 
policies from which other contracting parties could not deviate 
without jeopardising their rights under the General Agreement. The 
General Agreement would then no longer constitute a multilateral 
framework for trade among all contracting parties but would provide 
legal security only in respect of trade between a limited number of 
contracting parties with identical internal regulations" (para 5.27).
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The original interpretation is found in the report of the panel on "United States - Section 337 of the
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Notwithstanding the outcry in the US following this ruling, the panellists 
are probably correct when they conclude that this interpretation, and the 
like one in respect of Article XX(g), do not constrain in any way the ability 
of contracting parties to pursue internal environmental policies or to co­
operate in addressing international environmental problems. Rather it 
safeguards the integrity of the GATT.
Paragraph (g) provides for measures "relating to the conservation 
of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in 
conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption". As 
argued by the panellists in the first Canada-US. Salmon and Herring 
dispute, the question of whether or not a measure is "relating to the 
conservation of exhaustible natural resources" is one of whether or not it 
has a true conservation purpose. In turn, as the panellists in the second 
Canada-US Salmon and Herring dispute noted, this is simply the obverse 
of the second proviso of the preamble to Article XX, that the measure is 
not a "disguised restriction on international trade". Some indication of 
how one might go about determining the proportionality of measures is 
provided by these and other dispute panellists.
According to the panel report from the first Canada-US Salmon and 
Herring dispute "the purpose of including Article XX(g) in the General 
Agreement was not to widen the scope for measures serving trade policy 
purposes but merely to ensure that the commitments under the General 
Agreement do not hinder the pursuit of policies aimed at the conservation 
of exhaustive (sic) resources". As a result, the panellists concluded that 
to be considered to be "relating to" conservation within the meaning of 
Article XX(g) a measure must be "primarily aimed at" such conservation.
Tariff Act of 1930" (L/6439), paragraph 5.26, adopted on 7 Nov. 1989, in BISD 36S, 1990.
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Accordingly this is a somewhat weaker requirement than the "necessary 
to" requirement in Article XX(b). At the same time, the panel considered 
that the phrase "in conjunction with" had to be understood in the light of 
the purpose for which it had been included in the General Agreement. 
Therefore, a measure could only "be considered to be made effective 'in 
conjunction with' production restrictions if it was primarily aimed at 
rendering effective these restrictions" (para 4.6).
The "primarily aimed at" test was developed further in the panel 
report on the second Canada-US Salmon and Herring dispute. 
Recognising that particular measures could have several effects including 
both conservationist and trade restricting, in the view of this panel 
ultimately the basis of the test is "if the measure would have been 
adopted for conservation reasons alone". In turn, the central issue in this 
test is whether the conservation benefits of the measure are sufficiently 
large to counterbalance the commercial inconvenience caused if that 
commercial inconvenience was being borne in the jurisdiction imposing 
the measure (paras 7.07-7.11). Moreover, as the panellists in the US- 
Mexico Tuna case observed, a country can effectively control the 
production or consumption of natural resources only to the extent that 
they are under its jurisdiction. Accordingly, the purpose of Article. XX(g) is 
to facilitate contracting parties implementing trade measures which are 
primarily aimed at rendering effective restrictions on exhaustible natural 
resource production or consumption "within their jurisdiction" (para 5.31, 
emphasis added).
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WTO Article IX
Article IX.3 of the Agreement Establishing the WTO provides for a 
Ministerial Meeting to waive any WTO obligations in any circumstance 
they may wish. Clearly this is a provision with potential application for 
facilitating environmental measures which would otherwise be 
inconsistent with the WTO.
Part IV
In Article. XXXVII the developed country contracting parties 
committed themselves to refrain from introducing or increasing tariff or 
non-tariff barriers, including fiscal measures, on the products currently or 
potentially of particular export interest to the less-developed countries. 
Currently it is unclear what this obligation may mean for efforts to reduce 
the trade in unsustainably produced products including, for example, 
those associated with tropical forests. UNCTAD (1991b) suggests that 
more stringent environmental standards in the developed countries will 
not have only negative effects on the exports of the developing countries; 
often there will be positive consequences as well. Indeed, as regards this 
issue, these authors appear to be quite optimistic. They suggest at one 
point, for example, that "it is quite conceivable that for certain products a 
kind of dual world market will emerge: one of relatively expensive, high- 
tech, high-quality, more environmentally advanced products in the 
developed world and another market of relatively cheap products, less 
sophisticated or with a greater impact on the environment but adapted to 
the specific economic and environmental conditions in the developing 
world" (p. 10). The question remains as to whether, in those cases where 
the negative effects are preponderant, Article XXXVII provides an
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obligation on the part of the developed countries to exempt or minimise 
the impact on developing country exporters from any environmentally 
motivated import restrictions they may wish to implement.
Relation of the GATT to International Environmental Agreements
The NAFTA is the first trade agreement to provide for the trade 
provisions of specified international environmental agreements taking 
precedence over it (NAFTA Article. 104). These international 
environmental agreements fall into two categories. One is the multilateral 
agreements to which all three NAFTA parties are signatories: CITES, the 
Montreal Protocol, and the Basel Convention upon its entry into force in 
all three parties. The other is the bilateral and regional agreements: the 
Canada-US agreement on the transboundary movement of hazardous 
waste, and the Mexico-US border area environment agreement. Article 
104 also provides for the subsequent inclusion of any other international 
environmental agreement that the three parts agree to include. 
Unfortunately a multilateral version of this provision is not so simply 
constructed.
To the extent they have no third-party effects, there is no a priori 
reason why any rights and obligations arising from the trade-related 
provisions of any bilateral and regional environmental agreements, with 
the agreement of the parties concerned, should not also be automatically 
preserved over the GATT. The issue of multilateral environmental 
agreements is rather more problematic. There may not be a 
correspondence of signatories of the various international environmental 
agreements and the GATT, and no country would permit its trade 
advantages negotiated in the GATT to be eroded by the provisions of an
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environmental agreement to which it is not a party. For much the same 
reasons, regional environmental agreements that have third party trade 
effects also pose difficulties. Nonetheless, the GATT must accommodate 
such international environmental agreements wherever their provisions 
intersect or overlap.
The European Community has proposed that "a collective 
interpretation of Article XX provides the best means of clarifying the 
relationship between the GATT and trade measures taken pursuant to [a 
multilateral environmental agreement]" (see "EC Proposal on Trade and 
Environment", in Inside US Trade - Special Report, 27 November 1992). 
This would entail establishing clear criteria in GATT Article XX on the use 
of trade measures in multilateral environment agreements. They suggest, 
in particular, the need to clarify and reinforce three crucial principles of 
Article XX: non-discrimination, "that such measures are not applied in a 
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail"; 
legitimacy, that measures should not constitute "a disguised restriction on 
international trade"; and necessity, including primarily that the measure in 
question involves the least trade-restrictive means of achieving the 
environmental objective. Clearly these are parallel to the principles 
articulated in the third legitimacy test. Agreement on definitions for these 
principles is obviously important, therefore. However, in the meantime, 
important as these principles are and as helpful as their further definition 
would be, this approach seems unnecessarily complex. Entia non sunt 
multiplicanda praetor necessitatum!
The formulation and articulation of clear principles for the 
application of GATT Article XX will be difficult to negotiate, and there is no
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particular reason why bringing bona fide multilateral environmental 
agreements into accordance with the GATT needs to be delayed by such 
negotiations. Indeed such unnecessary delays may serve only to 
underscore the concern of environmentalists that the GATT is an obstacle 
to proper environmental management. More to the point, further definition 
of these principles, the crucial Third Test for the unilateral use of TREPI, 
is less important within the context of multilateral environmental 
agreements. The purpose of sharpening the definition of these principles 
is to constrain the behaviour of individual authorities. Further definition or 
elaboration of key GATT principles helps to protect against deleterious 
actions by individual members, not against collective activities.
WTO Article 9 provides a better, if still not fully satisfactory, facility 
whereby international environmental agreements can be identified and 
agreement sought on a waiver of GATT obligations to their trade-related 
provisions, in the event of any inconsistency between them and the 
GATT. This procedure could be used for both multilateral environmental 
agreements and regional environmental agreements that have third party 
trade effects. While in practical terms this would permit the imposition of 
certain environment-related trade provisions and/or the nullification and 
impairment of negotiated benefits on a number of small developing 
countries, it could only occur with the support of two-thirds of the GATT 
membership. For any affected non-participants provision would need to 
be made for compensation, as is done for GATT Article XIX safeguard 
actions and GATT Article XXVIII negotiations. This, together with a 
provision for the periodic review and reauthorization of any such waivers 
from GATT disciplines would provide some assurance against charges of 
aggressive Northern or "environmental" hegemony.
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To expedite the implementation of multilateral environmental 
agreements while waiting for a WTO waiver, Article 9 could be amended 
to provide for automatic approval of general categories of environmental 
agreements together with a requirement for their subsequent review and 
approval, in the manner of GATT Article XXIV.5/6 for trade agreements. 
Such general categories could be defined in accordance with criteria such 
as those proposed by the European Community. These are that the 
environmental agreement be negotiated under the auspices of the United 
Nations; that participation in its negotiation is open; that participation in its 
implementation and enforcement is equally available to all WTO 
members; and that regional environmental agreements should not have 
any extra-regional trade effects.
CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter we have noted the close symmetry between the 
core GATT principles and the three tests of legitimacy proposed earlier in 
this thesis. Therefore, it was argued, the use of any TREPI which meet 
the legitimacy tests should also be seen to be consistent with the GATT, 
and any conflict should be resolved by modification of the relevant GATT 
provisions. The current scope for the development of the GATT to be 
more accommodating to environmental concerns has been suggested by 
comparison with NAFTA provisions wherever possible.
In the review of the main GATT provisions and jurisprudence which 
could be expected to affect environmental measures, a number of issues 
were prominent. For example, although it was argued that there needs to
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be a basic prohibition against the use of trade restrictions to enforce PPM 
standards, a number of specific exceptions were found to be justifiable. In 
the SPS trade restrictions to enforce environmental or health standards 
are permitted under certain circumstances. In providing this facility, a 
number of problems arise, however. Disputes over the validity of scientific 
evidence could frustrate the application of legitimate environmental or 
health standards. At the same time, it was seen that the adoption of the 
Codex Alimentarius into the SPS could seriously undermine the objectivity 
of the international standards that the Codex is meant to provide. It was 
also argued that Article XX (and its parallel provision in the GATS, Article 
XIV) requires clarification to provide explicitly for environmental measures. 
The chapter concluded by proposing a means by which the GATT could 
quite easily accommodate and coexist with international environmental 
agreements.
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CHAPTER NINE
ENVIRONMENTAL SUBSIDIES AND COUNTERVAILING BORDER
MEASURES
As discussed earlier, differences between environmental regimes 
can have commercial effects. Sometimes such effects can be justified by 
natural differences in environmental endowments or preferences. At other 
times, other factors may be involved, including the receipt by firms or 
industries of environmental subsidies. Foreign competitors may then 
complain that such subsidies are unfair and seek the application of 
countervailing duties on the imports of the product receiving such 
benefits. This issue is the subject of this chapter. We begin by looking at 
the matter of subsidies as they relate to environmental regulation. Then 
we consider the use of countervailing border measures.
Environmental Subsidies
The argument for providing domestic subsidies to firms and others 
to encourage or enable them to act in a more environmentally appropriate 
manner is quite straightforward. The domestic producer sees the 
increased regulatory burden as an impairment of his competitive position
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and, accordingly, seeks public assistance to assuage or reduce the 
perceived disadvantage. Such assistance could be provided by many 
means including grants, loans at concessional interest rates, accelerated 
depreciation rates, and tax-deductible allowances. However it is provided, 
the advantage to the private sector is the externalisation of a portion of 
the cost of complying with public regulations which restrict their ability to 
externalise the environmental costs of their activities.
When considering an environment policy response to such 
subsidies, research indicates that pollution charges may be more effective 
than subsidies (see, for example, De Kock, 1980). Such pollution 
charges would also be in accord with the Polluter Pays Principle (PPP).
The PPP is a widely accepted principle regarding the provision of 
public assistance to facilitate the adoption of environmentally appropriate 
behaviour. It was adopted by the OECD in 1972 as part of a number of 
guiding principles concerning the international economic aspects of 
environmental policies. Its purpose is to encourage the internalisation of 
environmental costs in prices and markets, as well as to avoid any trade 
distortions which might occur as a result of different methods of financing 
pollution abatement. Accordingly the PPP requires that polluters should 
bear fully all expenses associated with the control and prevention of the 
pollution for which they are responsible. With limited exceptions, 
therefore, subsidies are contrary to the PPP.
OECD (1972) provides that "the principle to be used for allocating 
costs of pollution abatement and control measures to encourage rational 
use of scarce environmental resources and to avoid distortions in 
international trade and investment is the so-called 'Polluter-Pays
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Principle*. This Principle means that the polluter should bear the 
expenses of carrying out the above mentioned measures decided by 
public authorities to ensure that the environment is in an acceptable state. 
In other words, the cost of these measures should be reflected in the 
costs of goods and services which cause pollution in production and/or 
consumption. Such measures should not be accompanied by subsidies 
that would create significant distortions in international trade and 
investment" (para. 4).
In 1974 the OECD provided further definition on the implementation 
of the PPP. Important in this extended PPP is the provision for a number 
of exceptions. Public assistance could be provided in any of three 
circumstances: first, to ease transition periods when especially tough new 
environmental policies are being implemented; second, to stimulate the 
development of new environmentally appropriate technologies; and third, 
where necessary to facilitate other socio-economic programs such as 
regional development. Any such subsidies must be provided for only a 
fixed period of time, be in a clearly identifiable program, and should not 
distort international trade or investment.
Along with the adoption of the extended PPP by the OECD in 
1974, agreement was also reached on the establishment of a notification 
and consultation system. To date, four surveys have been carried out 
under the notification procedures: in 1975, 1978-9, 1981-2, and 1987-8. 
Although the data compiled in these surveys is not as comprehensive as 
could be desired, they suggest that, overall, the level of environment- 
related subsidies have not been significant. It should be noted, however, 
that this conclusion is based on central government programs only, 
conceals sector-specific differences, and does not preclude substantially
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higher levels of environmental subsidies being provided in the future as 
environmental policies become more broad-ranging and demanding. No 
request to use the consultations facility has yet been submitted.
Wherever the PPP is not fully implemented the presence of 
environmental subsidies may be suspected. Domestic environment- 
related subsidies, as indeed other types of subsidies, can be understood 
either in terms of the "cost to the Treasury" or "benefit to the recipient". 
The first of these involves the calculation of the amount of a subsidy by 
reference to the effect on the government accounts. This would include 
both expenditures by government as well as revenue foregone such as 
tax exemptions or deferrals. The second approach to subsidy calculation 
looks at the value to the recipient of the benefits in question. For 
example, while a government guarantee of a loan may not involve any 
immediate budgetary cost to the government, it provides a very definite 
benefit to the recipient. Indeed, since the "benefit to the recipient" would 
not normally be less than the "cost to the Treasury" it could be argued that 
the full market distortion effect of subsidies is best evaluated by use of the 
"benefit to the recipient" approach. The new WTO Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (SCM) Code has adopted this distinction by 
providing that while the existence of a subsidy is determined by reference 
to a financial contribution by government, the calculation of the amount of 
the subsidy for the purpose of the countervailing measure is made in 
terms of the benefit to the recipient (see SCM Article 14).
Although the identification of fiscal costs under the "cost to the 
Treasury" approach is relatively straightforward since they are usually a 
matter of public record, other benefits which can be made available to a 
recipient are less transparent. Notably such benefits could include weak
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regulations, exemptions from regulations or discriminatory regulations. 
While the OECD notification system and the WTO Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) have focused on "cost to 
the Treasury" benefits to determine the existence of a subsidy, the PPP 
can be interpreted to include also the relatively opaque benefits derived 
from regulatory differentials. Such differentials may have a zero or de 
minimis cost to the Treasury even though they give rise to significant 
market distortions and to substantial derogations from the PPP. This then 
raises the problem of enforcing the PPP.
The PPP may be enforceable by way of domestic countervailing 
duty laws or through the GATT SCM procedures for subsidies of the "cost 
to the Treasury" type. Given that the GATT SCM's definition of a subsidy 
is in such terms,63 and because of the fungability of money, "cost to the 
Treasury" benefits could be addressed by way of standard countervailing 
duty laws. This is possible because, with very limited exceptions, the 
specific purpose of the assistance is not directly relevant to the 
prosecution of a countervailing duty case. But where the subsidies in 
question are indirect or nonfinancial no avenues of enforcement for the 
PPP are available. Moreover other OECD principles would conflict with 
any compensatory import measures and export rebates implemented in 
response to such subsidies.64
63
Article 1.1(a) refers to "a financial contribution by a government", or to where "there is any form of 
income or price support in the sense of Article XVI of the General Agreement". Regarding the scope of this 
latter aspect a GATT Panel report adopted on 24 May 1960 on the Review pursuant to Article XVI.5 agreed 
that if "a government fixes by law a minimum price to producers which is maintained by quantitative 
restrictions or a flexible tariff or similar charges... there would be no loss to the government and the measure
would not be governed by Article XVI" (emphasis added).
64
Including especially the CILER Principle, as discussed below under "Border Charges and Taxes",
at p. 12.
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In looking at subsidisation a number of distinctions need to be 
made. Subsidies can entail the externalisation of environmental costs 
and may be either general or specific. Likewise, they could involve the 
externalisation of environmental protection costs and, again, may be 
either general or specific. The first is a case of a lack of environmental 
regulation or regulatory enforcement, also known as "ecodumping", while 
the latter is a case of providing government assistance to facilitate 
compliance with the applicable environmental regulations. Each of these 
cases will be considered in turn.
1. Ecodumping
Generally poor environmental management, defined as economic 
activity by most firms and industries above the environmental threshold, 
Emax, is sometimes called "ecodumping". In this case two issues must 
be distinguished. These parallel the First Test described in Chapter 3: 
first, whether or not this results in extra-jurisdictional environmental or 
economic effects; and second, whether or not the responsible jurisdiction 
has the ability to manage its environment in a more responsible and 
sustainable manner.
Clearly if the responsible jurisdiction lacks either the expertise or 
the resources to effect higher environmental standards then the best 
course of action would be to provide any necessary support and 
assistance. Similarly, if the concern arising from the generally poor 
environmental standards was extra-jurisdictional environmental damage, 
the onus would be on any jurisdiction, or group of jurisdictions, 
implementing border measures to prove that such measures were the 
most effective means available of inducing the necessary improvements
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to the offending environmental policy. This reflects the Second Test 
described in Chapter 4 which emphasised the importance of ensuring that 
the use of a TREPI would be effective.
Where avoidable generally inadequate environmental management 
prevails which has extra-jurisdictional economic consequences, it could 
be represented as constituting commercially predatory behaviour, and 
giving those affected by such behaviour a right to take countermeasures. 
This was an important motivation behind the negotiation of the North 
American Agreement on Environmental Co-operation (final draft, 13 
September 1993). When the extra-jurisdictional effects at issue are 
environmental, it is legitimate to question whether or not financial 
countermeasures would be an optimal response; there should be a 
presumption against their use. Whenever the extra-jurisdictional effects at 
issue are economic, however, a stronger prima facie case for using 
financial countermeasures exists. Indeed, whenever they would be 
effective, the desirability of using financial measures may in principle be 
presumed, since they are as a rule to be preferred to quantitative 
measures. The primary issue becomes the proportionality of the 
countermeasure. However, since most available evidence suggests that, 
for most industries, international regulatory differences are not yet, of 
themselves, sufficiently large to have significant competitive or investment 
relocation effects, it would follow that they would not cause material 
commercial injury, and so would not be actionable. One may conclude, 
therefore, that even in the case of avoidable generally inadequate 
environmental regulation, financial countermeasures would not likely 
provide the optimal solution. More importantly, as we saw in Chapter 4, it 
is unlikely that unilateral countermeasures would be effective.
197
Accordingly, a multilateral dispute settlement mechanism with multilateral 
enforcement needs to be provided for.
2. "Green" Subsidies
In the GATT SCM the contracting parties agreed that a subsidy 
exists when "there is a financial contribution by a government or any 
public body within the territory of a Member", including direct transfers of 
funds, government revenue foregone, government provision of goods and 
services (other than general infrastructure) or the purchase of goods, and 
a benefit is thereby conferred (SCM Article 1.1). However, before 
countervailing measures can be taken, it must first be established that, 
amongst other things, such government assistance is not "generally 
available", or under one of the exceptions provided for.
If a subsidy exists, the SCM provides that to be actionable it must 
also be "specific". Three principles are given in the SCM for determining 
specificity within the territory of the subsidising country: first, specificity 
exists "where the granting authority, or the legislation pursuant to which 
the granting authority operates, explicitly limits access to a subsidy to 
certain enterprises”65; second, specificity does not exist if the subsidy is 
provided subject to objective, transparent, and automatic criteria; and 
third, in addition to being de jure non-specific in terms of the two principles 
above, a subsidy must also be de facto non-specific. Taking account of 
the extent of diversification of economic activities in the subsidising 
country and the length of time that the subsidy program has been in 
operation, the considerations here are whether the subsidy is used only 
by a limited number of enterprises, predominantly used by certain
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enterprises, granted disproportionately to certain enterprises, and the 
amount of discretion exercised by the granting authority.
In addition to these three principles, specificity will be deemed to 
exist whenever the subsidy is granted contingent, whether solely or as 
one of several other conditions, in law or in fact on export performance, or 
on import substitution.
Subsidies that are not specific, that are "generally available" within 
the jurisdiction of the granting authority, are not actionable under the 
current WTO rules. Subsidies that would be exceptions under the new 
SCM would also be permitted or non-actionable.
The exceptions contained in the SCM find their origins in the 1974 
extended OECD PPP. They are for subsidies provided under certain 
defined circumstances, under certain conditions, and within the context of 
research and development programs, and regional development 
programs. Any subsidies for which an exception is to be invoked must be 
notified in advance of implementation, in such detail as to permit Members 
to evaluate their consistency with the criteria for exception, and annual 
updates on the subsidy provided. Upon a request by a Member, all such 
information shall be reviewed by the Secretariat of the WTO for its 
consistency with the SCM provisions, and the matter may subsequently 
be sent for binding arbitration.
Of particular relevance, the SCM permits government assistance to 
ease the burden on companies of adapting facilities to new environmental 
laws or regulations. Such assistance must be non-recurring, limited to 20
65
The term "certain enterprises" means "an enterprise or industry or group of enterprises or
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per cent of the cost of such adaptation, and apply only to facilities more 
than two years old. Moreover, the assistance must "not cover the cost of 
replacing and operating the assisted investment, which must be fully 
borne by firms; and is directly linked to and proportionate to a firm's 
planned reduction of nuisances and pollution, and does not cover any 
manufacturing cost savings which may be achieved; and is available to all 
firms which can adopt the new equipment and/or production process" 
(SCM Article. 8.2(c)).
These new exemptions, including the environmental exemption, 
are not absolute. Even if a programme is found to be consistent with the 
relevant criteria, as laid down in SCM Article 8, if it causes “serious 
adverse affects to the industry of [another] Member”, SCM Article 9 
provides for consultations and multilateral review. Such a review could 
lead to the authorisation of “appropriate countermeasures commensurate 
with the nature and degree of the effects determined to exist.”
Notwithstanding this new provision in the GATT SCM, and because 
green subsidies are a relatively new sort of subsidy, it is unfortunate that 
the SCM permits unilateral action, especially on a benefit to the recipient 
basis. Rather, in this new and contentious area of trade and the 
environment a mandatory multilateral dispute settlement mechanism 
should be provided for.
Countervailing Border Measures
In principle financial border restrictions can be divided into those 
which are motivated by environmental considerations and those which are
industries".
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motivated by commercial or economic considerations. Normally, however, 
commercial or economic considerations are the main motivation; border 
charges and taxes, whether as import levies or as export rebates, are 
often sought as a means of equalising competitive disadvantages which 
might otherwise occur as a result of international environmental regulatory 
differentials, or the provision by government of assistance with costs 
arising from environmental regulation.
Since 1972 such charges and taxes have been prohibited under 
the Compensating Import Levies and Export Rebates (CILER) Principle, 
adopted by the OECD as part of their "Guiding Principles Concerning the 
International Economic Aspects of Environmental Policies". The authors 
of the CILER Principle, fearing the rise of pressures to adopt protectionist 
measures in response to competition from countries with lower 
environmental standards, agreed to prohibit the use of compensatory 
measures in response to environmental regulatory differentials. However, 
as was recognised by the OECD at the time they drafted their "Guiding 
Principles", this Principle is valid only to the extent that the Polluter Pays 
Principle (PPP) is honoured. Because, and to the extent that, the PPP is 
not implemented, an exception to the CILER Principle to facilitate the 
enforcement of the PPP is necessary.
The CILER Principle is also not fully in accordance with GATT 
provisions, as the US Superfund case demonstrates. In this case the US 
imposed a tax on certain chemicals and a corresponding border tax on 
the like products in order that the US producers of the affected chemicals 
were not disadvantaged. As the EC and others pointed out, this is 
contrary to the CILER Principle. The US successfully argued, however, 
that the CILER Principle was only a recommendation of the OECD with no
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effect on the GATT. Moreover, on the basis of the conclusions adopted in 
1970 of a GATT Working Party on Border Tax Adjustments, the dispute 
panel found that "the tax adjustment rules of the General Agreement 
distinguish between taxes on products and taxes not directly levied on 
products; they do not distinguish between taxes with different policy 
purposes. Whether a sales tax is levied on a product for general revenue 
purposes or to encourage the rational use of environmental resources, is 
therefore not relevant for the determination of the eligibility of a tax for 
border-tax adjustment" (para. 5.2.4).
Thus the GATT jurisprudence contains an exception to the CILER 
Principle. Where environmental regulatory differentials are effected by 
way of taxing products, import levies or export rebates may be 
implemented to compensate for any competitive disadvantage which may 
result. Note that this would not apply to taxes on production processes, 
and again the distinction between "cost to the Treasury" and "benefit to 
the recipient" appears to be important. Where environmental policy 
differentials are of the relatively transparent "cost to the Treasury" type 
there appears to be greater scope for permitting compensating import 
levies and export rebates.
In light of these difficulties, the CILER principle needs to be 
fundamentally reconsidered. But facilitating compensatory border 
measures is also fraught with difficulties.
In the case of quantitative border restrictions, as well as being very 
crude instruments, they entail economic costs in addition to those caused 
by financial restrictions. This is because quantitative border restrictions 
provide economic rents to the quota holders as well as increasing the
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market power of import-competing domestic producers. But financial 
restrictions, or environmental tariffs, pose complex practical and technical 
problems.
Four arguments are widely proffered in favour of the use of 
financial measures, or environmental tariffs. First, they are seen to be a 
means of reducing domestic pressures to lower environmental standards 
in the face of competition from imports subject to less onerous standards 
abroad. In this regard they are seen as tools for the restoration of "fair" 
competition. The second argument, related to the first, is that 
environmental tariffs reduce the cost advantage of investing in locations 
with lower environmental production standards and then exporting 
products back to the country with the higher production standards. The 
extent to which either of these concerns has empirical justification has yet 
to be proven. A third reason given for applying environmental tariffs is 
that they may encourage competitors to internalise fully the environmental 
costs of their activities. This may be seen to be desirable either for 
commercial reasons or solely as an environmental measure. Fourth, it is 
indisputably the case that environmental subsidisation does occur. 
Accordingly corrective measures, in the form of offsetting environmental 
border duties or tariffs, are seen to be both desirable and justifiable.
Against these points, however, there are a number of reasons for 
caution. First, there are legitimate international differences in the levels of 
optimal environmental standards. These differences are an important 
source of the comparative advantage that international trade is ostensibly 
founded upon. Second, the unilateral and extra-jurisdictional application 
of environmental judgements and preferences that the use of 
environmental tariffs entails, would constitute a grievous and
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unacceptable impairment of national sovereignty. Third, the use of 
environmental tariffs would facilitate abuse by domestic interests seeking 
protection against competition for non-environmental reasons. At the 
same time it would provide a means for domestic producers to avoid the 
perceived competitive disadvantages of higher domestic environmental 
standards. This is somewhat ironic in so far as much evidence to date 
indicates that "green" business practices often improve competitiveness, 
so such avoidance would in fact tend to impair international 
competitiveness. Fourth, from an environmental point of view, 
countervailing environmental duties may be ineffective: the exporting firms 
may simply absorb the additional costs and, as we have already 
discussed, sanctions usually do not work. Fifth, it should be noted that if 
there is no domestic production there cannot be injury. Both 
countervailing and antidumping duty laws require that, in addition to a 
demonstration of the existence of a subsidy or dumping, a domestic 
industry must be injured and that a causal connection between the 
subsidy or dumping and the injury must be demonstrated. Accordingly, 
the use of such instruments for environmental purposes could be of only 
limited application. Finally, even if all the economic arguments were 
overridden by environmental concerns, and all the political problems set 
aside in a demonstration of "leadership", and it was demonstrated that, on 
balance, there would be positive environmental benefits, still the practical 
complexities of estimating the size of the environmental subsidy and 
implementing the offsetting tariffs remain immense. Any resulting 
instrument would be extremely crude, could be employed only by a few 
big players, and would, therefore, be only a "bully" option. International 
bullying cannot be expected to be the optimal or even a useful means of 
developing the international co-operation that will be required to develop 
and conduct globally responsible environment policies.
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Fortunately, as we have already seen, to date there is limited 
evidence of purposive environment-related subsidisation. Nonetheless, a 
number of commentators, mainly from the US, have suggested the use of 
domestic countervailing or antidumping duty laws in response to 
perceived environmental regulatory differentials. Komoroski (1988), for 
example, argues that a government's failure to provide adequate 
environmental regulation could be a countervailable subsidy. More 
recently, Commissioner David Rohr of the US International Trade 
Commission has put the case for using both types of "fair-trade" laws. In 
Rohr's view, countervailing duty laws would be appropriately applied in 
cases where a firm received a derogation from the generally applicable 
environmental standards in its country of operation, while antidumping 
duty laws would be applied wherever environmental standards were found 
to be generally lax or non-existent. In this latter regard, Rohr 
recommends the use of the facility in US antidumping law to make certain 
assumptions regarding cost of production and to devise "constructed 
value scenarios".66
Clearly the concern of many trade policy analysts that there could 
be a destructive proliferation of protectionist border measures in response 
to environmental regulatory differentials, if they were not otherwise 
prohibited, is not without foundation. Nonetheless, it is also true that for 
some industries environmental regulatory differentials may impair relative 
competitiveness and, as a result, there will be continuing political pressure 
to respond. Such response could be either to harmonise standards at the 
lowest common denominator or to offset whatever competitive advantage 
is derived from inadequate environmental standards or purposive
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environmental subsidisation. Ruling out the first option as an 
inappropriate response because of its insensitivity to ecosystemic 
differences, there is a need to develop a system which controls rather 
than prohibits compensatory measures. Such a system should be 
multilateral; in order to forestall the otherwise inevitable resort to 
unilateralism it will be important to provide a credible multilateral 
mechanism for the settlement of environment-related trade disputes. The 
difficulties in developing such a system, as discussed above, should not 
be underestimated. The threat of resort to destructive unilateralism in the 
absence of a credible multilateral dispute resolution system, however, is 
potentially an even greater threat.
Important US Congressional support for such a multilateral system 
was provided by Senator Max Baucus in a speech he gave before the 
Institute for International Economics on 31 October 1991. The Senator 
argued erroneously that "if imported products or the process used to 
produce those products doesn't meet the importing nation's environmental 
standards, duties can be applied to the imported product". Clearly 
ecosystemic differences indicate that the relevant environmental 
standards should be those of the exporting country or any relevant 
international environmental agreements. Nonetheless, the conditions 
stipulated by the Senator for the application of duties are helpful: "First, 
the environmental protection standards applied must have a sound 
scientific basis. Second, the same standards must be applied to all 
competitive domestic production." Significantly, he also suggests that "a 
GATT dispute settlement body similar to that established under the 
Subsidies Code should settle disputes regarding [such matters]".
66
These include such crude, untenable assumptions as that general, selling, and administrative 
expenses are not less than 8 per cent, and a profit of at least 8 percent is made. Commissioner Rohr's
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It will also be important to acknowledge that wherever any alleged 
subsidisation is in the form of generally inadequate environmental 
standards and the responsible jurisdiction lacks either the expertise or the 
resources to effect higher environmental standards, the correct course of 
action would be to provide any necessary assistance, not to implement 
economic penalties. Similarly, if the concern arising from generally poor 
environmental standards was extra-jurisdictional environmental damage, 
the onus would be on any jurisdiction, or group of jurisdictions, 
implementing any TREPI to prove that such measures were the most 
effective means available of inducing the necessary improvements to the 
offending environmental policy. Such a demonstration would need to be 
transparent and at least subject to the concurrence, if not the oversight, of 
a multilateral body.
CONCLUSIONS
There are two main types of environmental subsidy: externalising 
of the environmental costs of producing or trading of a good or service; 
and, compensation for internalising such costs. The first type may occur 
because the relevant authority is either unable or unwilling to do 
otherwise. If it is the case that the authority is unable, then border 
measures are unlikely to be appropriate instruments. Rather, positive 
assistance should be made available to help bring about an improvement 
in the environmental management. If the authority is unwilling to change 
then unilateral border measures are unlikely to be effective for the 
reasons that were discussed in chapter 4 concerning sanctions, and a 
multilateral dispute settlement route needs to be developed.
argument is contained in ITC (1991), pp. 6.8-6.9.
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The second type of subsidy, the so-called "green" subsidy, where a 
firm or trader is compensated for internalising environmental costs which it 
had previously externalised, is permissible under three circumstances: 
first, if it does not entail a cost to the Treasury within the meaning of GATT 
SCM Article 1.1; second, if it is generally available throughout the 
jurisdiction of the granting authority; and third, when a subsidy meets the 
conditions of the GATT SCM environmental exemption. Green subsidies 
that do not come under any of these three “non-actionability” exemptions 
would be actionable in terms of the benefit to the recipient. Although 
GATT SCM Article 14 provides guidelines for the calculation of the benefit 
to the recipient of subsidies, they are new and untested. With green 
subsidies also being a new type of subsidy, unilateral determinations 
should be foreclosed and a mandatory multilateral dispute settlement 
mechanism provided for.
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CHAPTER TEN 
Summary and Conclusions
The central question of this thesis has been when would the use of 
international trade restrictions in support of environmental measures 
TREPI) would be justified. Three principal communities of interests were 
identified that must be reconciled in any possible solution to this question: 
the international trade community, the environmental community, and the 
development community. The main problem in finding such a 
reconciliation is that each approaches the problem with its own world 
view, priorities and suspicions. A key contribution of this thesis is in its 
proposal of a possible solution: a three-part legitimacy test.
We began our enquiry by examining the basis of environmental 
standards, and showed that they must be established and differentiated 
according to the relevant ecosystem, and the limits of ecosystems must 
be respected. Little reason was found for distinguishing the application of 
environmental standards according to wealth, as some LDCs have 
proposed. This does not mean that there could not be any differentiation 
in the treatment of LDCs and richer countries, or that TREPI should not be 
used.
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Whether the use of TREPI might be considered legitimate was the 
next issue considered. It was suggested that an examination of the 
interaction of the economic, ecological, and political dimensions of the 
international system is a good place to begin to understand the links 
between international trade and the environment. This examination also 
suggested a first test of the legitimate use of TREPI: whether a jurisdiction 
is materially affected or not. Before the use of TREPI can be considered 
legitimate, however, it was argued that two additional tests must also be 
met.
The second test asked whether or not the proposed action would 
be effective. In exploring this aspect of the issue it was found that TREPI 
could be effective in a numbef of circumstances. They are effective, for 
example, when the international trade system is integral to an 
environmental problem. Similarly, they may be effective as multilateral 
sanctions, though not as unilateral sanctions. They may also be effective 
in response to certain commercial effects of environmental measures or 
regimes. However, in the case of commercial effects, it was found that it 
was not possible to distinguish objectively the role of environmental 
factors from other possible causes. Accordingly, it was argued that the 
use of TREPI in such circumstances should be avoided. Finally, it was 
found that the use of TREPI for sustainable development would also be 
effective. Importantly, it was emphasised that such use might entail either 
the application or the removal of TREPI.
The third test of the legitimacy of the use of TREPI is to determine 
whether it would be the least-cost effective option. It was shown that the 
use of integral TREPI for consumption-related environmental concerns, 
but not for production-related problems, would be legitimate. Likewise,
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the use of TREPI as multilateral sanctions could also be legitimate.
Finally, it was concluded that the application of domestic taxes and, to a 
lesser extent subsidies would be legitimate means of furthering 
sustainable development. It was further argued that reference to three 
principles would increase the probability that a measure will be the least 
cost and least disruptive alternative available: that the use of the 
proposed TREPI be developed and applied in a transparent manner; that 
it is proportional to its intended purpose; and that it is non-discriminatory 
in both its application and effect.
To show how this three-part legitimacy test might work in practice, 
three cases were considered. The first case looked at the GATT dispute 
regarding a Thai import prohibition on foreign cigarettes in support of 
efforts to improve public health. An example of integral TREPI, this case 
failed on several counts. The second case was the ongoing dispute 
between Europe and Canada, the US and Russia regarding furs caught 
with leg-hold traps. This was an example of the application of an import 
restriction, by Europe, as a sanction on the behaviour of another country. 
While some change in behaviour did occur, as predicted the use of TREPI 
as sanctions was very slow and inefficient. Finally we considered the 
possibility of using import restrictions to offset competitive disadvantages 
which are felt to arise when environmental regulations are different in one 
country than another. In this case, the effect at the industry level of 
environmental and animal welfare regulations on UK agriculture was 
found to be insignificant: no anti-competitive effect was found in the 
research results considered. Even though it was recognised that certain 
businesses would suffer competitive disadvantages, the use of trade 
restrictions was seen to be disproportionate, and a number of alternate 
courses of action suggested. It was acknowledged, however, that these
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results could be superseded as the burden of regulations increases, and a 
facility for the use of financial border measures may need to be 
developed.
In all cases the legitimacy test proved to be a robust, effective and 
efficient means of evaluating whether the use of TREPI should be 
permitted or not.
It is generally agreed that the fundamental purpose of the GATT 
system is the furtherance of international trade liberalisation. Therefore, 
before considering the compatibility of the GATT system with the 
legitimate use of TREPI, this thesis next reviewed the interactions 
between trade liberalisation and the environment. Three aspects of this 
complex issue were emphasised: the content of trade; the distinction 
between systemic and intervention effects; and the effects of economic 
growth on the environment. It was found that free and open international 
trade relations were normally supportive of environmentally sustainable 
activities, but that the use of trade restrictions for environmental policy 
objectives may be advisable in certain circumstances.
In light of these findings, the thesis then considered the main 
aspects of the GATT system that might affect the use of TREPI. It was 
first noted that there is a symmetry between the core principles of the 
GATT and the third test of the legitimate use of TREPI. It was argued, 
therefore, that if the use of TREPI is found to be legitimate according to 
the three tests described earlier but its use is inconsistent with the GATT, 
then the GATT should be amended as necessary. Wherever appropriate, 
the scope for modification or clarification of the GATT was suggested by 
reference to the provisions of the NAFTA, and a number of proposals for
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further improvement were made. In particular, a number of significant 
problems with the SPS agreement were disclosed.
The thesis concluded with an examination of the contentious 
matter of “environmental subsidisation”, and the use of countervailing 
border measures. It was found that there are two main types of 
environmental subsidy: externalising of the environmental costs of an 
activity, or environmental dumping; and compensation for internalising 
such costs, or the receipt of “green” subsidies. Regarding environmental 
dumping, no case was found for the unilateral use of TREPI. The receipt 
of “green” subsidies, by comparison, was found to be permissible under 
the new WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures in 
certain circumstances, as equally is the unilateral use of countervailing 
duty (CVD) actions. The need for closer restriction, or even prohibition, of 
unilateral CVDs was suggested. The mandatory use of an appropriate 
multilateral dispute settlement system was proposed.
In summary, there have been two main purposes of this thesis. 
First, we sought to determine whether there could be a legitimate role for 
trade-related environmental policy instruments (TREPI). While we found 
that there were often too many relevant variables to articulate generally 
applicable conclusions, the use of the three-part legitimacy test elucidated 
a legitimate role for TREPI in certain cases and under certain 
circumstances.
The second purpose of this thesis was to determine whether, to the 
extent that TREPI have a legitimate role, the current international trade 
regime requires amendment to accommodate such use, and if so in what
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ways. Here we identified a number of areas which would benefit from 
modification or clarification.
214
TABLES
The notes for the tables are given as endnotes, following the tables.
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TABLE 61
COUNTRY
% POP.
GROWTH
1980-90
% POP. 
URBAN 
1990
% POP. WITH 
SANITATION, 19882
% POP. WITH 
SAFE WATER, 19883
URBAN RURAL URBAN RURAL
LOW INCOME 2.0
(2.6)4
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
CHINA 1.4 33.4 100 95 87 66
INDIA 2.1 27.0 38 4 79 73
PAKISTAN 3.1 32.0 40 8 99 35
SRI LANKA 1.4 21.4 74 44 87 40
KENYA 3.8 23.6 89 19 85 15
SUDAN 2.7 22.0 40 5 90 20
ZAMBIA 3.7 49.9 77 34 76 43
MID INCOME 2.0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
PHILIPPINES 2.4 42.6 98 85 100 75
CHILE 1.7 85.9 100 6 100 21
BRAZIL 2.2 74.9 89 41 100 86
S. KOREA 1.1 72.0 99 100 91 49
MEXICO 2.0 72.6 100 12 79 49
MALAYSIA 2.6 43.0 100 75 92 68
THAILAND 1.8 22.6 84 41 67 76
OECD 0.6 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
US 0.9 75.0 N/A N/A N/A N/A
JAPAN 0.6 77.0 N/A N/A N/A N/A
GERMANY 0.1 87.4 100 100 100 100
AUSTRALIA 1.5 85.5 N/A N/A N/A N/A
UK 0.2 89.1 100 100 100 100
FRANCE 0.5 74.3 100 100 100 100
CANADA 1.0 77.1 N/A N/A N/A N/A
WORLD 1.7 45.2 N/A N/A N/A N/A
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TABLE 75
COUNTRY FERTILIZER
KILOS/HECT
1987-89
PESTICIDE
KILOS/HECT
1982-84
CHINA 255 1.66
INDIA 62 0.31
PAKISTAN 85 0.09
SRI LANKA 107 0.37
KENYA 47 0.54
SUDAN 4 N/A
ZAMBIA 17 N/A
PHILIPPINES 64 0.55
CHILE 73 0.40
BRAZIL 46 0.59
S. KOREA 411 5.77
MEXICO 73 1.12
MALAYSIA 150 1.99s
THAILAND 33 1.01
US 95 1.97
JAPAN 425 6.90
GERMANY 405 1.89
AUSTRALIA 26 1.33
UK 359 5.07
FRANCE 312 5.16
CANADA 47 1.19
WORLD 97 N/A
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TABLE 87
CO UN TR Y
C 0 2  PER
CAPITA
1989
TONNES8
CFC
1989
'000
TONNES
AIR POLLUTION  
1983-869
W A TER  POLL. 
1983-8610
S 0 2 PARTICULANT O XYG EN
11
FECAL12
CHINA 2.16 12 103.3 368.7 8.6 788
INDIA 0.77 4 46.4 320.8 7.16 1580
PAKISTAN 0.51 6 N/A 496 6.6 431
BANGLADESH 0.11 0 N/A N/A 6.6 700
EG YPT 1.54 3 129 N/A N/A N/A
GHANA 0.26 1 N/A 108 N/A N/A
SUDAN 0.33 N/A N/A N/A 8.2 N/A
PHILIPPINES 0.66 1 34.0 205 7.9 N/A
CHILE 2.45 0 65.5 N/A 12.65 354
BRAZIL 1.39 6 46.0 98 7.17 6784
S. KOREA 5.20 5 N/A N/A 10.5 8
M EXICO 3.70 5 N/A N/A 4.77 55849
MALAYSIA 2.82 2 24.0 139.5 5.4 N/A
THAILAND 1.43 3 15.0 205 7.0 2235
US 19.68 130 33.0 62.7 10.33 821
JAPAN 8.46 95 26.75 50 10.13 12101
GERM ANY 10.48 27 56 39 N/A N/A
AUSTRALIA 15.46 8 16.33 76.67 8.8 103
UK 9.89 25 42.75 75 10.3 N/A
FRANCE 6.38 24 N/A N/A N/A N/A
CANADA 17.33 11 22.5 76.86 N/A N/A
OECD 12.46 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
W ORLD 4.21 580 N/A N/A N/A N/A
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TABLE 913
COUNTRY
ENERGY USE 
1989
ENERGY USE BY SECTOR 
1989
PER CENT14
GIGA-
JOULES
PER
CAPITA15
MEGAJOULES 
PER US$ 
GDP16
AGRI IND'TRY TRANSP OTHER
AGRI IND
CHINA 23 8 66 5 64 5 25
INDIA 9 2 33 3 53 25 18
PAKISTAN 8 2 34 3 46 26 24
SRI LANKA 3 0 8 0 13 61 27
KENYA 3 1 15 1 24 50 25
SUDAN 2 N/A N/A 11 36 46 8
ZAMBIA 6 2 16 2 65 19 13
PHILIPPINES 9 3 9 8 32 23 37
CHILE 35 N/A N/A 0 42 39 18
BRAZIL 23 6 10 5 39 37 19
S. KOREA 65 3 12 3 43 20 34
MEXICO 51 5 23 3 42 34 21
MALAYSIA 41 N/A N/A 0 44 40 17
THAILAND 18 7 7 9 24 54 14
US 295 6 12 1 30 35 34
JAPAN 118 3 5 2 46 24 28
GERMANY 156 4 6 1 35 26 37
AUSTRALIA 211 5 10 2 37 39 22
UK 147 4 7 1 29 31 40
FRANCE 115 5 7 2 31 29 38
CANADA 321 9 15 2 37 26 35
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NOTES FOR THE TABLES
1 Sources: World Bank (1992), Table 26; World Resources Institute (1992), Tables 16.4,
2 Sudan and Germany, 1986 data; UK and France, 1985 data.
3 Sudan and Germany, 1986 data; UK and France, 1985 data.
4 Low income other than China and India.
5
Source: World Resources Institute (1992), Tables 18.1,18.2, and 18.3.
6
One year data only.
7
Sources: World Resources Institute (1992), Tables 24.1 and 24.2; World Bank (1992),
A.4 and A.5; and OECD (1991), p. 27.
8
Estimates are of the carbon dioxide emitted, 3.664 times the elemental carbon it
9
Statistics are of aggregate concentrations divided by the number of observations.
mean concentration in micrograms per cubic meter.
10
Statistics are of aggregate concentrations divided by the number of observations.
11
Annual mean concentration in milligrams per litre. Germany, France, and Canada are
averages of the last three years.
12
Annual mean concentration, number per 100-millilitre sample.
13
Source: World Resources Institute (1992), Tables 21.2 and 21.3.
14
Totals may not add to 100 per cent due to Independent rounding. Data for Pakistan and
are 1986; data for China, India, Sri Lanka, Chile, and Malaysia are 1988.
15
1 gigajoule = 1,000,000,000 joules = 947,800 BTUs.
16
1 megajoule = 1,000,000 joules = 947.8 BTUs.
17.2.
Tables
contains.
Annual
1991
Zambia
220
BIBLIOGRAPHY
ACOST (1992) “Cleaner Technology”, Report of the Advisory Council on 
Science and Technology, HMSO, London
Alanen, Leena (1996), “The Impact of Environmental Cost Internalisation on 
Sectoral Competitiveness: A New Conceptual Framework”, UNCTAD 
Discussion Paper No. 119, Sept. 1996.
Anderson, Kym and Richard Blackhurst, (eds.), (1992), The Greening of World 
Trade Issues. Harvester-Wheatsheaf, London, 1992.
Arden-Clarke, Charles (1991) The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 
Environmental Protection and Sustainable Development: A VWVF 
Discussion Paper. World Wildlife Fund, Geneva, June 1991.
Boulding, Kenneth (1966) "The Economics of the Coming Spaceship Earth", in
H. Jarrett, ed., Environmental Quality in a Growing Economy Johns 
Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1966.
Brett E. A. (1985) The World Economy Since the War: The Politics of Uneven 
Development. MacMillan, London.
Brittan, Sir Leon (1999), “Brittan: green issues must be at the heart of the 
WTO”, Agri- Info, 15 March 1999.
Brown, Lester R. and Edward C. Wolf (1987), “Charting a Sustainable Course” 
in Lester R. Brown etal, State of the World, 1987, Worldwatch Institute, 
Washington, DC.
221
Brundtland, Gro Harlem (1997) Our Common Future: The Report of the World 
Commission on Environment and Development, Final Edited Manuscript, 
mimeo.
Burke, Tom (1998) “Environmental Regulation, Finance and TNCs” in Trade, 
Investment and Environment, a Conference held at The Royal Institute 
of International Affairs, 29-30 October, 1998.
Canada-U.S. Trade Commission (1989) In the Matter of Canada's Landing
Requirement for Pacific Coast Salmon and Herring: Final Report of the 
Panel Established Under Chapter 18 of the Canada- U.S. Free- 
Trade Agreement, Ottawa 1989.
Canada-U.S. Trade Commission (1990) Lobsters from Canada: Final Report of 
the Panel Established Under Chapter 18 of the Canada-U.S. Free-Trade 
Agreement, Ottawa 1990.
Chandler, William U. (1987), “Designing Sustainable Economies” in Lester R. 
Brown etal, State of the World, 1987, Worldwatch Institute, Washington, 
DC.
Charnovitz, S. (1991), “Exploring the Environmental Exceptions in GATT Article 
XX” in Journal of World Trade, October 1991, 37-55.
Charnovitz, S. (1992), “Environmental and Labour Standards” in The World 
Economy , May 1992, 335-356.
Christensen, Eric (1990) "Pesticide Regulation and International Trade" in 
Environment, November 1990, 2-3, 44-45.
222
De Castro, Juan, (1994) “Internalisation of External Environmental Costs and 
Sustainable Development, UNCTAD Discussion Paper No. 81, March 
1994.
De Kock (1980) "Government Financial Incentives for the Protection of the 
Environment", in M. Boothe, (ed.), Trends in Environmental Policy and 
Law, 1980.
Dean, Judith M. (1991) "Trade and the Environment: A Survey of the Literature" 
Background Paper, World Development Report, 1992 SAIS Johns 
Hopkins University, Washington DC, April 1991.
Demaret, et a l , eds. (1997), Trade and Environment: The Search for Balance, 
Cameron May, London.
Dicken, Peter (1992) Global Shift: The Internationalisation of Economic 
Activity, 2nd edition, Paul Chapman Publishing, London.
Dohlman, Ebba (1990) "The Trade Effects of Environmental Regulation", in The 
OECD Observer 162 Feb-Mar 1990, 28-32.
Dommen, Edward (1993), ed. Fair Principles for Sustainable Development 
Published for the United Nations by Edward Elgar Ltd., Aldershot, UK.
Dryzek, John S. and Susan Hunter (1987), "Environmental Mediation for
International Problems", in International Studies Quarterly (1987) 31, 87- 
102.
European Commission (1999), EC Strategy Paper on Trade and Environment 
in the New WTO Round, 23 February 1999, Brussels.
Esty, Daniel C. (1994) Greening the GATT: Trade, Environment, and the 
Future, Institute for International Economics, Washington, DC.
223
Financial Times, various editions.
Finlayson, Jock (1990) The End of the South? Developing Countries and
International Trade Regimes in the 1990s, paper presented to a seminar 
of the Centre for Trade Policy and Law, Ottawa, April 4, 1990, mimeo.
Flanders, Karen (1990) Integrating Environment and Trade Policy: Third World 
Considerations, A Discussion Paper, Environment and Development 
Resource Centre, Brussels.
Fowler, Cary and Pat Mooney (1990) The Threatened Gene: Food, Politics, 
and the Loss of Genetic Diversity. Lutterworth Press, Cambridge.
Gabel, H. Landis (1992) The Environmental Effects of Trade in the Transport 
Sector, A Report for the OECD Joint Session of Trade and Environment 
Experts, mimeo.
GATT (1971) "Industrial Pollution Control and International Trade" GATT 
Studies in International Trade, No. 1. General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade, Geneva, April 1971.
GATT (1983) "United States-Prohibition of Imports of Tuna and Tuna Products 
from Canada", Report of the Panel adopted on 22 February 1982 
(L/5198) in Basic Instruments and Selected Documents, 29th Suppl. 
1981-82. Geneva 1983.
GATT (1988a) GATT Activities, 1988, 63-65 and 73-74. t
GATT (1988b) "United States-Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported
Substances", Report of the Panel adopted on 17 June 1987 (L/6175) in
224
Basic Instrument and Selected Documents 34th Suppl. 1986-87.
Geneva 1988.
GATT (1989) "Canada-Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring 
and Salmon", Report of the Panel adopted on 22 March 1988 (L/6268) 
in Basic Instruments and Selected Documents 35th Suppl. 1987-88. 
Geneva 1989.
GATT (1990) Trade Policy Review: United States. General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade, Geneva, March 1990.
GATT (1991a) "Environment initiative sparks debate on GATT role", and "GATT 
and the environment: a chronology", in GATT Focus 78 Jan-Feb 1991, 
pp. 3,5.
GATT (1991b) "Thailand-Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on 
Cigarettes", Report of the Panel adopted 7 Nov. 1990 (DS10/R) in Basic 
Instruments and Selected Documents 37th Suppl. 1990-91. Geneva 
1991.
GATT (1991c) Trade Policy Review: The European Communities. General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Geneva, March 1991.
GATT (1991d) "Trade-Environment Debate Narrows Down Differences", in 
GATT Focus 82 July 1991, pp. 1 -3
GATT (1991e) Trade and Environment: Factual Note by the Secretariat,
L/6896, 18 September 1991.
GATT Focus, (86), Nov/Dec 1991.
225
GATT (1992), Trade and the Environment, advance copy with Press Release 
GATT/1529, 3 February 1992.
Georgescu-Roegen, Nicholas (1971) The Entropy Law and the Economic 
Process, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1971.
Government of Canada (1992) North American Free Trade Agreement: 
Canadian Environmental Review, October 1992, mimeo.
Grimmett, Jeanne J. (1991) "Environmental Regulation and the GATT', CRS 
Report for Congress. Congressional Research Service, The Library of 
Congress, Washington D.C., March 27,1991.
Grubb, Michael (1992) The Greenhouse Effect: Negotiating Targets, 2nd edition, 
Royal Institute of International Affairs, London.
Haas, Peter M. (1990) "Obtaining International Environmental Protection
through Epistemic Consensus", in Millennium: Journal of International 
Studies, Vol. 19 , No. 3, 347-363.
Hudson, Stewart (1992) “Trade, Environment and the Pursuit of Sustainable 
Development”, in Patrick Low, ed., International Trade and the 
Environment, World Bank Discussion Paper 159, Washington, DC.
Hufbauer, Gary Clyde, Jeffrey J. Schott and Kimberly Ann Elliot (1990)
Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy, Second 
edition,Institute for International Economics, Washington, D.C., 1990.
ICI pic (1996), Submission to the Parliamentary Inquiry into World Trade and
the Environment, 20 February, 1996, mimeo.
226
IFAP (1996), Trade and Environment - a farmers* perspective, IFAP, Paris, 
November, 1996.
USD (1999), Report on the WTO’s High-Level Symposium on Trade and 
Environment, 15-16 March, 1999, mimeo.
I.O.C.U. (1991) Buying the Earth: A Consumer Commentary on the Overlap
Between World Trade and Environmental Problems, A discussion paper 
from the International Organisation of Consumers Unions, Geneva, April
1991.
Inside US Trade, various editions.
Jackson, John (1989) The World Trading System: Law and Policy of 
International Economic Relations. MIT, London.
Jacobs, Michael (1991) The Green Economy: Environment, Sustainable 
Development and the Politics of the Future. Pluto Press, London.
Koo, A.Y.C. (1974) "Environmental Repercussions and Trade Theory", in 
Review of Economics and Statistics 56, 235-44.
Kramer, Ludwig (1989) "The Open Society, Its Lawyers and Its 
Environment", in Journal of Environmental Law, 1(1) 1-9.
Low, Patrick (1992) “International Trade and the Environment: An Overview”, 
in Patrick Low, ed., International Trade and the Environment, World 
Bank Discussion Paper 159, Washington, DC.
Low, Patrick and Raed Safadi (1992) “Trade Policy and Pollution”, in Patrick 
Low, ed., International Trade and the Environment, World Bank 
Discussion Paper 159, Washington, DC.
227
Low, Patrick and Alexander Yeats (1992) “Do ‘Dirty’ Industries Migrate?”, in
Patrick Low, ed., International Trade and the Environment, World Bank 
Discussion Paper 159, Washington, DC.
Lucas, Robert E.B., et al (1992) “Economic Development, Environmental
Regulation and the International Migration of Toxic Industrial Pollution: 
1960-1988, in Patrick Low, ed., International Trade and the 
Environment, World Bank Discussion Paper 159, Washington, DC.
Lutz Ernst (1990) "Agricultural Trade Liberalisation, Price Changes and
Environmental Effects" Divisional Working Paper No. 1990-16 Policy 
and Research Division, Environment Department, World Bank, 
Washington D.C., December 1990.
Mabey (1998) “Environmental Regulation and International Investment
Agreements” in Trade, Investment and Environment, a Conference held 
at The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 29-30 October, 1998.
MAFF (1996) Agriculture in the United Kingdom, H.M Stationery Office,
London.
MAFF (1997) Farm Accounts in England, 1994/95 and 1995/96, MAFF,
London.
MAFF (1998) Farm Accounts in England, 1995/96 and 1996/97, MAFF,
London.
MacNeill, Jim (1990a) "The Greening of International Relations", in International 
Journal Vol. XLV, No. 1, 1989-90, 1-35.
228
MacNeill, Jim (1990b) Sustainable Development and the Need for Global
Bargains: A Report to the Quadrangular Forum. Institute for Research 
on Public Policy, Ottawa, June 1990.
MacNeill, Jim, Pieter Winsemius and Taizo Yakushiji, (1991), Beyond 
Interdependence: The Meshing of the World's Economy and the 
Earth's Ecology, A Trilateral Commission Book , Oxford University 
Press, New York, 1991.
Magee, S. and W. F. Ford, (1972), “Environmental Pollution, the Terms of 
Trade, and the Balance of Payments.” Kyklos, vol. 25, pp. 101-18.
Meade, J. E. (1955), The Theory of International Economic Policy, Volume II: 
Trade and Welfare, Issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, Oxford University Press, London, 1955.
Meadows, Donella H., et al, The Limits to Growth: A Report for the Club of 
Rome's Project on the Predicament of Mankind, Universe Books, New 
York.
Nelder-Corvari, Carol (1989) "The Greening of the GATT: Trade and the
Environment" Working Paper Canadian Department of Finance, Ottawa, 
December, 1989.
OECD (1978), Macroeconomic Evaluation of Environmental Programmes, 
OECD, Paris.
OECD (1989) Strengthening Environmental Co-operation with Developing 
Countries. OECD, Paris.
OECD (1991) Environmental Indicators: A Preliminary Set, OECD, Paris.
229
OECD Environment Committee (1991a) "Environment and trade: Major 
Environmental Issues", ENV/EC(91)4, 19 March 1991.
OECD Environment Committee (1991b) "Trade Issues in the Transfer of Clean 
Technologies", ENV/EC/TE(91)3, 20 Sept. 1991.
OECD Joint Session of Trade and Environment Experts (1991a) "Joint
Report On Trade And Environment", COM/ENV/EC/TD(91)14/REV2,
14 May 1991.
OECD Joint Session of Trade and Environment Experts (1991b) "Summary 
Record of the Meeting Held on the 22nd May 1991", 
COM/ENV/EC/TD/M(91)3, 19 June 1991.
OECD Joint Session of Trade and Environment Experts (1991c) "Trade and 
Environment and the Developing Countries", COM/ENV/EC/TD(91)60, 
20 Sept. 1991.
OECD Joint Session of Trade and Environment Experts (1991d) "OECD
Guiding Principles Concerning the International Economic Aspects of 
Environmental Policies: Background and Discussion", 
COM/ENV/EC/TD(91 )68, 31 Oct. 1991.
OECD Joint Session of Trade and Environment Experts (1991e) "The 
Applicability of the GATT to Trade and Environment Concerns", 
COM/ENV/EC/TD(91) 66, 04 Nov. 1991.
OECD Joint Session of Trade and Development Experts (1991f) "Trade and 
Environment: Major Issues for Discussion", COM/ENV/EC/TD(91)78,
15 Nov. 1991.
230
OECD Trade Committee (1989a) "Controlling the Trade Effects of 
Environmental Measures", TC(89)3, 7 Feb 1989.
OECD Trade Committee (1989b) "Trade and the Environment", TC(89)9, 28 
June 1989.
OECD Trade Committee (1990a) "Trade and the Environment: Issues Arising 
With Respect to the Trading System", TD/TC(90)14, 3 July 1990.
OECD Trade Committee (1990b) "Trade and Environment", TD/TC(90)20, 11 
Oct. 1990.
OECD Trade Committee (1991a) "Trade and the Environment: A Discussion 
of Some Current Views", TD/TC/WP(91)5, 4 Feb. 1991.
OECD Trade Committee (1991b) "Checklist of Environmental Instruments for 
Assessing Their Potential Trade Impact", TD/TC/WP(91)6/REV1, 26 
March 1991.
Park, Chris C. ed. (1986) Environmental Policies: An International Review. 
Croom Helm, London.
Pasurka, C. (1985) “Environmental Control Costs and US Effective Rates of 
Protection” in Public Finance Quarterly, vol. 13, pp. 161-82.
Pearce, David W. (1991) Trade and the Environment, 24 Sept. 1991, mimeo.
Pearce, David W. and R. Kerry Turner (1990) Economics of Natural Resources 
and the Environment. Harvester Wheatsheaf, London.
Pestel, Eduard (1989) Beyond the Limits to Growth: A Report to the Club of 
Rome. Universe Books, New York.
231
Pethig, R. (1976) "Pollution, Welfare, and Environmental Policy in the Theory of 
Competitive Advantage", in Journal of Environmental Economics and 
Management 2; 160-9.
Radetzki, Marian (1992) “Economic Growth and Environment”, in Patrick Low, 
ed., International Trade and the Environment, World Bank Discussion 
Paper 159, Washington, DC.
Raghavan, Chakravarthi (1990) Recolonization: GATT, the Uruguay Round and 
the Third World. Zed Books, London.
Redclift, Michael (1984) Development and the Environmental Crisis: Red or 
Green Alternatives? Methuen, London.
Richardson, JD, and JH Mutti, (1976), “Industrial Development through
Environmental Controls: The International Competitive Aspect.” In I. 
Walter (ed.) Studies in Internatioal Environmental Economics. Wiley,
New York.
Robinson, HD. (1988), “Industrial Pollution Abatement: the Impact on the
Balance of Trade”, Canadian Journal of Economics, vol. 21 (February), 
pp. 187-99.
Royal Institute of International Affairs (1997), Trade and Environment: Conflict 
or Compatibility?, Proceedings of the conference held on 11 April 1997, 
London.
Ritchie, Mark (1990) The Environmental Implications of the GATT Negotiations. 
Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy, Minneapolis.
232
RSPCA, et al (1997) Animal Protection and the Multilateral Trade Regime of 
the World Trade Organisation. Mimeo.
Rubin, Seymour J. and Thomas R. Graham eds. (1982) Environment and 
Trade: The Relation of International Trade and Environment Policy. 
Frances Pinter, London.
Ruggiero, R. (1998), “GATT at 50 -  New Challenges” in Trade, Investment and 
Environment, a Conference held at The Royal Institute of International 
Affairs, 29-30 October, 1998.
Sand, Peter H. (1990) "Innovations in International Environmental Governance" 
in Environment, 32(9), Nov. 1990.
Sandbach, Francis (1982) Principles of Pollution Control. Longman, New York.
Shahin, Magda (1998) “The Future of the Trade/Investment/Environment
Debate” in Trade, Investment and Environment, a Conference held at 
The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 29-30 October, 1998.
Shrybman Steven (1988) Selling Canada's Environment Short: The
Environmental Case Against The Trade Deal, Canadian Environmental 
Law Association, Toronto.
Shrybman, Steven (1990a) "International Trade and the Environment: An 
Environmental Assessment of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade" in The Ecologist 20, Jan-Feb 1990.
Shrybman, Steven (1990b) "International Trade and the Environment: An 
Environmental Assessment of the Present GATT Negotiations" in 
Alternatives Vol. 17 No. 2, 1990, 20-29.
233
Shrybman, Steven (1999) “The World Trade Organisation: The New World
Constitution Laid Bare", The Ecologist, vol. 29, no. 4, July 1999, pp. 270- 
75.
Shutt, Harry (1985) The Myth of Free Trade: Patterns of Protectionism Since 
1945. The Economist Publications, London.
Siebert, H., et al (1980) Trade and the Environment; a Theoretical Enquiry. 
Elsevier, Amsterdam.
Siebert, H. (1985), “Spatial Aspects of Environmental Economics” in A. Kneese 
and J. Sweeney (eds.) Handbook of Natural Resource and Energy 
Economics, North Holland, New York.
Simon, Julian L. and Herman Kahn (1984), The Resourceful Earth: A 
Response To ‘Global 2000’” , Basil Blackwell, Oxford.
Sorsa, Piritta (1992) “GATT and Environment: Basic Issues and Some
Developing Country Concerns”, in Patrick Low, ed., International Trade 
and the Environment, World Bank Discussion Paper 159,
Washington, DC.
Stone, Frank and Blair Seaborn (1989) Protection of the Environment and the 
Trade Rules. Institute for Research on Public Policy, Ottawa, draft 
mimeo, June 1989
St-Pierre, Antoine (1990) "Business and the Environment: The International 
Dimension" in Global Business Issues, September 1990, The 
Conference Board of Canada, Ottawa.
234
Tobey, J. (1990), “The Effects of Domestic Environmental Policies on
Patterns of World Trade: and Empirical Test”, Kyklos, vol. 43, no.2, 
pp. 191-209.
The Economist, various editions
Thomas, Caroline (1992) The Environment fin International Relations, The 
Royal Institute of International Affairs, London.
Ugelow, Judith L. (1982) "A Survey of Recent Studies on Costs of Pollution 
Control and the Effects on Trade" in Environment and Trade: The 
Relation of International Trade and Environmental Policy, Seymour J. 
Rubin and Thomas R. Graham eds., Frances Pinter, London.
Uimonen, Peter, and John Whalley (1997) Environmental Issues in the New 
World Trading System, Macmillan Press Ltd., Basingstoke, Hampshire.
UNICE (1999), UNICE Position Paper on WTO High-Level Symposium on 
Trade and Environment to be Held orn 15-16 March 1999, mimeo.
United Nations (1990) Global Outlook 2000: An Economic, Social, and
Environmental Perspective. United Nations Publications, New York.
UNCTAD (1990) Sustainable Development and UNCTAD Activities,
TD/B/1267, Geneva, 7 August 1990.
UNCTAD (1991a) Environment and North-Scouth Relations: Background Paper, 
prepared for the UNCTAD Seminar ini Oslo, 14 February 1991, mimeo.
UNCTAD (1991b) Environment and Internatiional Trade: A Report of the
Secretary-General of UNCTAD submiitted to the Secretary-General of
235
the Conference pursuant to General Assembly resolution 45/210, 
A/CONF. 151/PC/48, 10 July 1991.
UNCTAD (1992a) “The Commodity Sector and the Environment”, UNCTAD 
Bulletin, No. 16, Sept/Oct 1992, pp. 10-12.
UNCTAD (1992b), The Links Between Market Conditions, Intensity of Resource 
Use and Environmental Impact: The Case of Mining, NCTAD/COM/11,
1992.
UNCTAD (1993), UNCTAD’s Contribution, within its mandate, to Sustainable 
Development: Trade and Environment - Trends in the Field of Trade 
and Environment in the Framework of International Co-operation, 
(TD/B/40(1)/6, 1993.
UNCTAD (1994a), “Trade and Environment Issues and Small Island States”, 
UNCTAD Bulletin, No.24, Jan/Feb 1994, p. 10.
UNCTAD (1994b), “UNCTAD’s Activities on Environment and Sustainable
Development”, UNCTAD Bulletin, No.27/28, July/Aug/Sept/Oct 1994, pp. 
9-14.
UNCTAD (1995a), Trade and Environment: The International Debate, 
UNCTAD/SELA, 1995.
UNCTAD (1995b), Trade and Environment: A South Asian View, 
UNCTAD/UNDP and MacMillan, 1995.
U.S. International Trade Commission (1991) International Agreements to 
Protect the Environment and Wildlife: Report to the Committee on
Finance, United States Senate, on Investigation No. 332-287 Under
